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This working paper aims at improving the comparability of forecast quality measures of in-
solvency prediction studies.  
For this purpose, in a first step commonly used accuracy measures for categorial, ordinal and 
cardinal insolvency predictions are presented. It will be argued, that ordinal measures are the 
most suitable measures for sample spanning comparisons concerning predictive power of rat-
ing models, as they are not affected by sample default rates. A method for transforming cardi-
nal into ordinal accuracy measures is presented, by which comparisons of insolvency predic-
tion results of older and present-day studies are enabled.  
In the second part of the working paper an overview of influencing variables – aside from the 
quality of the insolvency prediction methods – is given, which affect the accuracy measures 
presented in the first part of the paper and thus impair sample spanning comparison of empiri-
cally obtained forecast quality results. In this context, methods for evaluating information 
losses that are attributable to the discretization of continuous rating scales or preselection of 
portfolios are developed.  
Measure results of various insolvency prognosis studies are envisaged and compared with 
three benchmarks. First benchmark is the accuracy that can be achieved solely by taking into 
account legal status and industry classification of corporations. The second benchmark is the 
univariate prognosis accuracy of single financial ratios. As third benchmark, ALTMAN’s Z-
score model is examined, a multivariate insolvency prediction model, that is currently used as 
reference rating model in many empirical studies. It turns out, however, that the Z-score’s 
forecast quality is so discontenting, that its application is not recommendable. Instead it is 
suggested to use those rating models that are cited in this discussion paper, which are fully 
documented and which therefore can be rebuilt and directly applied to any desired data sam-
ple. If applied to the respective target groups, their performance matches with the perform-
ance of commercial rating systems, like bureau and business scores for rather small compa-
nies, middle market rating models for SMB, or agency ratings for large public companies. 
JEL classification: G33, C14 
Key words: financial ratio analysis, corporate bankruptcy prediction, forecast validation,  
accuracy ratio, information entropy, sample selection, rating granularity 
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1  Why to measure accuracy of insolvency predictions? 
The ability to provide powerful predictions of corporate insolvencies is of great importance 
both from an individual and a collective point of view. From an individual perspective, along-
side owners, employees, customers, suppliers, certified accountants, and other counterparties 
of companies, in particular banks are interested in accurate insolvency predictions, as in case 
of bankruptcies of their costumers they have to reckon considerable losses.
2,3 From a bank’s 
perspective powerful insolvency predictions are a fundamental prerequisite for enabling risk 
commensurate credit charges and/or the embodiment of non-financial credit terms (limits, re-
quired collaterals), for improving the cost-efficiency of its credit processes (by identifying 
those critical cases that require a more elaborate supervision and support by credit experts), 
for improving the liquidity of the bank’s assets and for increasing the controllability of credit 
risks via securitization of individual credits or entire portfolios, and for determining and con-
trolling economic and regulatory capital demands.
4  
From a national economy perspective, the employment of powerful insolvency prediction 
models by creditors is an important precondition for guaranteeing the soundness and stability 
of the banking system and for the implementation of risk-sensitive loan terms which provide a 
motivation for incentive compatible, risk sensitive behavior of debtors.
5,6  
By measuring the accuracy of insolvency predictions an important attribute of methods for 
insolvency predictions shall be evaluated, that also possesses a major role in the current dis-
cussion accompanying the introduction of the Basel II regulatory rules.
7 
Other output-oriented attributes of rating models, which shall not be considered in this work-
ing paper, are the temporal stability of prognoses
8, the additional information utility of rating 
models when used in combination with other rating models
9, the ability of the models to theo-
                                                 
2  See  also  DIMITRAS, ZANAKIS, ZOPOUNIDIS (1996, p. 488) and BALCAEN, OOGHE (2004, p. 4) for an analysis 
of stakeholders in insolvency predictions for business companies. 
3   In an empirical study FRANKS, SERVIGNY, DAVYDENKO (2004) identify various influencing variables on loss 
given default rates of bank loans and find, that on average German banks can redeem only 60% of the loans 
outstanding, for instance by realizing collateral (ibid., p. 4). See on this BASEL COMMITTEE (2000b, p. 27f.), 
BASEL COMMITTEE (2000c, p.7f), S&P (2003a, p. 64, p. 66) or MOODY’S (2004a, p. 13). For further empirical 
results and over 60 references upon loss given default see also GUPTON and STEIN (2002).  
4  On the theoretical and empirical relevance of insolvency predictions for banks see for instance ENGLISH, 
NELSON (1998, p. 11f.), TREACY, CAREY (2000/1998, p. 897), BASEL COMMITTEE (2000b, p. 33) and ESCOTT, 
GLORMANN, KOCAGIL (2001, p. 3). 
5   see for instance DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2001, p. 15), BASEL COMMITTEE (2004, §4), OENB (2004b, p. 33) 
6   Excessive credit risks were the major cause for the about 100 bank insolvencies in Germany since the 
1960ies, see FISCHER  (2004, p. 13) and the literature thee cited. See also http://www.the-exit.net/plaza/-
bankinsolvenzen.de (22.6.2005) for a survey on all bank insolvencies in Germany since 1945 (without speci-
fication of insolvency causes, though). 
7   see DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2003), ÖSTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK (2004), BASEL COMMITTEE (2005) 
8   FONS (2002), CANTOR, MANN (2003), LÖFFLER (2003, 2004 a,b), ALTMAN, RIJKEN (2004), HAMILTON (2004)  
9   See SHANNON, (2001/1948, p. 13f.), KEENAN, SOBEHART (1999, p.11f), SOBEHART, KEENAN, STEIN (2000, p. 
15) and STEIN ET AL (2003, p. 38). See as well LEHMANN (2003) and GRUNERT, NORDEN, WEBER (2005) who 
showed, that the inclusion of “soft factor” ratings into the rating systems of a German banks (statistically) 
significantly increased the accuracy of the bank intern rating systems.    4
retically (causally, structurally) explicate insolvencies
10 or the models’ eligibility to derive 
recommendations aimed at influencing individual insolvency likelihood.
11,12  
It might be desirable to directly state the accuracy of rating models in monetary terms, e.g. as 
expected profitability in basis points per volume of credit.
13 Such a measure would not only 
facilitate textual interpretability, it could also be directly related to the utility of the decision 
maker. However, the data requirements that have to be fulfilled are prohibitive for real world 
applications.
14 
Accuracy measures for insolvency predictions that are subsequently presented do not make 
such high demands, but they can only be heuristically justified, which means, that only “as a 
general rule” – but unfortunately not always – a prediction model that is superior to another 
prediction model according to a certain measure will indeed increase the utility of a specific 
decision maker. On the other hand, these measures are intersubjective, as they are not based 
on individual cost-benefit-relations and they are not only suited for evaluating insolvency pre-
dictions. They can be used for evaluating predictions and diagnoses of other areas of applica-
tion as well, given the events that have to be predicted (or diagnosed) are of a categorial 
(yes/no) type.
15 The multipurpose character of the measures and methods that are presented in 
the following becomes also apparent by the fact, that central terms and concepts for insol-
vency prediction measures have actually been adopted from other scientific domains that are 
also concerned with predicting (or diagnosing) uncertain events, such as signaling theory
16, 
meteorology 
17 or medical sciences
18.  
                                                 
10  A major advantage of structural and inductive models, for instance scoring models or expert systems, com-
pared with statistical models lies herein. For a survey of the various methods that are used for predicting in-
solvency see e.g. GÜNTHER, GRÜNING (2000, p. 41) or ÖSTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK (2004, p. 32). 
11  Herein lies a major shortcoming of statistical methods. Although they identify what combinations of variables 
empirically correlate well with defaults, they do not reveal causalities – and thus are potentially manipulable 
by economically nonsensical conducts. And this is one of the reasons, besides trying to protect their intellec-
tual property (see e.g. BLÖCHLINGER,  LEIPPOLD (2005/2004, p. 20)) and besides trying to prevent “self-
fulfilling prophecies” (see e.g. KÜTING, WEBER (2004/1993, p. 350f.), why banks are reluctant to make their 
own insolvency prediction models transparent to their customers. 
  Opposed to that, inductive methods – such as scoring models or expert systems – do in principle allow theo-
retical explanations and derivations of recommendations aimed at influencing individual insolvency probabil-
ity. Limits to their usefulness have to be recognized as they are not based on complete and consistent models. 
The possibility to theoretically explicate insolvencies is one of the major strengths of structural models. They 
are based on complete and consistent – and ideally also realistic – models. In principle they even allow the 
derivation of quantitative predictions of insolvency probabilities without having to use historical insolvency 
data as input. Whether they are suited for deriving concrete recommendations depends on the “deepness” of 
their modelings. If a structural model, as e.g. the KMV Public Firm Model (see KEALHOFER (2003)) is essen-
tially exclusively based on the level and variability of a firms’ stock price, without revealing the influencing 
variables of these parameters, the model cannot be used for managing individual probabilities of default. 
12  For further, predominantly technical and organizational requirements for the implementation of rating models 
see KRAHNEN, WEBER (2001), CROUHY, GALAI, MARK (2001) or BASEL COMMITTEE (2000c, 2004). 
13  This approach is actually pursued in a simulation study by JORDÁO, STEIN (2003). 
14  See e.g. the model of JORDÁO, STEIN (2003). It does not only require the knowledge of all rating relevant data 
of all potential customers. Also the competing banks’ rating models and price policies would have to be 
known in detail in order to establish own monetary consequences of the application of a certain rating model.  
15  For explanatory variables with more than two possible parameter values more efficient quality measures are 
generally available. Nevertheless, an application of the quality measures that are presented subsequently is 
technically feasible, if the explanatory variable is transformed to a two-state variable (for instance by assign-
ing a value of “1”.for above average [or above median] parameter values and “0” for below average [median] 
values, see for instance GUPTON, STEIN (2005, p. 26ff.))  
16  see Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) for describing error performance in data transmissions, see 
chapter 2.3.1, or (information) entropy, see chapter 2.4.  
17  see evaluation of accuracy of predictions of precipitation via BRIER-scores in BRIER (1950), WINKLER (1994)     5
In the following chapter three groups of accuracy measures for judging insolvency predictions 
are presented: within the groups a number of measures will be presented that are partly axio-
matically founded, that allow good direct interpretability, or that exhibit analogies to other 
measures, which are widely used in their original fields of applications. 
In the proximate chapter feasibilities of sample or portfolio spanning comparisons of predic-
tive accuracy measures will be discussed and empirical results of insolvency prediction stud-
ies will be given.  
For obtaining not only a relative ordering of the various models but for obtaining also a first 
notion of “absolute” quality of the models, three different benchmarks are consulted, that are 
meant to form a lower level of just about acceptable predictive quality. Surprisingly, some 
models that are still in commercial use today can only marginally surmount these hurdles, 
while other commercial models even fail at them. 
                                                                                                                                                          
18  see evaluation of predictions of therapy results in LEE (1999) or see SWETS (1973, p. 997ff.), SWETS (1988, p. 
1287ff.), or SWETS, DAWES, MONAHAN (2000, p. 4ff.) for various other medical applications.    6
2  Accuracy measures for judging performance of 
insolvency predictions 
2.1  Operationalizing predictive accuracy 
When referring to the accuracy of a method or model for insolvency prediction, in the follow-
ing the degree of accordance between the insolvency predictions and the realized insolvency 
events is meant.  
Mathematically comprehensible specifications of accuracy have to account for, whether in-
solvency predictions that have to be evaluated are of categorial, ordinal or cardinal nature. 
•  Categorial insolvency predictions are insolvency predictions that only use the two ex-
treme predictions: “corporate A will default [within a specified time horizon (usually one 
year)
19]” vs. “corporate B will not default”.  
•  In case of ordinal insolvency predictions evaluations of the relative probabilities of de-
faults of the corporations under consideration are given: “corporate B will default with a 
greater likelihood then corporate A, but with a smaller likelihood than corporate C”. Al-
though ordinal insolvency predictions could in principle be arbitrarily differentiated, in 
practice ordinal rating systems preponderate that transform their results on a discrete 7- or 
17-ary scale
20 and use a notation that was adopted from S&P.
21,22 
                                                 
19  If not stated otherwise, in the following accuracy of insolvency predictions will refer to a prediction horizon 
of one year. More important than the decision upon which horizon to choose, is the decision to choose always 
the same horizon when comparing different prediction systems. As the majority of insolvency studies report 
their results only for horizons of one year, this horizon had to be used as base of comparison. 
  Besides data availability, textual reasons for choosing just this horizon may be offered, too. 
• A model that correctly classifies many defaults that occur within one year automatically captures with that a 
lot of the defaults that occur in an n-year horizon.  
• At least some parts of the defaults of corporations can be referred to attributes of corporations, which cannot 
be remedied on short notice, e.g. low endowments with equity capital or dependencies from few key cus-
tomers. Corporations that have above/below average probabilities of default within the next year for these 
reasons tend to have above/below average probabilities of default in subsequent years as well. 
• Many rating models utilize annually updated financial statements as their major - and often exclusive - 
source of input. As comparison horizon, therefore, a period of at least one year – or a whole-numbered mul-
tiple of it - should be chosen. 
• According to the Basel II requirements banks are obliged to estimate one-year-probabilities of default for 
their loans (BASEL COMMITTEE (2004, § 285, 331)), they have to update their ratings once a year (ibid. § 
425) and they have to check and validate their rating systems (at least) once a year (ibid., §§ 443, 449). 
On empirical findings concerning bank practice see also BASEL COMMITTEE (2001, p. 12): “The ‘time hori-
zon’ over which a rating is expected to be valid (i.e. the forecast horizon of the rating) is mostly described 
by banks to be one year, [..]. The decision for a one-year horizon is mostly based on annual financial report-
ing cycles (bank and borrower), frequency of internal review of the rating, and in some cases the uncertain-
ties of projected performance beyond one year.” 
20  17-ary scale: 1=”AAA”, 2=”AA+”, 3=”AA”, 4 =”AA-“,5=“A+“, 6=“A“, 7=“A-“, 8=“BBB+“, 9=“BBB“, 
10=“BBB-“, 11=“BB+“, 12=“BB”, 13=”BB-“, 14=”B+”, 15=”B”, 16 = “B-“, 17 = “CCC/C”, 
   7-ary scale: “AAA“, “AA“, “A“, “BBB”, “BB”, “B”, “C”.  
21  In BASEL COMMITTEE (2000c, p. 23f) rating symbols of 30 rating systems of various international rating 
agencies are investigated. 22 agencies use letter combinations for expressing their ratings (ca. 75%), 6 agen-
cies communicate their ratings in the form of [numerical] marks, and only 2 agencies render their ratings in 
terms of probabilities of default. From the 22 letter-ratings 14 exactly match the detailed (“modified”) 17-ary 
S&P notation and 2 ratings match the abbreviated (“whole-letter”) 7-ary S&P notation. 
Banks, however, predominantly use numerical rating class denotations (ca. 85%) instead of letter combina-
tions (ca. 15%), see ENGLISH, NELSON (1998, p. 4).    7
•  Cardinal insolvency predictions assign probabilities of default to each corporate. 
 
The respective methods are downwardly compatible: by any weakly monotone transformation 
(cardinal) probabilities of defaults can be converted to (ordinal) score values, which can also 
be merged to a finite number of rating classes. By further merging neighboring rating classes, 
so long until only two classes remain, ordinal insolvency predictions can be transformed to 
cardinal insolvency predictions.  
The reverse can be achieved by using empirical default data. Ordinal predictions can be con-
verted to cardinal predictions by utilizing historical, i.e. realized rating class specific default 
rates as default probabilities.
23,24,25 This approach is fraught with a few problems and was 
therefore extended in various ways. In order to improve individual probability forecasts some 
of the extended approaches for instance incorporate current macro economic indicators or 
other individual characteristics besides individual ratings.
26 
 
The type in that insolvency predictions are available (categorial vs. ordinal vs. cardinal) is 
conditional on the estimation method that is used.
27 Categorial predictions are for instance de-
livered by discriminant analyses or neural networks, though their output is sometimes inter-
preted in an ordinal fashion.
28 Ordinal insolvency predictions result for instance from apply-
ing subjectively parameterized scoring or ratio models while logit or probit regression mod-
els can provide cardinal predictions. 
 
The type in that insolvency predictions have to be available is dependent on their intended us-
age: if a decision maker has only two options for action available - e.g. accepting or refusing a 
potential debtor, positively or negatively deciding about the eligibility of some financial as-
sets as collateral
29 - categorial predictions do suffice. For a more differentiated, qualitative 
                                                                                                                                                          
22  “To provide finer rating gradations to help investors distinguish more carefully among issuers, […] Standard 
and Poor's in 1974, and Moody's in 1982 started attaching plus and minus symbols to their ratings.” CANTOR, 
PACKER (1994, p. 2) 
23  See S&P (2004a, p.11): “Many practitioners utilize statistics from this default study and CreditPro® to esti-
mate probability of default and probability of rating transition. It is important to note that Standard & Poor’s 
ratings do not imply a specific probability of default; however, Standard & Poor’s historical default rates are 
frequently used to estimate these characteristics.” 
24  See e.g. the annually and quarterly updated default studies of STANDARD AND POOR’S and MOODY’S, cf. S&P 
(2004a) and MOODY’S (2004). 
25  see also STEIN (2005, p. 1218): „While it is not always the case that powerful models are calibrated accurately 
to probabilities of default, it is empirically feasible to calibrate a model to real-world default probabilities by 
performing a default study on the historical behavior of each model score. Thus assuming a bank has histori-
cal data and can perform ROC analysis, it can also calibrate a model to a similar level of accuracy using the 
same machinery.” 
26  Cf. KEENAN (1999): growth rate of inflation adjusted industrial production index, absolute (!) number of new 
speculative grade issuers, share of speculative grade issuers in all issuers, yield of 10year bills, etc.; BANGIA, 
DIEBOLD, SCHUERMANN (2002): state of the economy (expansionary vs. recessionary); S&P (2004b, p.3): un-
employment rate, slope of yield curve, aggregated business profits, distribution of outlooks of speculative 
grade issuers; HAMILTON (2004): individual rating outlook and rating history. 
27 For a survey of diverse insolvency prediction methods see for instance GÜNTHER,  GRÜNING (2000), 
ÖSTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK (2004). 
28  See for instance ALTMAN, SAUNDERS (1998, p. 1737) for assigning discriminant analysis cut-off scores to 
(ordinal) rating classes. 
29  see DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1999)    8
evaluation, e.g. as foundation for stipulating different types or amounts of collateral, (at least) 
ordinal insolvency predictions are required. As a basis for quantitative decisions, e.g. for pric-
ing loans or for determining economic or regulatory capital requirements
30, cardinal predic-
tions are indispensable.  
                                                 
30  According to the new regulatory requirements that were developed by the Basel Committee for banking su-
pervision, which come into force as from January 2006, bank internal rating systems have to be based on car-
dinal predictions of insolvency (probabilities of defaults), see BASEL COMMITTEE (2004, in particular §461f.).    9
2.2  Performance measures for categorial insolvency predictions 
Categorial insolvency predictions divide corporations into two groups, “presumably insol-
vent” vs. “presumably not insolvent”. Unfortunately, none of the prediction methods in use 
today come even close to yielding such selective and correct prognoses (for empirical find-
ings see chapter 3.5).
31 Apart from “lucky strikes” in small samples, categorial predictions 
therefore inevitably will exhibit errors.  
Two kinds of errors have to be taken into account: errors of type I – actual defaults that were 
forecasted as non-defaults (also called α-error or false negative proportion) and errors of type 
II – actual non-defaults that were forecasted as defaults (also called β-error or false positive 
proportion). 
It is common use to state errors of type I only in relation to the number of real defaulters and 
errors of type II in relation to the number of real non-defaulters (see Figure 1).
 32 The term 
100% -error type I is also referred to as hit rate and error of type II also as false alarm rate, 










































Figure 1: contingency table 
The unweighted average
34 of both error rates or a weighted average of them could be chosen 
as comprehensive predictive quality measures, whereas the shares of defaulters and non-
                                                 
31  Insolvencies are also triggered by random events, events whose realizations can not be predicted with cer-
tainty even by state-of-the-art methods and which can only be described by probability density functions (see 
e.g. RiskMetrics (1997, p. 43ff.), HULL (2003)). Such events might embrace the occurrence/ non-occurrence 
of extraordinary damages or the concrete realization of currency exchange rates, commodity prices, and inter-
est or inflation rates.  
 That  on principle – at least based on financial statements data – no deterministic (and always true) insolvency 
predictions can be made, is suggested by OHLSON’s (1980, p. 129) “error”-analysis: „[T]he reports of the mis-
classified bankrupt firms seems to lack any ‘warning signals’ of impeding bankruptcy. All but two of the thir-
teen companies reported a profit. The two losses were minor […] and these two companies had strong finan-
cial positions […]. Other ratios analyzed showed the same ‘healthy patterns’. It is not surprising that these 
firms were misclassified, especially if one considers the profile of the nonbankrupt firms […]. None of the 
misclassified bankrupt firms had a ‘going-concern’ qualification or disclaimer of opinion. […] Some of the 
firms even paid dividends in the year prior to bankruptcy.” 
32  See for instance SWETS (1973, p. 995), ENGELMANN, HAYDEN, TASCHE (2003, p. 13), and OENB (2004c, p. 
21). 
33  See ibid. An alternative, probably more intuitive definition (which is not in accordance with the above men-
tioned definition) of hit rate would be: share of really insolvent corporations in all corporations that were 
forecasted as insolvent. An alternative and probably more intuitive definition of false alarm rate would be: 
share of all “false alarms” (non-insolvent corporations that were predicted as insolvent) in all alarms (predic-
tions of insolvency). For further ratios that can be derived from contingency tables see SWETS, DAWES, MO-
NAHAN (2000, p. 25f.)  
34  See BALCAEN, OOGHE (2004, p.12) and the literature there cited.    10
defaulters in the examined sample or in the basic population (“Bayesian error”
35), or the error 
specific costs
36 that are involved (errors of type I: credit losses, errors of type II: foregone 
credit margins and “cross-selling-revenues”
37) could be used as weighting coefficients. 
A delving analysis on advantages and disadvantages of the various summary measures for 
categorial predictions shall be passed on as modern methods of insolvency prediction do no 
longer rest upon categorial but upon ordinal or cardinal predictions, for which specific meas-
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Figure 2:   classification errors subject to chosen cut-off-score and rating score 
probability density functions for defaulters and non-defaulters
39 
In addition, all rating models that generate categorial predictions are faced with a conflict of 
objectives concerning type I and II error rates. Down to the model’s parameterization they can 
achieve type I error rates of 0% and simultaneously type II error rates of 100% and vice versa 
– arbitrary many different trade-offs between these two extremes are usually feasible, too (for 
an illustration see Figure 2).
40 In the light of infinitely many alternative error-I-II-
combinations it would be licentious to choose just one concrete error combination as basis for 
                                                 
35  The Bayesian error rate states, which proportion of all prognoses are incorrect without differentiating between 
errors of types I and II. In the context of insolvency predictions this measure is poorly suited when applied to 
the basis populations, which are (at least for time horizons of one year) usually characterized by defaulter 
proportions of less than one or two percents. An obviously worthless rating system that always made the pre-
diction “non-default” would cause a Bayesian error rate of just one or two percent, while an exceptionally 
good rating system (cf. chapter 3.5) that would cover virtually all defaulters by having to exclude only 5% of 
all non-defaulters would be characterized by a Bayesian error rate of 5%, cf. OENB (2004a, p. 117ff.) 
36  see for instance NANDA, PENDHARKAR (2001, p. 155ff.) 
37  see for instance OENB (2004b, p.33, 80) 
38  see also SWETS, PICKETS (1982, p. 24ff.) for a survey and discussion of “often used, but inadequate, [cate-
gorial] indices of accuracy” 
39  source: following DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2003, p. 73), ENGELMANN, HAYDEN, TASCHE (2003, p. 5) and 
OENB (2004a, p. 107) 
40  see for instance OHLSON (1980, p. 124ff.)    11
measuring the quality of the rating method.
41 Avoiding this sort of arbitrariness is the funda-
mental idea of measures for ordinal forecasts: they do evaluate a rating model’s performance 
based on the universe of error-I-II-combinations that can be achieved by the respective model 
by applying all feasible cut-off values –not on a single, arbitrarily chosen combination. 
                                                 
41  A conceivable justification for restraining the performance measurement of a rating system to one concrete 
error-I-II-combination would be the utilization of optimal (cost minimal) type I and II error combinations. 
However, which combination could be considered optimal, would not be intersubjectively identical (a bank 
would probably have much smaller error type II costs than a vendor of preliminary products), is dependent on 
conditions that may be subjectively influenceable (e.g. the concrete design of the loan’s terms (interest rates, 
collateral, guarantees, etc.)), and may depend on non influenceable but temporally instable conditions, such as 
the economy wide average default rate (see on the last item BALCAEN, OOGHE (2004, p. 15)).    12
2.3  Accuracy measures for ordinal insolvency predictions 
Although ordinal insolvency predictions are more general than categorial insolvency predic-
tions, mere comparing statements about relative risks of corporations do in general not suffice 
for supporting any meaningful activity. For virtually all applications quantifications of risks 
are required, e.g. for assessing whether a yield premium of 1.5% p.a. is a commensurate com-
pensation for granting a loan with a maturity of three years, whose ordinal rating implies, that 
“[T]he obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. 
[But] adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor’s ca-
pacity or willingness to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.”
 42,43,44 
Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of accuracy measures for ordinal predictions is worthwhile, 
for the following reasons: 
•  Ordinal predictions correspond to that, what major rating agencies claim to deliver. 
45,46 
•  The appraisal of ordinal measures for insolvency predictions is meanwhile a dominant 
method for evaluating the quality of rating models.
47 
•  There are some graphical representations of ordinal predictive quality measures avail-
able, which also facilitate the perception of quantitative measures that are derived 
from them. 
•  Discriminative power, which is gaged by ordinal prediction measures, is a key quality 
aspect of cardinal predictions as well – and is actually more important than any other 
measurable aspect of cardinal predictions, including calibration. Implementing correct 
                                                 
42  See definition of rating grade B for long-term credit ratings according to S&P (2003b, p.7). 
43  See on this also FRERICHS, WAHRENBURG (2003, p. 13): “Under what circumstances is such a measure [area 
under the ROC-curve] useful? The ranking of borrowers is sufficient for credit risk management if banks are 
not able to charge different credit risk premiums for different customers in the market. In this case, banks 
maximize their risk-adjusted returns by not granting credit to customers with negative expected returns which 
is equivalent to defining a minimum credit score. Yet, this line of thought does not lead us to the AUC as a 
measure of system quality, but to the concept of minimized expected error costs. The AUC measures the qual-
ity of the complete ranking and not only of one threshold. Only if the threshold is difficult to define in prac-
tice, the AUC may be a sensible measure.” 
44  Or, to cut a long story short: “There are no bad loans, only bad prices.”, see FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, KOCAGIL 
(2000, p. 5). 
45  CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 6): “MOODY’S primary objective is for its ratings to provide an accurate relative 
(i.e., ordinal) ranking of credit risk at each point in time, without reference to an explicit time horizon.” and 
CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 1, formatting added): “Moody’s does not target specific default rates for the indi-
vidual rating categories.”, but also: “Moody’s also tracks investment-grade default rates and the average rat-
ing of defaulting issuers prior to their defaults. These metrics measure Moody’s success at meeting a secon-
dary cardinal or absolute rating system objective, namely that ratings be useful to investors who employ sim-
ple rating ‘cutoffs’ in their investment eligibility guidelines.”, see ibid. 
46  BASEL COMMITTEE (2000c, p.2) “Most firms report that they rate risk on a relative – rather than absolute – 
scale, and most indicate that they rate ‘across the business cycle’, suggesting that ratings should in principle 
not be significantly affected by purely cyclical influences.” From 15 rating agencies, that provided informa-
tion on this, 13 stated their ratings would measure “relative risk”. Only two agencies claimed to measure “ab-
solute risk” (KMV Corporation and Upplysningscentralen AB), see ibid. (p. 23f). 
47  See for instance MCQUOWN (1993, p.5ff), KEENAN, SOBEHART (1999, p. 5ff), STEIN (2002, p.5ff.), FAHR-
MEIR, HENKING, HÜLS (2002, p. 22f), ENGELMANN, HAYDEN, TASCHE (2003, p.3ff), DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
(2003, p. 71ff.), OENB (2004a, p. 113ff.). Also the major rating agencies, cf. STANDARD AND POOR’S (2005, 
p.19ff.) and MOODY’S (2004c, p.3ff.), measure the quality of their rating systems by the methods and meas-
ures presented in this chapter.    13
(calibrated) probabilities of defaults is easier to achieve, then implementing discrimi-
native probabilities of defaults.
48,49 
•  Empirical comparisons of different rating models (based on the same samples) yielded 
largely identical orderings of the models with respect to their “accuracy”, irrespective 
of whether ordinal or cardinal measures were used.
50 These findings imply, that qual-
ity differences between rating models are less ascribable to their differential abilities 
in issuing calibrated insolvency prognoses, which is relevant only for cardinal meas-
ures, but rather to their differential abilities in issuing discriminative prognoses, which 
is important both for ordinal and cardinal measures. 
•  For those aspects of cardinal insolvency predictions (in particular for calibration), that 
cannot already be evaluated with instruments originally developed for evaluating ordi-
nal insolvency predictions, there are currently no powerful test procedures available! 
These shortcomings are essentially caused by the empirical finding, that defaults are 
correlated between corporations. 
51,52  
Although the major rating agencies do not aim at meeting any predetermined cardinal default 
objective with their ordinal ratings for any specified space of time,
53 they demonstrate 
(amongst others) the quality of their ratings, by their empirically proved ability to separate 
groups of corporations with clearly different, monotonically increasing default rates
54 (see 
Figure 3 for average rating class specific one-year-default rates according to the ratings of 
S&P and MOODY’S and Figure 4 for the respective multi-year default-rates).  
                                                 
48  BLOCHWITZ, LIEBIG and NYBERG (2000, p.3): “It is usually much easier to recalibrate a more powerful 
model than to add statistical power to a calibrated model. For this reason, tests of power are more important in 
evaluating credit models than tests of calibration. This does not imply that calibration is not important, only 
that it is easier to carry out.”, see also STEIN (2002, p. 9). 
49  For details relating to calibrating rating systems see SOBEHART ET AL (2000, p. 23f.) or STEIN (2002, p. 8ff.). 
50  See for instance KRÄMER, GÜTTLER (2003) for a comparison of predictive accuracy of S&P and Moody’s rat-
ings or SOBEHART, KEENAN, STEIN (2000, p. 14) for a similar comparison of six different rating models via 
ordinal and cardinal measures. 
51  see BASEL COMMITTEE (2005, p. 31f.): “These [“entropy” based] measures appear to be of limited use only 
for validation purposes as no generally applicable statistical tests for comparisons are available. [...] The 
Group [the Validation Group is a subgroup of the Research Task Force (RTF) of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision] has found that the Accuracy Ratio (AR) and the ROC measure appear to be more mean-
ingful than the other above-mentioned indices because of their statistical properties. For both summary statis-
tics, it is possible to calculate confidence intervals in a simple way. […] However, due to the lack of statistical 
test procedures applicable to the Brier score, the usefulness of this metric for validation purposes is limited.” 
and ibid, p. 34: “At present no really powerful tests of adequate calibration are currently available. Due to the 
correlation effects that have to be respected there even seems to be no way to develop such tests. Existing 
tests are rather conservative […] or will only detect the most obvious cases of miscalibration […]” 
52  When defaults are only moderately correlated, realized default rates can differ materially from their expected 
values – even in indefinitely diversified portfolios, see e.g. HUSCHENS, HÖSE (2003, p. 152f.). 
53  S&P (2005, p. 28, formatting added): “Many practitioners utilize statistics from this default study and Credit-
Pro® to estimate probability of default and probability of rating transition. It is important to note that Stan-
dard & Poor's ratings do not imply a specific probability of default; however, Standard & Poor's historical 
default rates are frequently used to estimate these characteristics.” 
54  see for instance MOODY’S (2005, p.7)    14
durchschnittliche Einjahresausfallraten, 



























































































































S&P (1981-2003) and MOODY’S (1983-2003) 
 
Figure 3:  average historical one-year-default-rates by modified rating classes for STANDARD & POOR’S 
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Figure 4:  average historical cumulated one- to ten-year-default-rates by modified rating classes for 
STANDARD & POOR’S (1981-2003) and MOODY’S (1983-2003) ratings
56  
Explanatory note: Financial market participants consider ratings of S&P and MOODY’S as 
close substitutes concerning meaning
57,58 and quality
59,60. Although both agencies listed 
                                                 
55  see S&P (2004, p.13), MOODY’S (2004, p. 26) 
56  See S&P (2004, p.13), MOODY’S (2004, p. 26). For lack of space for the rating classes AA, A, BBB, BB and 
B were only displayed the middle classes (according to MOODY’S notation: Aa2, A2, Baa2, Ba2 and B2) but 
not the rating classes with + and - respectively 1 and 3 modifiers.    15
nearly identical default rates for the companies and periods they covered (S&P: 1981-2003, 
MOODY’S: 1983-2003) of 1.76%
61 and 1.86%
62 p.a., rating class specific one-year-default 
rates are smaller for all rating classes displayed in Figure 3 for MOODY’S ratings compared 
with the respective S&P rating classes (with a minor exception for BB-/Ba3). Wherefrom may 
be concluded, that MOODY’S ratings are not fully equivalent with S&P ratings but are a bit 
sterner.
63 However, with exception of corporations with the worst rating grades (CCC/C 
respective Caa/C), who account for only a very minor share of all issuers, there are only small 
differences concerning both agencies realized rating class specific one- and multi-year default 
rates.  
As can be seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4, by the ratings they assigned ex-ante, both agencies 
were able to separate groups of companies who subsequently were characterized by clearly 
different realized default rates. This ability, however, is only a necessary but not a sufficient 
precondition for highly discriminative ratings.
64 Following two extreme examples are com-
patible with the figures presented above
65: 
•  Example I: the rating system arranges practically all corporations to one single, middle 
rating class, for instance BB (Ba2) (see Figure 3), and only very few corporations to 
other rating classes.  
•  Example II: the rating system arranges practically all corporations to the two “ex-
treme” rating classes, i.e. either AAA (Aaa) or CCC/C (Caa/C), and only a few to 
middle rating classes. 
                                                                                                                                                          
57  see CANTOR, PACKER (1994, p. 12): „As a practical matter, however, it appears that market participants have 
historically viewed the Moody's and Standard and Poor's scales as roughly equivalent [...].“ 
58  On a 17ary rating scale corporations that were rated both by S&P and MOODY’S receive exactly the same rat-
ing in about 40%-45% of all cases. In further 40%-45% of all cases ratings of both agencies differ by exactly 
one grade and in 10%-15% by exactly two grades. Differences of more then two grades appear only in 2,5%-
5% of all cases, see GÜTTLER (2004, p.13 and the studies there cited). On a 7-ary scale S&P’s and MOODY’S 
ratings coincide in 71% of all cases, in 28% they differ by one whole grade, in 1,1% by two whole grades and 
in 0,1% of all cases by more than two grades (own analysis basing on GÜTTLER (2004, appendix B)).  
59  see ELTON ET AL (2004, p. 2755f.) and STEINER, HEINKE (2000, p. 560f.) 
60  Based on examinations of identical samples of corporations, that were rated both by S&P and MOODY’S, 
KRÄMER, GÜTTLER (2003) and GÜTTLER (2004) find, that MOODY’S rating system is slightly superior with re-
spect to various forecast horizons and validation measures. 
61  S&P(2004, p. 16) 
62  Special note: The value given in MOODY’S (2004, p. 26), 1.24%, is wrong, as was confirmed on inquiry at 
MOODY’S investors service. In MOODY’S (2005, p.17) the average all corporations default rate for the (mar-
ginally different) period 1983-2004 is given with 1.79%.  
63  See on this GÜTTLER (2004, p.13) and the studies there cited: for corporations that were rated both by S&P 
and MOODY’S and where both agencies’ ratings conflicted, MOODY’S was assigning worse ratings in 60% of 
all cases. Nonuniform results were obtained by the studies, whether the negative bias in MOODY’S ratings (or 
the positive bias in S&P’s ratings) was attributable to negative biases mainly in the domains of investment or 
speculative grades. 
64  The default studies of S&P and MOODY’s are based on issuer ratings (also corporate credit ratings, implied 
senior-most rating, default ratings, natural ratings, estimated senior ratings), which are intended to measure 
the probabilities of default of corporations – however, without reference to an explicit time horizon, see on 
this S&P (2003b, p. 3ff., 61ff.), CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 6f.), MOODY’S (2004b, p. 8), and MOODY’s (2005, 
p. 39). Ratings of specific issues, so called issue ratings, do additionally take into account expected losses in 
case of default and therefore can be considered as measures for expected credit losses. Issue rating of senior, 
unsecured liabilities are usually agreeing with the corporate’s issuer rating. Depending on the order of prior-
ity in case of bankruptcy, collaterals and other influencing variables, issue ratings of other liabilities are de-
rived from issuer ratings by “notching up or down” by usually no more than one or two points, see ibid. 
65  see on this also CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 14)    16
In example I the rating system would be virtually worthless, because it hardly permits any dif-
ferentiation among the various companies with respect to default probabilities (strictly speak-
ing: with respect to default rates). In example II the value of information provided would be 
immense: the rating system would always give “extreme predictions” – i.e. predict either very 
low or very high chances of default - and the prognoses would be correct: as can be seen in 
Figure 3, hardly any AAA rated company would ever default within one year and only 0.5% 
would default with in ten years while about a quarter of all CCC/C rated companies would de-
fault within one year and about 80% within the next ten years. 
Therefore, for determining ordinal quality of a rating model, not only default rates of the vari-
ous rating classes have to be taken into account, but also the distribution of the rated compa-
nies among the various rating classes.    17
2.3.1 Graphical  determination of predictive accuracy 
The ability of a rating system to reliably discriminate between “good” and “bad” companies 
can for instance be visualized by ROC-
66 and CAP-curves
67 and can be quantified by various 
cross-convertible measures.
68  
ROC-curves were firstly used in experimental psychology in the early 1950ies.
69 Other label-
ing for ROC- or CAP-curves are intelligence profile, power curve, Lorenz curve, Gini curve, 
lift-curve, dubbed-curve or ordinal dominance graph.
70 
A rating system’s ROC-curve is given by the universe of all combinations of hit rates (100% - 
error type I) and false alarm rates (error type II) that the rating system can achieve by apply-
ing different cut-off values (in case of categorial forecasts) or thresholds (in cases of ordinal 
or cardinal forecasts) (see Figure 5, left hand side). If the cut-off score/ threshold is chosen 
tight enough, all corporations would be forecasted as insolvent which invokes hit rates of 
100% (which is desirable) but also false alarm rates of 100% (which is obviously undesir-
able); while when choosing a threshold too lax, hit rates and false alarm rates of 0% in each 
case would result. For thresholds in-between these extreme cases, there is a trade-off between 
bith types of errors. The quality of ordinal (and important aspects of the quality of cardinal) 
insolvency predictions just express itself in the nature of this trade-off. A perfect forecast sys-
tem would not have to exclude a single non-defaulter in order to “hit” each defaulter (vertical 
course of the ROC-curve from (0%; 0%) to (0%; 100%)), tightening the threshold would only 
increase the false alarm rate (horizontal course of the ROC-curve from (0%; 100%) to (100%; 
100%)). The ROC-curve of a rating system that assigns its ratings at random would lead along 
the main diagonal – each percentage point increase in hit rate would come at a cost of one 
percentage point increase in the false alarm rate. 
ROC-curves of realistic insolvency prediction systems exhibit a concave shape (see Figure 5, 
see also appendix I for various empirical examples of ROC-curves). Concave shapes imply, 
that realized default rates continuously recede with improving credit ratings, which is also 
called “semi-calibration”.
71  
CAP-curves (see Figure 5, right hand side) result from applying a slightly modified procedure 
compared with that of ROC-curves. The abscissa here does not represent false alarm rates 
(error of type I), but the share of companies – no matter whether they are defaulters or non-
defaulters – that have to be excluded in order to attain a specific hit rate.  
                                                 
66 “A curve […] is called a ‘ROC’ – sometimes short for Receiver Operating Characteristic, especially in the 
field of signal detection, and sometimes short for Relative Operating Characteristic, in generalized applica-
tions.”, see SWETS (1988, p. 1287, formatting added). 
67  CAP … cumulative accuracy profile 
68  For alternative graphical representations of ROC-curves and for corresponding quantitative measures see 
SWETS, PICKET (1982, p. 31ff.), who suggest to use “binormal” ROC-curves, i.e. ROC-curves, whose abscissa 
and ordinate values are transformed for quantile values between 1% and 99% according to the reverse func-
tion of the Gaussian distribution. According to SWETS, PICKET (1982, p. 31f.) empirical binormal ROC-curves 
can be approximated quite well by linear functions – which, however, could not be confirmed in own exami-
nations of empirical ROC-curves that are presented in Appendix I. If binormal ROC-curves could indeed be 
approximated by linear functions, it would be possible to inter- and extrapolate ROC-curves just on the basis 
of two combinations of errors of types I and II. It would also be possible to completely characterize ROC-
curve with only two parameters. 
69  see SWETS (1988, p. 1287) 
70  see BLOCHWITZ,  LIEBIG,  NYBERG (2000, p. 33): power curve, lift-curve, dubbed-curve, receiver-operator 
curve; FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, KOCAGIL (2000, p.25): Gini curve, Lorenz curve, ordinal dominance graph; 
SCHWAIGER (2002, p. 27): intelligence profile (Aufklärungsprofil) 
71  see KRÄMER (2003, p. 403)    18
Starting in (0%; 0%) the CAP-curve of a perfect rating system leads “steeply“ up – but not or-
thogonally – because at least PD% of all corporations have to be excluded in order to cover 
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Figure 5: ROC- and CAP-curve 
If - when applied to the same sample of companies - the ROC-/CAP-curve of a rating system 
A1 is positioned entirely top left of the ROC-/CAP-curve of a rating system A2, this means 
that rating system A1 gives strictly better prediction for every possible threshold than rating 
system A2 (cf. Figure 6, left hand side).  
ROC-curve A1
100%































































intersecting ROC-curves  
Figure 6: non-intersecting (left hand side) and intersecting ROC-curves (right hand side) 
If the relative advantageousness of a rating system was solely dependent on its precision
72, 
system A1 would be objectively superior to system A2– irrespective of individual error costs.
73 
                                                 
72  Besides the aspects mentioned in the introductory chapter another relevant criterion for the advantageousness 
of rating systems might be the costs they evoke themselves, in particular the costs for obtaining and process-   19
If, however, the curves of both rating systems intersected at some point, no such far-ranging 
statements could be made.  
In the example chosen (see Figure 6, right hand side) rating system B1 is better than B2 in dif-
ferentiating among “good corporations”, while system B2 is more discriminative among “bad 
corporations” (for identical, low false alert rates it always achieves better hit rates than B1).
74  
If the decision maker is not forced to opt exclusively for either the one ore the other rating 
system, he might probably be able to combine both systems to a new system B3 that is supe-
rior to both B1 and B2. The same holds for a situation like that depicted in Figure 6, left hand 
side: although A1 is strictly inferior to A2, it could be possible to generate a system A3 such 
that it is not only superior to A2 (which is trivial) but also to A1.  
In empirical studies, it was shown, that the predictive quality of ratio based bank rating sys-
tems could be improved by including “soft factor” ratings, although the predictive quality of 
the ratio based ratings alone was strictly better than that of the “soft factor” ratings alone.
75 
For practical purposes in addition to graphical representations, comprehensive quantitative 
measures of rating accuracy are essential. Minimum requirements for such measures are that 
the measure shall be defined for any ROC-curve and when the ROC-curve of one rating sys-
tem A1 is top left of the ROC-curve of another rating system A2, the measure associated with 
A1 should unequivocally indicate the superiority of A1 over A2.
76 In the following chapter two 
cross-related measures are presented, that fulfill this minimum requirement. 
 
It is possible to directly infer relative default rates (in relation to the average sample default 
rate) from the ROC- and CAP-curves’ slopes: the steeper the curves are at some sections, the 
higher is the default rate of the companies that are covered by those sections.
77 If the average 
sample default rate is known, also absolute default rates can be calculated:  
Given a total number of def defaulters and ndef non-defaulters, by additionally excluding the 
worst remaining ∆x*(def+ndef) companies, the total number of correctly classified defaulters 
rises by ∆CAP(x)*def and thus 
                                                                                                                                                          
ing the data required. Banks, for instance, often use highly automated rating systems (that tend to be cheap 
but less discriminative) for evaluating small loans and more labor-intense and thus expansive but more dis-
criminative systems for larger loans, see TREACY,  CAREY (2000/1998, p. 905) and BASEL  COMMITTEE 
(2000b, p.18f.) 
73  see for instance BLOCHWITZ, LIEBIG, NYBERG (2000, p.7f) 
74  According to KRÄMER (2003, p. 402, translation), when comparing real life rating systems, ROC- or CAP-
curves usually intersect. “Insofar the concept of default-dominance is not helpful in many applications […]. 
The concept of default dominance is primarily recommendable for sorting out substandard systems.” Default-
dominated prognoses can be derived from dominating prognoses, see KRÄMER (2003, p. 397f.) 
75  See on this LEHMANN (2003, p.21). See as well GRUNERT, NORDEN, WEBER (2005), who only state aggre-
gated measures for the different models (financial ratios rating, soft factor rating, combined rating) – but no 
CAP- or ROC-curves. In their study, the predictive ability of the soft factor rating actually was better than 
that of the financial ratios rating (see ibid, p. 519). For the LEHMANN (2003)-study see also the survey in 
chapter 3.5. The GRUNERT, NORDEN, WEBER (2005)-study was not incorporated into that survey due to its 
minor sample size (340 non-defaulters, 69 defaulters). 
76  The converse of the minimum requirement (“If A1 > A2 then is ROC1 top left of ROC2“) does not hold in gen-
eral. It can only be excluded, that when A1>A2, the ROC-curve belonging to A1 is down to the right of the 
ROC-curve belonging to A2. However, if A1 > A2 it still might be possible that both ROC-curves intersect. 
See on this CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 12): “Although the accuracy ratio is a good summary measure, not 
every increase in the accuracy ratio implies an unambiguous improvement in accuracy.” 
77  see e.g. FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p. 30f)    20
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          with ∂CAP(x)/∂x = tangent of the slope of the CAP-curve at point x and  
          PD…average sample default rate 
          PD(x)   local default rate at point x 
Proceeding analogously for ROC-curves yields: 
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          with ∂ROC(x)/∂x = tangent of the slope of the ROC-curve at point x  
If a ROC- or CAP-curve is made up of linear fragments, as in Figure 5, this means that there 
is no differentiation of risk possible within the respective fragments, i.e. a user of the rating 
system is faced with the same error type I and II trade-off – and thus with the same probabil-
ity of default - for all corporations that are covered by that section. One possible cause could 
be, that the ROC- or CAP-curve under consideration is not based on a continuous score but on 
discrete rating classes.
78  
                                                 
78  See on this e.g. S&P (2005, p.19ff.). In the CAP-curves there given, for all linear fragments the respective rat-
ing grades are denoted.    21
2.3.2 Quantitative  determination of predictive accuracy 
The measure most often used in context with ROC-curves is the area under the ROC curve 
AUCROC:  
F 7)  () ∫ =
1
0
ROC dx x CAP AUC   
79,80  
As can be shown, the area under the ROC-curves equals the probability that for two randomly 
chosen individuals, one chosen from all defaulters and one chosen from all non-defaulters, the 
non-defaulter was (correctly) assigned a better score than the defaulter.
81  
A perfect rating system would receive an AUCROC score of 100%, while a purely random 
(“naïve”) rating system would achieve a score of only 50% (on average). 
82,83 
In the field of insolvency prediction it is common to use a linearly transformed version of 
AUCROC, with co-domains of [-100%; +100%] instead of [0%; 100%]. This transformation 
also ensures that “naïve prognoses” receive scores of 0% rather than 50%. The variable thus 
created is called “accuracy ratio” ARROC
84, with:  
F 8)  () 5 , 0 AUC 2 AR ROC ROC − ⋅ = . 
It can be shown, that the Accuracy Ratio is just a special case of other, costumary ordinal 
measures.
85 
In contrast to ROC-curve based measures it is not conventional to quote AUC-measures for 
CAP-curves (probably because they do not enable similar probabilistic interpretations like in 
case of ROCAUC– at least not without further adjustments). It is conventional, however, to use 
the CAP-Accuracy Ratio, which is determined by a slightly modified calculation:  
F 9)  B A ARCAP ′ ′ =      (cf. Figure 5, right hand side), whereby A´ stands for the area be-
tween the CAP-curve and the main diagonal and B´ for the area be-
tween the main diagonal and the CAP-curve a perfect rating could 
achieve given the sample default rate.  
It can be shown, that AUCROC and AUCCAP are identical.
86 Thus: 
                                                 
79    see e.g. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2003, p.71ff.) 
80  For further, well interpretable measure for ROC-curves see LEE (1999). 
81  see LEE (1999, p. 455) 
82  The lowest possible value, 0%, would be achieved by a rating system whose forecasts were always wrong. By 
simply inverting the systems forecasts, the system could easily be converted to a perfect rating system. 
83  An alternative notation for AUCROC is CoC … Coefficient of Concordance, cf. LEHMANN (2003, p. 12).  
84  Further notations for Accuracy Ratio are: GINI index or GINI coefficient (see BLOCHWITZ, LIEBIG, NYBERG 
(2000)), LORENZ-MÜNZER concentration measure (see DVFA (2004, p. 599), or power statistic (see FAHR-
MEIR, HENKING, HÜLS (2000, p. 27)) 
85  See on this HAMERLE, RAUHMEIER, RÖSCH (2003, p. 21f.), who show, that the accuracy ratio is a special case 
of the more general measure SOMER’S D, which is also defined if the variable to be explained can adopt more 
than only two distinct parameter values (default vs. non-default). See also SOMER (1962, p. 804f.) for a depic-
tion of SOMER’S D relations to other ordinal measures such as KENDALL’S tau or GOODMAN and KRUSKAL’S 
gamma. 
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For a rating system with g separate classes the integral term ∫CAP(x)dx can be decomposed 
into g triangular and g rectangular shaped subareas with known side lengths, see Figure 7. In 
this figure formulas for single triangular and rectangular surface areas are given.  






























































Figure 7: vertical decomposition of the area under the CAP curve AUCCAP 






































dx x CAP       (cf. Figure 7) 
     with  g…number of separate rating classes,  
aj  … share of corporations of rating class j in all corporations, 
PDj … realized default rate in rating class j,    23
PD … average default rate 












≡   whereby cumPDi stands for the share of the defaulters of rating 
classes 1..i in all defaulters and  
F 16)  1 cumPDg =                   it follows that 
F 17)  1 i i





    By insertion to formula F 14 follows  
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1 dx x CAP  An insertion to formula F 13 yields: 
F 21)   
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The measures presented above are equally well suited for evaluating rating systems with con-
tinuous and discrete scores (or predicted default probabilities).
87 Transforming continuous rat-
ing scales to discrete rating scales comes along with information losses that, however, are 
relatively minor under reasonable conditions (see chapter 2.3.4), so that the quality of insol-
vency predictions can be measured solely on the basis of rating class specific relative fre-
quencies of occurrence and realized default rates.  
Special note: In publications issued by MOODY’S Investors service a slightly different accu-
racy-ratio definition is applied (which leads to lower values compared with the values ob-
tained by applying the conventional accuracy ratio definition, in particular for multiyear-
prediction periods).
88 
F 23)  ARCAP,MOODY’S = A’/ 0,5     (cf. Figure 5, right hand side)  
The accuracy ratio as defined by MOODY’S does change only, when the underlying CAP-
curve changes. It was designed to be invariant to proportional changes simultaneously affect-
ing all rating classes (which would not alter the CAP-curve’s shape) in order to provide a 
measure that is unaffected by changes in average default rates. 
89 
                                                 
87  In case of continuous scores, g would be equal to the number of corporations with ai = 1/g for all i, i.e. each 
corporate would form its own rating class. 
88  see for instance MOODY’S (2005, p.11) 
89  “The benefit of not including the perfect foresight comparison is that the accuracy ratio will be invariant to 
changes in the aggregate default rate and will only change due to changes in the rating distribution and the    24
However, demanding default-rate-invariance - as defined above - is not very suggestive, as 
may be shown by following example: an obviously imperfect rating system, that separates 
90% of all corporations into one class with a PD1 of 0% and the remaining 10% of all corpo-
rations in another class with a PD2 of 20% (average PD: 2%) would receive an identi-
cal ARMOODY’S-score as a perfect rating system which is yielded, if all rating class default rates 
are quintupled, which also separated 90% of all corporations in one class with a PD1 of 0% 
and the remaining 10% of the corporations with a PD2 of 100% (average PD: 10 %).
90 It can 
be shown, both empirically and theoretically, that – counter the original intention – MOODY’S-
measure is actually stronger (negatively) related with average default rates than the “conven-
tionally defined” accuracy ratio.
91  
                                                                                                                                                          
distribution of default rates. In practical terms, though, there is little empirical difference between the accu-
racy ratio of SOBEHART ET AL [(2000)] and that used in this Special Comment.“ CANTOR, MANN (2003, p.11) 
   “The accuracy ratio measures only relative accuracy, not absolute accuracy, and is invariant to proportional 
changes in marginal default rates. The marginal default rate is the percent of issuers in any given rating cate-
gory that subsequently default. If the marginal default rates for all rating categories change proportionally, 
neither the CAP plot nor the accuracy ratio changes at all.”, CANTOR, MANN (2003, p.12). 
90  Although based on different samples, both rating systems evoke the same CAP-curve (but incidentally differ-
ent ROC curves): in both cases 10% of all corporations have to be excluded in order to achieve a hit rate of 
100%, so that in both cases MOODY’S-accuracy-ratios of 90.0% result (=(10%*100%/2+90%*100%-0,5)/0,5). 
According to the formula yielding the conventional accuracy ratio (see formula F 13) both values had to be 
“normalized” with 1/(1-PD) which would yield an AR-value of 91,8% in the first and 100% in the second 
place. Such, the perfect rating would not only get a better score than the imperfect rating, but it would also 
get the highest attainable value, 100%.  
91  Source: own studies. Based on MOODY’S (2004a) cohort rating performance data in the 1983-2003 period, 
there were found correlation coefficients of -0.591 / -0.682 for the interrelationship of the MOODY’S modified 
AR (forecast periods 1 year / 5 years) and the respective 1- and 5-year default rates. Correlation coefficients 
for the conventional AR and 1- and 5-year default rates were -0.494 / -0.437. 
  In addition, a simulation experiment was performed with 10,000 simulation runs using portfolios of 5,000 
companies (which is roughly equivalent to the total number of corporations that currently are rated by S&P, 
see S&P (2005, p. 26))), whose rating class distribution and default behavior (cumulated 5 year default rate) 
were taken from the S&P (2004a) default study. Contrary to empirical examinations, in the experimental set-
tings could be assured, that rating class specific default probabilities were constant throughout time (or better: 
throughout the different imulation runs) In each simulation run random realizations of default events for all 
companies of the portfolio were “diced” - according to the rating class specific default probabilities - and the 
resulting accuracy ratio and average default rate of the whole portfolio were determined. 
  In effect, conventional ARs and average default rates of the 10,000 simulation runs were practically uncorre-
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Figure 8:  empirical time series of accuracy ratios for MOODY’S ratings (standard vs. MOODY’S defini-
tion) and default rates, MOODY’S cohorts, 1970-2003, forecast horizon: 1 year and 5 years  
Other disadvantages that may be noted are, that the MOODY’S modified accuracy ratio is 
incompatible with the ROC-accuracy ratio, and that perfect rating systems cannot obtain 
MOODY’S values of 100%. For short forecast horizons, i.e. one year, differences between con-
ventional and MOODY’S modified accuracy ratios are of rather negligible magnitudes (they 
differ by factor 1/(1-PD)), except in times of extraordinarily high default rates as in the early 
1990ies or in 2001. Major differences and heavily varying magnitudes of differences in time, 
however, occur for longer forecast horizons (see Figure 8).
92  
                                                 
92  Owing to the rather small number of corporations that were rated by MOODY’S in the early 1970ies, time se-
ries of realized accuracy ratios is characterized by large fluctuations, see Figure 8. In 1970 only 1,031 compa-
nies were rated by MOODY’S, in 2004 nearly five times as many, see MOODY’S (2005, p.22f.).     26
2.3.3  Comparability with measures for categorial insolvency predictions  
As was outlined in chapters 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, not only measures for categorial insolvency pre-
dictions are based on an analysis of errors of the types I and II but, after all, also ROC- and 
CAP-curves and the measures derived from them, such as the area-under-the-ROC-curve 
(AUCROC) or the accuracy ratio (ARROC/CAP).
93 
Albeit for every error-I-II-combination indefinitely many ROC-curves with differing AUC-
values can be found that contain this particular combination,
94 it is possible to derive exact 
upper and lower limits for the measures that are related to these ROC-curves (for a derivation 
of the results see Appendix I). As the interval that is spanned by these limits is usually rather 
ample, additionally heuristic accuracy-ratio-estimators were developed and successfully em-
pirically tested, that assume particular functional ROC-curve forms. 
Being able to transform error-I-II-combinations into accuracy-ratio-values makes it possible 
to compare results of older insolvency prediction studies (see on this chapters 3.3 and 3.4), 
which are usually only reported in terms of single error-I-II-combinations on a univalent ba-
sis
95 and on a uniform basis with newer studies, that usually report their results in terms of 
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Figure 9: best and worst CAP-curve given (X0, Y0) 
                                                 
93  Contrary to categorial insolvency predictions, ordinal predictions are not evaluated on the basis of one single 
error-I-II-combination but on the universe of all error-I-II-combinations attainable by the rating system by ap-
plying various thresholds. 
94  The only exception is the (0%; 0%) error-I-II-combination that is exclusively comprised by the “perfect” 
ROC-curve. 
95  Bivalent error-I-II-combinations, which prohibit direct comparisons, unless both errors of one rating model 
are bigger/smaller than those of another rating model, are transformed into a univalent accuracy ratio value.     27
It can be shown that, under plausible assumptions, the “worst possible” CAP-curve containing 
a given point (X0, Y0) in the CAP-diagram is the linear spline (0%; 0%) - (X0; Y0) – (100%; 
100%). This CAP-curve corresponds to a CAP-curve of a rating model that can only differen-
tiate between the two groups that are separated by X0 – but without possessing any discrimi-
native power within these groups – which essentially is commensurate with a categorial rating 
model with only one single threshold value.  
The best possible CAP-curve containing (X0, Y0), on the other hand, is characterized as fol-
lows: starting from (0%; 0%) it proceeds along the dotted straight line (PD), which means that 
the corporations that are excluded first have a default rate of 100%, afterwards it linearly pro-
ceeds through (X0; Y0) until it intersects the 100%-hit-rate-line (see Figure 9). Slope and ab-
solute term of the line have to be identified by an optimization approach. Subsequently the 
CAP-curve horizontally proceeds until it reaches (100%; 100%), i.e. the corporations finally 
excluded have a probability of default of 0%. 
Formulas for obtaining best and worst possible AR values, given a combination of errors of 
types I and II (F1 and F2) or given a pair of CAP-coordinates (X0, Y0) are reported in Table A. 
Besides upper and lower limits for the accuracy ratio and AUC, four heuristic estimators for 
the accuracy ratio are given ARmv (mean value of upper and lower limits of accuracy ratios at-
tainable), ARα, ARβ, and ARα&β (average of ARα and ARβ), see also Appendix I and IV for 
derivation and empirical accomplishments of the various estimators. 
For error-I-II-combinations with equally sized errors of type I and II, all four estimators give 
good predictions of the true accuracy ratio, for asymmetrical error values best results are 
achieved with ARα&β.  
  CAP-coordinates  errors of types I and II  
ARmin 
PD 1
X Y 0 0
−
−   () 2 1 F F 1 + −  
ARmax 
PD 1
Y PD 4 Y PD 4 Y X 4 X 4 PD 1
2
0 0 0 0 0
−
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + − −   2 1 F F 4 1 ⋅ ⋅ −  
ARmv 
2
AR AR min max +  
2
AR AR min max +  
ARα 
( ) ( )
() ( ) PD 1 log Y log PD Y X log
PD 1 log Y log PD Y X log
0 0 0
0 0 0
− − + ⋅ −
− − − ⋅ −   ()
() 1 2
1 2
F 1 log F log
F 1 log F log
− +
− −  
ARβ 
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) () PD 1 log PD Y X PD 1 log Y 1 log
PD 1 log PD Y X PD 1 log Y 1 log
0 0 0
0 0 0
− − ⋅ + − − + −
− + ⋅ + − − − −   ()
() 2 1
2 1
F 1 log F log
F 1 log F log
− +
− −  
ARα&β 
2
AR AR β α +  
2
AR AR β α +  
Table A:   Formulas for obtaining exact upper and lower limits and heuristic estimators ARmv, ARα and ARβ for 
accuracy ratios from CAP-coordinates/ combinations of errors of type I and II 
Example: In a study conducted by ALTMAN (1968, p. 599; see also chapter 3.4) a rating model 
was presented, which – given a sample of each 33 corporations who stayed solvent / became 
insolvent within one year – could correctly classify 31 of the insolvent and 32 of the solvent 
corporations. The type I error rate therefore was 6.1% and the type II error rate 3.0%. Exact 
upper and lower limits for the accuracy ratio are thus 1-(6.1%+3.0%) = 90.9% and 
1-4*6.1%*3.0%=99.3%. Estimated values for the accuracy ratio are ARmv=95%, ARα = 
96.5%, ARβ=97.8%, and ARα&β=97.2%.     28
As opposed to most other studies, ALTMAN (1968, p. 603) additionally also stated all individ-
ual score values for the (very few) corporations, partitioned into solvent and insolvent one. 
Therefore, here it was possible to reproduce the complete ROC-curve and calculate the re-
spective accuracy ratio (98.7%) directly.  
For comparison: the ratings of S&P and MOODY’S have historically achieved average one-
year-accuracy-ratios of “only” about 85% (see also chapter 3.5).
96 However, the results of 
ALTMAN’s (1968) study are based on a very small sample – and thus are statistically not very 
reliable (see chapter 3.1). Additionally, the performance of the model was measured on the 
same sample on that the model was calibrated before (“in-sample”). In later studies, in par-
ticular in those studies that were carried out by other authors, ALTMAN’s model performed 
much worse (see chapter 3.4). 
                                                 
96  The achieved accuracy ratio values of about 85% refer to the universe of all corporations that are rated by 
S&P or MOODY’S. The accuracy of agency ratings for US industrial corporations, see the sample definition of 
ALTMAN’S study in chapter 3.4, is considerably worse, see on this chapter 3.5.    29
2.3.4  Accuracy losses caused by discretizing continuous rating scales 
Rating agencies and banks transform continuous (or “quasi-continuous”
97) scores to a finite 
number of ordinal rating classes, for instance for investigating historical default and/or migra-
tion characteristics of their ratings.
98,99,100  Seen from the point of view of an external user, 
who only knows about the rating class of a company but not about its continuous rating score, 
the rating looses part of its information value. While all information concerning cross-class 
relative probabilities of default are maintained, all information concerning intra-class relative 
probabilities of defaults are sacrificed. 
101,102. 
 
No studies could be found that attempted to quantify the magnitude of such information 
losses. Two simulation studies, however, based on empirical default data showed, that under 
certain conditions, using ratings with continuous rather than discrete scales yields no statisti-
cally significant improvements (expressed in different measures).
103,104 These results are in so 
                                                 
97   The rating model developed by MOODY’S-KMV, for instance, is using up to 1,000 different rating classes 
(intervals of probabilities of default), see KEENAN,  SOBEHART (1999, p.12)); or the CREDITREFORM-
Bonitätsindex (a German business score) is stated on a scale that allows up to 500 different values, see 
SCHWAIGER (2002, p.16). The SMB-rating model family RiskCalc, for which exist a variety of localized 
models, delivers continuous outputs (probabilities of default), see for instance KOCAGIL ET AL. (2003, p. 30). 
98   At the end of the 1990ies only four out of the 46 biggest US financial institutions had rating systems in op-
eration with more than eight rating classes for performing loans; four institutions even had only one to three 
such rating classes. However, having a reasonable number of rating classes available does not imply already, 
that bank rating systems are reasonably refined: at one third of the banks examined, the largest rating class 
accounted for more than 50%, in some cases even for up to 80%, of all rated corporate customers. At only 
15% of all banks the largest rating class accounted for less than 30% of all customers, see TREACY, CAREY 
(2000/1998, p. 902).  
  Basing on an examination of more than one hundred US commercial banks of different size classes, ENG-
LISH, NELSON (1998, p. 5) find, that about 2/3 of their new costumers were classified by banks with the re-
spective most frequently used rating class. Bank ratings, however, were mapped on a 5ary rating scale, that 
was predetermined by the National bank authorities. 
   According to more current surveys, German commercial banks use bank internal rating systems with 8 rating 
grades (Dresdner Bank, 2002), 12 RG (Commerzbank, 2003), 25 RG (Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken, 2002), 
see FISCHER (2004, p. 165 and the literature there cited). 
99   “Internal rating systems with larger numbers of grades are more costly to operate because of the extra work 
required to distinguish finer degrees of risk. Banks making heavy use of ratings in analytical activities are 
most likely to choose to bear these costs because fine distinctions are especially valuable in such activities 
(however, at least a moderate number of Pass grades is useful even for internal reporting purposes).” 
TREACY, CAREY (2000/1998, p. 902)  
100   KRAHNEN, WEBER (2001, p.13): “[…] the central question for the definition of a rating system now remains, 
how fine a rating system should be, i.e., how many categories it should have. It could be as fine as the POD 
itself, being basically identical to POD, or it could map PODs into a finite number of categories. Of course, a 
rating system which models POD would be the most exact one. However, for quite a number of situations a 
less fine rating system would be sufficient and more appropriate in an organizational context. The fineness 
of a rating system cannot be considered independently from Backtesting […]. There is no use in defining a 
large number of rating categories, if a bank is not able to back-test consistently, due to lack of data.” 
101   MCQUOWN (1993, p. 8): “There are 19 different gradations at S&P, including the pluses and minuses. S&P's 
precision could be, therefore, no greater than 1 in 19. […] We suspect that the resolution of EDFs may be 
nearer 1 in 100. Banks, typically, use fewer than ten gradations, of which three may be non-performing.” 
102   MILLER (1998): “While the intensive quantification of market risk has led to measurements accurate to the 
basis point (and beyond), difficulties in quantifying credit risk have resulted in the practice of measuring this 
risk with far less precision. Indeed, financial institutions that develop their own internal measures of credit 
risk usually employ a ‘1’ to ‘9’ scale of creditworthiness for their exposures,[ … ] Even with the further re-
finement of ‘notches’ designated with a ‘+’ or ‘-‘ the vast universe of credit risk is reduced to at most thirty 
buckets.” 
103   see KEENAN/ SOBEHART (1999, p. 12f.), FRERICHS, WAHRENBURG (2003, especially p. 3, 35)    30
far not very instructive, as if there are any difference in information value – and there must be 
some, as was shown by the above theoretical reasoning – they can be made significant at will 
at any desired confidence level, simply by varying sample size. Contrary to statistical exami-
nations, in simulation studies sample scarcity is no issue at all.
105  
In Appendix IV two approaches are presented that estimate the order of magnitude of infor-





















































































































































inv vs.spec (2ary scale) whole letter (7ary scale) modifier (17ary scale)
Accuracy ratio of Moody's ratings, 1 year, cohorts 1970-2003
inv.-grade vs. spec.-grade (2ary scale), whole letters (7ary scale), modificators (17ary scale)
 
Figure 10:   accuracy ratios for MOODY’S ratings, 1 year forecast horizon, 1970-2003, 2-, 7- and 17ary rating 
scales (source: own calculations)
 
To begin with, Figure 10 should convey a first notion of the empirical relevance of the issue. 
The figure displays time series data for the accuracy ratios of MOODY’S ratings for the 1970-
2003 period for three distinct rating scales that differ in number of rating classes:
106 
•  2ary scale: investment grade (Aaa-Baa3) vs. speculative grade (Ba1-Caa/C)), 
•  7ary scale: whole letter ratings (Aaa … Caa/C), 
•  17ary scale: modified ratings (Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, A3, …, CCC/C). 
In all years of the 1983-2003 period, the 7ary scale accuracy ratios were better than the re-
spective values of the 2ary scale, and in all years the 17er scale values were even better than 
those of the 7ary scale.
 107 
                                                                                                                                                          
104  A further, related study examines the relationship between rating scale fineness and regulatory equity capital 
requirements, see JANKOWITSCH, PICHLER, SCHWAIGER (2003).  
105  See on the inappropriateness of the concept of statistical significance in the context of simulation models 
SCHMEISER (2001, p. 43). 
106   source: own calculations based on MOODY’S cohort data (2004, p. 27-38)  
107  This does not reflect construction-conditioned features of the accuracy ratios calculated. See for instance the 
findings for 1976 and 1979. In both years, 2ary scale accuracy ratio exceeded 7ary scale accuracy ratios. 
Both years were characterized by extraordinary few defaults (1976: 2 defaults, 1979: 1 default), that coinci-
dentally only affected the best speculative grade class Ba. Thus, comprehending the whole letter rating    31
In the 1983-2003 period the average accuracy ratio of the 2ary scale rating was 66.9% (with a 
standard deviation σ = 5.4%)
108, while the 7ary scale rating achieved 83.1% (σ = 6.0%) and 
the 17ary scale rating 86.2% (σ = 5.7%). 
Passing over from a 2ary to 7ary scale, thus adding only 5 rating classes, increases the accu-
racy ratio by 16.2 pp (percentage points) on average with a standard deviation of 3.8 pp. Pass-
ing over from a 7ary to a 17ary scale, thus adding twice as many more rating classes, only re-
sults in an average accuracy ratio increase by additional 3.2 pp (σ = 1,7 pp). By the proce-
dures presented in Appendix IV it can be estimated, that by passing from a 17ary scale to a 
continuous scale the accuracy ratio should increase by another 0.5 pp (or stated conversely: 
under the prevailing circumstances using a 17ary scale instead of a continuous scale provokes 
information losses of about only 0.5 pp, or using a 30ary scale would provoke information 
losses of about only 0.1pp).  
The total information losses mainly result from information losses that occur in the “worst” 
rating class (Caa/C). Discretizing rating scores in the domain of other rating classes, espe-
cially in the domain of investment grade rating classes, exerts comparatively little influence 
on the information value of the rating system. 
                                                                                                                                                          
classes AAA, Aa, A, and Baa into one single aggregate, investment grade, did not deteriorate the predictive 
value of the rating system because no single default occurred in any of the classes, while comprehending the 
classes Caa/C, B and Ba into one single class actually improved performance, because stating no ordering, is 
better than stating a wrong ordering [of default rates among speculative grades]. 
108  See also CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 19): “Much of the information content of the rating system comes from 
the ability to determine whether credits are investment grade or speculative grade.” According to own ex-
aminations based on whole letter rating classes, the conventional cut-off Aaa-Baa vs. Ba-Caa/C (investment 
grade vs. speculative grade) does not always yield accuracy-ratio-maximizing values for Moody’s cohorts 
from 1971-2003. For some cohorts, among them all cohorts as of 1992, best values are achieved for the di-
chotomous rating class division Aaa-Ba vs. B-Caa/C, i.e. by considering Ba-ratings as “revised investment 
grade” ratings. Based on pool data and whole letter ratings, the AR-maximizing cut-off is compatible with 
the conventional investment-grade vs. speculative grade dichotomy (Aaa-Baa vs. Ba-Caa/C) from 1971-
1999, but from 2000 onward best results are achieved with a Aaa-Ba vs. B-Caa/C separation.  
   Based on modified rating classes AR-maximizing cut-offs for the various cohorts from 1983-2003 are posi-
tioned between Aaa-Baa2 vs. Baa3-Caa/C and Aaa-B1 vs. B2-Caa/C – the latter cut-off is valid as of 2001. 
According to the pool data, the AR-maximizing cut-off for modified rating classes is steadily located at Aaa-
Ba2 vs. Ba3-Caa/C as of 1986.  
   If a two-class separation of a rating system is attempted, that is as discriminative as possible (here in terms 
of achieving the maximal attainable accuracy-ratio) the conventional investment grade vs. speculative grade 
dichotomy currently yields inferior results in all examined cases (pool vs. cohort data, whole letter ratings 
vs. modified ratings). Instead, at least the two “best” modified speculative grade rating classes, Ba1 and Ba2, 
should be assigned to the better one of the two segments (“revised investment grade”). For reasons of practi-
cability, in particular for maintaining identical cut-offs for whole letter ratings and modified ratings, addi-
tionally also rating class Ba3 should assigned to the better one of the two segments. The “revised speculative 
grade” should comprise only rating classes B and Caa/C.    32
2.4  Accuracy measures for cardinal insolvency predictions 
While ordinal insolvency predictions only order corporations according to their relative de-
fault probabilities, cardinal predictions explicitly state probabilities of default.  
By ignoring their cardinal implications, probabilities of default may also be interpreted as 
simple ordering criteria. Therefore all measures and methods that were developed for assess-
ing ordinal predictions may also be used for cardinal predictions:
109,110  
•  Resolution: measures by how much realized default rates differ between different progno-
ses. Minimal resolution is given, when realized default rates are the same for all progno-
ses. Maximal resolution is achieved, when only default rates of 0% or 100% are occurring 
(for a graphical representation of resolution see Figure 3), 
•  Discriminative power: measures by how much prognoses of defaulters and non-defaulters 
differ. 
Additionally in case of cardinal predictions also criteria may be tested that compulsory require 
the ex-ante specification of probabilities of default: 
•  Calibration: measures to what extend stated default probabilities are matched by realized 
default rates,  
•  Unconditional bias: states, by how much average forecasted probability of default differs 
from the actual average default rate,  
•  Refinement:  measures by how much forecasted default probabilities differ from each 
other (cf. resolution). Minimal refinement is given then, when all predicted default prob-
abilities are the same, maximal refinement is achieved, when only 0% and 100%-
prognoses are stated (no matter how predictive they are). 
As in the ordinal case, measures that simultaneously quantify some or all of the quality as-
pects of predictions mentioned above are labeled accuracy measures. Measures that quantify 
the accuracy of a rating system in relation to some reference measures are labeled measures of 
relative accuracy or skill measures.
111 
Measures that quantify only single of the aspects mentioned above, in particular calibration, 
will not be discussed in the following. Representatives of these measures are for instance:
112  
•  Grouped Brier score
113,114: 
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109   See MURPHY, WINKLER (1992, p. 440) for examples of formal definitions of the aspects resolution, dis-
crimination, calibration, refinement, unconditional bias, accuracy and skill. 
110  Note that the ordinal measures Accuracy Ratio and Area under Curve that were presented in chapter 2.3.2 
are being influenced by resolution and discriminative power, too. 
111   see MURPHY, WINKLER (1992, p. 440) 
112  For further test, such as binomial tests, χ
2-tests, or normal tests, that exclusively check for correct calibra-
tions of the forecasted default probabilities see BASEL COMMITTEE (2005, p. 47ff.). 
113  See on this FRERICHS, WAHRENBURG (2003, p. 16, own notation). In a simulation study the authors find, that 
the grouped Brier score is no suitable validation measure for rating systems, because it fails to reliably iden-
tify rating systems that are known to be “inferior” because of their designs. 
114   Note, despite certain formal similarities, the grouped Brier scores fundamentally differs from the Brier score 
that is presented below. The grouped Brier score is only affected calibration issues and is completely unre-
ceptive with respect to the discriminative power of forecasts.     33
            g … number of rating classes 
115,116, 
•  “Rommelfanger-index” 
117 












      with  ( ) fore , i real , i i PD PD ; 0 max − = ∆  for i=1..g-1, respectively  ( ) real , i fore , i i PD PD ; 0 max − = ∆  
for i=g, ai, âi… relative amounts of all loans in the validation/ estimation sample, 
fi … “appropriate weighting factors”
118,119  
The accuracy measures for cardinal insolvency predictions presented in the following are 
based on a unitary rationale: they compare the individually forecasted probabilities of defaults 
PDi,fore with the realizations of the individual default events Θi (with Θi=1/ Θi =0 if corporate 
i defaults/ does not default) and “sconce” the differences that occur with different “punish-
ment functions”. 
Contrary to categorial insolvency predictions, that only use the extreme predictions “default” 
vs. “non-default” (which may be either right or wrong), it may be less intuitive in case of de-
fault predictions stated in terms of probabilities of default, why deviations from individual de-
fault probabilities and default realizations should be “sconced” at all.  
After all, predictions must adopt values between 0% and 100%, while default realizations can 
only be of the extremes 100% (default) or 0% (non-default). Even in case forecasted prob-
abilities are “right”, meaning that they are correctly calibrated, if fore instance 1%/ 5%/ 20% 
of the corporations are defaulting for which a default probability of 1%/ 5%/ 20% was fore-
casted, the predictions are being “punished”, that is they don’t get the best possible valuation. 
However, what is actually being “punished” in these situations is not a failure in calibration, 
but a failure in discrimination: a rating that had predicted a probability of default in 2003 for 
each and every German corporate of 1.35%, had been perfectly calibrated, but had been pun-
ished for its non-selective forecasts. The best possibly accuracy value would be achieved by a 
rating that stated a PD of 100% for those 1.35% of all corporations who really defaulted sub-
sequently and a PD of 0% for the remaining corporations who did not default subsequently.
120 
                                                 
115  When determining the score value, it probably would be more suggestive to use weighting factors propor-







real . i fore , i i
*
grouped PD PD a Brier   
   with ai … share of the corporations with rating i in all corporations  
116  As a result of a simulation study by FRERICHS, WAHRENBURG (2003, p.17) the authors find, that the grouped 
Brier score, as opposed to all other measures examined, was not suited to discriminate between “good” and 
“bad” rating systems when used as sole measure. 
117   DVFA (2004, p. 600, own notation) 
118  See DVFA (2004, p. 599, translation). There are no assertions made, what constitutes the “appropriateness” 
of weighting factors.  
119  Next to its orientation to measuring only calibration aspects, the index may also be criticized for its depend-
ency on irrelevant variables (like the structure of the estimation sample). It may also be criticized for setting 
incentives for systematically misreporting default probabilities: In the rating classes 1..g-1 only too high and 
in rating class g only too low probabilities of defaults are being “punished”, therefore systematically over-
stating (rating class 1..g-1) or understating (rating class g) default estimations is rewarded. 
120   see for instance KRÄMER (2003, p. 396f.)    34
Following two accuracy measures for cardinal insolvency predictions that differ regarding 
their “sconce” or “punishment functions” are considered: 
•  logarithmic “punishment function”: CIE (conditional information entropy)
121:  
•  F 26)  () ∑
=
− θ + − =
n
1 i
i fore , i 1 PD log
n
1
CIE  with n … number of corpora-
tions,                 
Note: CIE is only not defined in those cases, where a default occurs, although it 
was ruled out with certainty (Θi=1 and PDi,fore=0) or in those cases where no de-
fault occurs, although it was forecasted with certainty (Θi=0 and PDi,fore=1). 
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with CIER … conditional information entropy ratio 
122  
with CIEPD…CIE-value of a “naïve” reference rating, that always forecasts the av-
erage probability of default PD
123,124, 




                                                 
121   Entropy is a concept that is borrowed from thermodynamics measuring the degree of a system’s disorderli-
ness. In the context of insolvency prediction, entropy is intended to quantify the degree of uncertainty that is 
associated with the distribution of probabilities of default that is asserted by a specific rating model for a 
given sample of corporations, cf. SOBEHART, KEENAN, STEIN (2000, p. 14). See SHANNON (2001/1948, p. 
11f.) for an axiomatic foundation for using logarithmic punishment functions. The last of the three axioms, 
however, is not meaningfully applicable in case of corporate defaults which are usually modeled as variables 
that can adopt only two possible values (“default” vs. “non-default“). See also MATHESON, WINKLER (1976), 
KEENAN, SOBEHART (1999, p.9), and BASEL COMMITTEE (2005, p.44) for formula F 27 (own notation). See 
KRÄMER, GÜTTLER (2003, p. 12) for formula F 26. 
122   see KEENAN, SOBEHART (1999, p. 10) 
123  CIER … conditional information entropy ratio, SOBEHART, KEENAN, STEIN (2000, p. 14): “The CIER com-
pares the amount of ‘uncertainty’ regarding default in the case where we have no model (a state of more un-
certainty about the possible outcomes) to the amount of ‘uncertainty’ left over after we have introduced a 
model (presumably, a state of less ignorance), 
124  In the light of highly volatile default rates, at least in case of corporate bond markets, more than just “na-
ivety” is required for correctly forecasting average default rates. See on this topic for instance KEENAN 
(1999), S&P (2004b, p. 3). 
125   see Basel COMMITTEE (2005, p. 30) 
126   see CANGEMI, SERVIGNY, FRIEDMAN (2003, p. 40)    35
•  squared “punishment function”: Brier score: 
127 
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F 35)  () ( ) ( ) PD 1 PD PD PD 1 PD 1 PD BS
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Both “punishment functions” presented are arbitrary in the sense, that there is no direct link 
to the utility of the user(s) of the predictions (see also chapter 1). However, both measures be-
have “plausibly”, so that one can at least assume a tight correlation with the users’ utility: 
both scores “reward” correctly calibrated
130,131 and discriminative 
132 forecasts. By appropri-
ately transforming the resulting scores (for one example see Figure 11), relationships to other 
quality relevant aspects of cardinal insolvency predictions - like resolution, refinement, and 
bias - can be shown as well.
133  
                                                 
127   see BRIER (1950, p. 1), MURPHY, WINKLER (1992, p. 439, formula 7), KRÄMER, GÜTTLER (2003, p. 11), FRE-
RICHS, WAHRENBURG (2003, p.14), OeNB (2004a, p. 123ff.), GRUNERT, NORDEN, WEBER (2005, p.517) 
128  In the notation that is used in the context of regression analyses, the Brierscore equals the “sum of the 
squared residuals” (RSS) divided by n, with RSS = Σ Yi
* - Yi, with Yi
* … forecasted value of the variable to 
be explained and Yi … actual parameter value of the variable to be explained, see for instance GUJARATI 
(1999/1992, p. 170ff.). 
129  In the notation that is used in the context of regression analyses, BSnaiv equals the sum of the total variation 
of the variable to be explained (TSS) divided by n. Therefore it holds, that SkillBS = (TSS – RSS)/ TSS, and 
thus SkillBS = r
2, with r
2… sample coefficient of determination and r
2 = ESS/TSS with ESS=TSS-RSS, see 
for instance GUJARATI (1999/1992, p. 170ff.). 
130  This is a non-trivial statement. If for instance absolute values of differences are chosen as punishment func-
tion ΙPDi,fore- θiΙ, so stating PDi,fore = 0% for E(PDi,real)<50% and PDi,fore = 100% for E(PDi,real)<50% leads to 
lower expected punishments than to state the true expected probabilities PDi,prog = E(PDi,real), see Appendix 
II. See also Appendix II for a proof of the incentive compatibilities of the Brier score and the entropy score. 
131   Already BRIER (1950, p.2) mentioned incentive compatibility as one advantage of his score: “[the forecaster] 
is encouraged to state unbiased estimates of the probability of each event when he cannot forecast perfectly.” 
132  Both measures achieve their best possible values only, when a rating systems gives probabilities of default 
of either 0% or 100% and is always right with these predictions. 
133   cf. MURPHY, WINKLER (1992)    36
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Figure 11: Brier score decomposition into the components variance – calibration - resolution
134 
One critical attribute of the Brier score and other cardinal measures that already becomes 
transparent in Figure 11, is their dependence from the average sample (or basic population) 
default rate. The bigger the environments variability (PD*(1-PD)), the bigger (=worse) the 
Brier score becomes (for a thorough analysis see Appendix III).  
For correcting for this unwanted environment dependence of cardinal forecasting accuracy 
measures, it was suggested to use skill measures, which consider accuracy measures in rela-
tion to the accuracy of naïve forecasts in the same environment.
135,136 This dependence is un-
wanted, because it impairs the inter-sample performance comparability of accuracy measures 
if samples differ in terms of average default rates.
137 
However, empirically and theoretically (based on certain additional assumptions, see Appen-
dix II), it can be shown, that skill scores, at least those for the Brier score and CIE, are envi-
ronmental dependent, too. Paradoxically, while Brier score and CIE are signaling deteriora-
tions of accuracy with increasing environmental variability, the respective skill scores are sig-
naling improvements of (relative) accuracy.
138,139 The accuracy measures for ordinal 
insolvency predictions presented in chapter 2.3 do not exhibit these disadvantages.
140 
                                                 
134   see MURPHY, WINKLER (1992, p. 439, formula 10, own notation)  
135   WINKLER (1994, p. 1397): “The development of so called ‘skill-scores’ has been motivated by the desire to 
produce average scores that reflect the relative ability of forecaster rather than some combination of the fore-
caster’s ability to and the situation’s difficulty. These skill scores attempt to neutralize the contribution of 
the situation by comparing a forecaster’s average score to the average score that an unsophisticated fore-
casting scheme would have obtained for the same set of forecasting situations.” 
136   see also KRÄMER (2003, p. 406) 
137  Differences in default rates of different samples may for instance be due to differences in length of periods 
covered (cumulated default rates rise approximately linear in time), they may be due to covering different 
periods of the business cycle or due to covering groups of firms that inherently differ in terms of default risk, 
or they may just be the result of composing samples with unrepresentatively high share of defaulters, which 
is common use in insolvency prediction studies with comparatively small data sets.  
18 from 31 insolvency studies listed in FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p. 14) use data sets of less 
than 100 corporations, 9 use 100-1,000 and only 4 more than 1,000 corporations. In 14 of the 18 (=78%) 
studies with less than 100 corporations, exactly 50% of the corporations covered were defaulters, the same 
holds for only 5 of the 9 (=56%) studies with 100-1,000 corporations and for none of the four studies with 
more than 1,000 corporations. In these four cases the shares of defaulters in all corporations were 5.0%, 
6.6%, 9.7%, and 14.1%. 
138  In a study of precipitation forecast accuracies of 20 weather stations, that were situated in regions with vastly 
different precipitation frequencies, WINKLER (1994, p. 1401f) found considerably high correlations between 
the Brier scores of the various weather stations’ forecasts and their average precipitation frequencies 
(r=+0.87) – which was to be expected (speaking pictorially: “In a desert it is easy to correctly forecast a 
rainless day.”) However, there was also found a positive correlation of Brier scores and precipitation fre-
quencies of nearly the same magnitude (r ca. +0.80) (speaking pictorially: “In a desert it is difficult to fore-
cast a high share of the few raining days.”) – which is obviously counter the intention of skill scores, which 
aim at neutralizing (and not reverting) the impact of environmental differences to the accuracy measures. 
  Note: higher Brier scores correspond with lower quality forecasts, while higher skill scores correspond with 
higher quality forecasts.    37
Sometimes, the accuracy measures mentioned above are used for assessing the quality of or-
dinal or cardinal forecasts under the fiction of correct calibration, i.e. by ignoring the true val-
ues for PDi,fore and by setting ex-post PDi,fore to the realized default rates for every i. 
141 In that 
case, formulas F 28 and F 33 can be simplified as following: 
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The accuracy measures thus calculated are non-sensitive with respect to wrong calibrations 
(or missing calibrations – as in case of ordinal solvency predictions) – the middle term in 
Figure 11 disappears – and are measuring only a combination of environmental variability 
and  resolution. These measures can also be interpreted as upper limits of accuracy the 
respective rating systems could at best achieve, i.e. in case of perfect calibration, given their 
resolutions and given the environmental variability. 
Due to their dependence on the average sample default rates, these measures are still unsuited 
for portfolio spanning comparisons of methods. For an assessment of different methods based 
on the same portfolio they are not more informative than the measures for ordinal insolvency 
predictions (like AUCROC or AR) that were presented in the previous chapters.  
However, in particular in case of intersecting ROC-/CAP-curves they could be considered as 
additional indicators for the relative quality of rating models, as in the end none of the diverse 
accuracy measures for insolvency predictions is directly linked to the users’ utilities. The 
more indicators suggest the predominance of one particular rating model in a direct compari-
son with another rating model, the more the decision maker’s certitude is strengthened that he 
chooses the right method (if he has to decide between two competing models without having 
the opportunity to combine their informational value). If, on the other hand, indicators are 
giving widely conflicting signals, it can be assumed that the decision maker is making no ma-
terial mistakes if he opts for one of the models by chance or if he applies some subordinate 
criteria (for instance development costs or the degree transparency of the model) to enforce a 
decision. 
                                                                                                                                                          
139  See Appendix III for a model based derivation of the results. See also CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 12) and 
DVFA (2004, p. 599) concerning the (nearly perfect) environmental independence of the accuracy ratio. 
140   see Appendix III 
141   cf. KRÄMER, GÜTTLER (2003, p. 12)    38
3  Empirical findings concerning accuracy of insolvency 
predictions 
3.1  Limitations on usefulness of empirical comparisons - 
Development of benchmarks for prediction accuracy measures 
On purely theoretical grounds it can be shown, that applying one and the same rating model 
on different samples of corporations may yield substantially and systematically varying 
measures of predictive quality.
142 Therefore the quality of a rating model cannot be unequivo-
cally characterized by a single value - and the relative quality of different rating models can-
not be unequivocally inferred from comparisons when they are based on samples of corpora-
tions that differ in some relevant aspects which affect accuracy measures. Based on empirical 
and theoretical studies there have been identified several such variables – unrelated to the 
prediction quality of a rating model. As determinants for such sample specific “structural dif-
ferences” have to be mentioned:
 143 
•  Pool vs. cohort data: When assessing the accuracy of insolvency predictions, depending 
on whether only data sets of corporations of the same period, e.g. 1994, were used (cohort 
data) or datasets of corporations from different periods (pools), e.g. 1970-2003, differ-
ences in measured accuracy have to be expected. Based on theoretical considerations, bet-
ter values should be achieved with cohort data sets, as a rating system here “only” has to 
deliver a consistent (discriminative) ordering of corporations at one single point in time in 
order to achieve a good valuation. Pooled data based rating systems, on the other hand, 
additionally must provide orderings that have to be consistent throughout time, too.
144 
These differences are accentuated, if the rating system is designed to give relatively stable 
ratings (point-in-time- (current-condition-) (PIT) vs. through-the-cycle-approach (TTC) 
145,146). Empirically, though, problems related to the usage of pool vs. cohort data seem to 
be of surprisingly minor relevance.
147 Besides that, for circumventing bottlenecks in the 
                                                 
142   see for instance HAMERLE, RAUHMEIER, RÖSCH (2003)  
143   OENB (2004, p. 137f.) makes following demands on the quality of validation benchmark data samples: 
comparable data quality, uniform definitions of input variables (in particular in case of qualitative variables), 
consistency of target variables (definition of default), structural consistency (with respect to company sizes, 
regional distribution, industry classification, and legal forms).  
144  Example: In order for a 2004 cohort based rating system to achieve a good valuation, corporations that were 
BBB-rated at 01/01/2004 should exhibit a much smaller default rate in 2004 than corporations that were BB-
rates at 01/01/2004. The same holds for a 1970-2004 cohort based rating system, but additionally the one-
year default rates of BBB-rated corporations with date of rating 01/01/2004 should be much smaller than the 
default rates of corporations that were BB-rated at 01/01/1970, or at 01/01/1980, etc. Essentially this im-
plies, that pooled data based ratings must provide rating class specific default rates that are stable through 
time. 
145  Based on a simulation model LÖFFLER (2004a, p. 709) finds dramatic performance differentials between 
TTC- and PIT-ratings. 
146   For an extended review of both approaches see e.g. BASEL COMMITTEE (2005, p.10 ff.). 
147  MOODY’S-ratings for instance achieved one- and five–year accuracy ratios based on pooled data for the 
1983-2002 period of 82.6% and 71.0%, while the same period’s average (issuer weighted) cohort accuracy 
ratios were only marginally better with values of 83.5% and 72.9%, see CANTOR, MANN (2003, p.19). 
 If  MOODY’S data for 1970-1982 is included in the analysis, the sequence of performance between pool and 
cohort data does even reverse (!): the 1970-2003 average cohort accuracy ratio (83.4%) is marginally lower 
than the 1970-2003 pooled accuracy ratio (83.5%). Source: own analysis. Note: contrary to CANTOR, MANN 
(2003), the own analysis was based on 7-ary ratings. Further, the conventional definition of accuracy ratio 
was applied (and not Moody’s definition), see chapter 2.3.2.  
  The sign of difference between the average cohort and pooled AR is in particular sensitive with regard to the 
inclusion or exclusion of the data of the 1973, 1976, 1977 and 1979 cohorts. All four cohorts were character-   39
provision of data for defaulted companies, practically all default studies are based on 
pooled data.
148 
•  Positioning of the observation data period in the default cycle: It was noted, that in gen-
eral the quality of insolvency predictions is (unfortunately) especially low, when it is es-
pecially important: namely in times of above average default rates (see also Figure 8). 
One possible explanation is, that from a portfolio of corporations that is made of “white, 
grey and black sheep”
149only “black sheep” tended to become insolvent in good times, 
while in economically more adverse times both “black” and “grey sheep” tended to be-
come insolvent, which reduces the measured discriminative power of insolvency predic-
tions. 
150,151 Because most default studies rest upon pooled data of relatively long periods 
(see above), biases resulting from this effect should be rather small. 
•  Preselection of portfolios (in particular bank portfolios): As in bank portfolios both cor-
porations which are either especially vulnerable to defaults (“black sheep”) and corpora-
tions that are exceptionally stable (“white sheep”) are underrepresented, discriminative 
power of rating systems is negatively affected, as the rating systems essentially have to 
differentiate between “bright and dark grey sheep”.
152 
Especially vulnerable corporations are underrepresented, because banks do not accept po-
tential customers from whom they expect unusually high insolvency hazards.
153 Addition-
ally, existing customers, whose credit-worthiness has declined substantially ever since the 
initiation of the costumer relationship, are often bank internally transferred to “problem 
portfolios“. If the assessment of bank data based rating models is executed by excluding 
these “problematical costumers” a further decrease in measured accuracy has to be ex-
pected.
154,155,156 
                                                                                                                                                          
ized both by extremely low default rates and extremely low accuracy ratios, whereof average cohort per-
formance was more negatively affected than pooled data performance. 
148  In a meta-study conducted by AZIZ, DAR (2004, p. 35ff.) only one out of 82 insolvency prognosis studies 
was based on data of one single cohort. 69 studies (84%) were based on pooled data of at least five sub-
sequent years, and 35 (42%) of the studies were actually based on pooled data of at least 10 subsequent years 
(!). 
149  “Black sheep” is a German phrase which can best be translated as “rotten apple”, although by loosing the in-
tuitive color-related connotation, which is important in the context above. Accordingly, a “white sheep” 
would be a “good apple”. 
150  “Recessions both increase and broaden the base of defaulters, lowering the measured power of default mod-
els in these periods. […] In [good] times, the really bad firms (C) default, while moderate firms (B) and ex-
cellent firms (A) don’t default. In bad times, however, section C still shows more defaults, but now section B 
is a gray area; a new class of firms that were previously almost never defaulting are now defaulting at low, 
but significant rates. This adds gray to a situation that was previously black and white, which the lower 
power of the model reflects.” FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, KOCAGIL (2000, p. 22f)  
Based on MOODY’S (2004) bond rating performance data, a correlation coefficient of -0,494 / -0,437 results 
for the interrelationship of accuracy ratios and average 1- and 5-year default rates for the 1983-2003 period’s 
cohorts. Source: own analysis. 
151  See on this also S&P (2004b, p. 14): „Trends in the one-year Gini ratio emerge during periods of both ex-
tremes in default pressure, […] In periods of high defaults, there tends to be greater variation with respect to 
how the defaults are distributed across the ratings spectrum, which reduces the Gini.“, see also BALCAEN, 
OOGHE (2004, p. 31 and the literature there cited). 
152   Besides validation, other phases of the development of rating models are affected from the pre-selection of 
portfolios, too. If the development sample (=training/ learning sample) of a statistical rating model only in-
cluded data from non-rejected applicants, incorrectly calibrated probabilities of default have to be expected, 
when the model is applied to rejected applicants, see FEELDERS (2000, p. 1ff.).  
153   For quantitative effects of censored customer acquisitions to predictive accuracy measures see KRAFT, 
KROISANDT, MÜLLER (2004, p. 7f.) and the literature there cited. 
154  For the effects of excluding “problematic costumers” from estimation and validation samples see LEHMANN 
(2003, p.8f).    40
An underrepresentation of corporations with exceptionally good  financial standings in 
bank loan portfolios, on the other hand, has to expected, as those corporations tend to be 
corporations, who have to take out no (or less than average many) bank loans, because of 
their above average endowments with equity capital, or because of their privileged access 
to alternative financial sources, like bond issuance (in particular in case of large corpora-
tions). When excluding 10% of the corporations with the worst ratings, accuracy ratio 
losses – measured at the remaining portfolio – of 10% to more than 50% (!) have to be 
expected. When excluding 10% of the corporations with the best ratings comparatively 
small accuracy losses of 2.5% or less have to be expected.
157 
•  Average (sample) default rates: One major disadvantage of cardinal measures for insol-
vency predictions, see chapter 2.4, is their dependence on average (sample) default rates. 
However, the measures for ordinal insolvency predictions, see chapter 2.3, are not af-
fected therefrom, see also Appendix III. 
•  Industry classification: Especially discriminative insolvency predictions are given by rat-
ing agencies for financial corporations. While MOODY’s ratings achieve extraordinary 
good one-year accuracy ratios of 92.3% for financial corporations, the performance for 
non-financial corporations (which account for about 60% of the Moody’s rated costumers, 
see Table H in chapter 3.5) is considerably worse with an accuracy value of only 
80.5%.
158 It is interesting to note, that just financial corporations are excluded from most 
default studies (see also chapters 3.3 to 3.5). A more detailed industry classification within 
the group of non-financial corporations would probably not reveal dramatic differences 
with respect to prognosis accuracy.
159,160,161 
•  Size of corporations: MOODY’s ratings achieve on average one-year accuracy ratios of 
84.4% for “big”  corporations as compared to only 74.0% for “small” corporations.
162 
Even more pronounced size-dependent differences in prognosis accuracy were noted in 
various empirical studies (see chapter 3.3).
163 As causations for the reduced predictive ac-
                                                                                                                                                          
155   FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p. 23): “Many institutions transfer credits to special asset groups 
once a credit is placed in any of the regulator criticized asset categories. Once there, many institutions do not 
continue to spread the financial statements associated with these high risk borrowers, or the borrowers no 
longer submit them.” 
156   FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, KOCAGIL (2000, p. 7): “Much of the dearth in default data is due to the vagaries of 
data storage within financial institutions. Defaulting companies are often purged from the system after their 
troubles begin, which creates a sample bias in that the default probability implicit in current bank databases 
is invariably low, even for a non-recessionary period.” 
157   See also Appendix V for the respective formal and empirical analyses. 
158   See MOODY’S (2004c, p.2). The AR-values stated refer to “historical averages” (probably 1983-2003). 
159  In a sample of 30,000 corporations BLOCHWITZ, LIEBIG, NYBERG (2000, p. 28ff., see also chapter 3.3) found 
only marginal differences in accuracy ratios for their insolvency predictions based on linear discriminant 
analyses that were individually calibrated and validated for three industry aggregates (trade, manufacturing, 
others). The respective AR-values were 55.8%, 60.0% and 54.4%. 
160  In a sample of 50,000 corporations DWYER, KOCAGIL, STEIN (2004, p. 17f.) could increase the discrimina-
tive power of their rating system only marginally (but statistically significant) from 54.4% to 55.1% by 
including industry specific ratios for nine different industry aggregates (However, the discriminative power 
of the ratings systems’ performance within the industry aggregates was not stated). 
161  With a rating model that was developed and validated based on accounting data of 19.500 Austrian firms, 
KOCAGIL ET AL. (2003, p. 20) find following, only slightly varying industry specific accuracy ratios: 
AR construction = 58.6%, AR industrials = 59.1%, AR services = 54.0%, AR trade = 57.1%. 
162   See MOODY’S (2004c, p.2). The AR-values stated, refer to “historical averages” (probably 1983-2003). No 
explicit definitions for “big” or “small” were given. 
163  See on this also KOCAGIL ET AL. (2003, p. 20). The same model achieved AR-values of 51.1% for corpora-
tions with revenues between 0.5-5m EUR, 59.3% for corporations with 5-25m EUR and 64.6% for corpora-
tions with revenues that exceeded 25m EUR.    41
curacy for smaller companies (who are less often quoted on stock exchanges and who 
have less often traded debt) were mentioned: worse quality of financial statements [in 
terms of correctness, not in terms of credit-worthiness] 
164,165,166 (see also the next para-
graph), non-availability of capital market data 
167 but also lower quality of default infor-
mation
168,169 which are essential ingredients for the calibration and validation of rating 
models.
170,171  
•  Data quality: “Bad” quality data, i.e. due to missing or wrong information about the fi-
nancial conditions of the corporations examined or their default states, negatively impact 
the accuracy of insolvency prediction models, that are developed with these data and adul-
terates validation results.
172,173 
                                                 
164   STEIN ET AL (2003, p. 5): “An important result of these structural differences, are differences in the availabil-
ity of good quality data on which to develop and test default models. Because most middle-market firms are 
not issuers of public securities, they are not required to report details of their financial statements on a regu-
lar basis as public firms do. These firms typically report such information to their lenders but it is not gener-
ally available to the marketplace in most countries. Furthermore, the quality of these reported financial 
statements both with respect to data accuracy and accounting rigor is typically inferior to that in the public 
markets.” 
165  F ALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p. 77): “Accounting statements are less noisy for rated compa-
nies, and this is reflected in the far greater number of audited statements for public companies as opposed to 
private companies. Adding noise to the input variables clearly weakens the power of any model to predict 
from them.” 
166   BOHN, AVORA, KORABLEV (2005, p. 14), however, qualify the conclusions that can be drawn thereof: „On 
the other hand, larger firms […] usually operate in multiple segments. This makes their financial ratios more 
difficult to interpret.“. 
167   STEIN ET AL (2003, p. 5): “[… ] Since, by definition, private firms do not have publicly traded equity and 
debt, price series of these financial assets are not available for individual firms. This implies that even if the 
firm-specific details of these companies were publicly known, price discovery reflecting the incorporation of 
these risks does not take place. Thus, various asset pricing-based approaches to default risk that have en-
joyed wide success and acceptance for public firms cannot be directly applied to private ones.” 
168   FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p. 77): “Yet, some of this loss of power can also be explained by 
the fact that defaults are measured better for rated firms than unrated public firms, and for public firms vs. 
private firms. More of the 'goods' in the unrated universes are mislabelled, but unfortunately we do not know 
which ones.”  
169   By merging MOODY’s and KMV’s databases it could for instance be estimated, that MOODY’S (pre-merger) 
data base contained only one third (!) of all defaults that pertained to corporations with revenues of less than 
1 m US$ that were covered by MOODY’s database, see DWYER, STEIN (2003, p. 7, 9). MOODY’S database is 
being used for developing, calibrating and validating insolvency predicting models for small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
170   FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, KOCAGIL (2000, p. 12): “Size is a notorious correlate with various inputs, most sig-
nificantly the quality of financial statements and our measurement of default. Larger companies tend to have 
audited statements that are of better quality. More importantly, perhaps, is that our measure of default is 
more accurate for the larger firms. While we do our best to make sure that companies in our database are 
truly defaulted or non-defaulted companies, and in fact exclude more data than we use because of this effort, 
inevitably we do make some misidentifications. Therefore, size and data quality correlate positively. “ 
171   BOHN, ARORA, KORABLEV (2005, p. 14) explain the declined (!) performance of a particular financial ratio 
based model when applied to larger firms as follows: „larger firms have more sophisticated financial state-
ments since they usually operate in multiple segments. This makes their financial ratios more difficult to in-
terpret.“ 
172   see STEIN ET AL (2003, p. 30f) 
173  For possible quantitative effects of “managing data quality” by “data cleaning” (deleting incomplete or pre-
sumably wrong data records) see DWYER, KOCAGIL, STEIN (2004, p. 8, 19ff.): increase in 1-year (5-years-) 
accuracy ratios from 48.2% (40.1%) to 51.7% (45.5%) or ESCOTT, GLORMANN, KOCAGIL (2001b, p.19): in-
crease in 1-year accuracy ratios from 59.7% to 70.9%. In this case, however, it is questionable in how far the 
“data cleaning“ criteria applied were really addressing data quality problems - rather than just biasing the 
sample by removing some groups of firms, where the rating model had often made faulty predictions before.    42
•  Regional origin: Predictive power of agency ratings does considerably vary with regional 
origin of the corporations under consideration. It was noted, that agency ratings for Euro-
pean corporations are quite more selective than those for US-American corporations.
174 
Whether these differences can really be traced back to region specific peculiarities, like 
different accounting systems or insolvency laws
175, or whether the quality of rating proc-
esses of the rating agencies’ local branches does vary
176 - or whether the differences that 
were found, can be completely explained by other “structural sample differences” (such as 
coverages of different phases of insolvency cycles, sizes of corporations, or industry clas-
sifications
177, …) is unknown. 
Restrained from “structural” aspects of the sample used, also methodical aspects of the fore-
cast method or rating model itself can impact measured accuracy, like: 
•  Underlying definition of default
178: Accuracy measures of rating models can vary depend-
ing on the definitions of default that were chosen. However, empirical relevance of this is-
sue seems to be rather small
179,180,181, at least when certain alternative objective definitions 
of default are being used (delay of payment [typically at least 90 days], restructuring, in-
solvency).
182,183,184 For theoretical reasons it would be more appropriate, not to consider 
                                                 
174   One-/Five-year-accuracy-ratios for US-American corporations with S&P-ratings are 82%/74%, while those 
for European corporations are 94%/84%, see S&P (2004b, p. 11). In cases of US-American MOODY’S rated 
corporations AR-values of 81.0%/66.6% are achieved [AR values were calculated according to MOODY’S 
own definition] and for European corporations 95.3%/92.4%, see MOODY’S (2004c, p. 2).  
175   CANTOR (2004, p. 3): „Regional distinctions, however, are critically important when applying this global 
methodology. Local expertise is likely to be quite valuable in rendering judgments about the meaning of fi-
nancial statements, the macroeconomic and financial environment, and potential sources of support. More-
over, regional bankruptcy regimes may influence the incentives of issuers to service their debts and the in-
centives of other market participants to provide financial support in times of distress.” 
176   CANTOR (2004, p. 3): “Why have European ratings provided more powerful rank orderings of credit risk 
compared to American ratings? Is it because Moody’s analytical practices are better in Europe or because 
relative risk is simply easier to judge in Europe? The following exhibit presents data which suggests the cor-
rect answer may be ‘some of each.’” 
177  See data given in CANTOR (2004, p. 9). Aside from Aaa-rated corporations, European MOODY’S rated indus-
trial firms are usually much bigger (two to four times) than American MOODY’S rated industrial firms.  
   According to the data given in BASEL COMMITTEE (2000c, p. 33f.) the share of financial corporations (banks 
plus insurances companies) in all MOODY’S  rated US corporations is only 30%, while for European 
MOODY’S rated corporations it is 66%! The respective ratios for S&P are 52% and 69%.  
All in all, European agency rated corporations are bigger than American corporations and are more often as-
sociated with financial industries. On a univariate basis, both factors have been found important in explain-
ing differences in predictive power of subgroups of corporations. 
178  See on this topic in particular BALCAEN, OOGHE (2004, p. 21ff.). 
179  In a study based on 35,000 medium-sized Austrian enterprises HAYDEN (2003, p. 33) showed, that statistical 
models that were calibrated on bankruptcies, practically had the same discriminatory power when validated 
on defaults defined as credit rescheduling events or on defaults defined as delays of payments events as sta-
tistical models that were specifically calibrated on these default events. 
180   see on this also GRICE, DUGAN (2001, p. 154ff.) 
181  More important than the exact definition of default seem so be, whether any or only the individually first de-
fault shall be forecasted, see LEHMANN (2003, p.8): “The analysis was also carried out with (not first-time) 
LLP [loan-loss-provision] […] as definition of default. A number of ‘easily classifiable’ observations en-
tered, the performance of the rating system rose by a considerable amount. Yet, this is rather trivial. Usually, 
defaulted loans enter a separate monitoring process. The bank is most of all interested in the ‘surprises’ in its 
non-default loan portfolio. The true capabilities of a credit rating system show in the prediction of first-time 
LLP, not the extrapolation of past LLP. The definition of the default criterion has great impact on the results. 
Therefore, studies with a different default criterion cannot be compared easily.” 
182  For the various empirically used definitions of default see S&P (2004, p. 7f), MOODY’S (2004, p. 3). See 
also the tables in chapters 3.3 to 3.5.    43
delay of payments as default events, because delays of payments do not inherently cause 
any adversities to the creditors.
185,186 At the best, delays of payments are good predictors 
for future debt losses, so that they should rather be used as explanatory variables, but not 
as variables to be explained. Considering practical issues, including delays of payments 
(but also other events, such as loan restructuring) as default events raises serious ques-
tions of data availability – even if bank internal data is accessible.
187  
Potentially fatal, however, is the default definition according to Basel II, that defines the 
existence of default events, amongst others, already then, when a bank assumes, that an 
obligor “is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the banking group in full […]”
188. As 
indications of the unlikeliness of full repayments are considered, amongst others, when 
“the bank makes a charge-off or account-specific provision resulting from a significant 
perceived decline in credit quality subsequent to the bank taking on the exposure.” When 
establishing the accuracy of default predictions - with the above mentioned definition of 
default – it is not (only) being tested how well bank ratings are suited for predicting bank-
ruptcies, but (also) how well current bank ratings can predict future bank ratings (see 
“unlikely” and “perceived decline in credit quality”), which is rather a test of rating stabil-
ity than a test for predictive power of rating, or how well current bank ratings can predict 
their future bank actions (“the bank makes a charge-offs”). If these actions are triggered 
by future values of the same rating system whose predictive power is being examined, 
predicting own future actions can also be rather considered to be a test of rating stability 
than a test of predictive power! 
•  Aspired temporal stability of ratings:
189,190 By pursuing other, potentially rivaling or con-
flicting goals, in particular by attempting to stabilize ratings (see the notes above concern-
                                                                                                                                                          
183  The economic impact of defaults, however, seems to be sensitive with respect to the default definition cho-
sen, see VARMA, CANTOR (2005, p. 32f., p. 43) for an examination on bond recovery rates for seven different 
(initial) default events. In case of distressed exchanges or missed principal defaults, bond holders can realize 
recovery rates that are on average more than 35 percentage points higher than in case of chapter 7 defaults. 
In about 85% of all 1,084 examined defaults, however, missed interest payments or chapter-11-defaults are 
involved, whose default rates differ by comparatively insubstantial 10 percentage points on a univariate ba-
sis (and even less on a multivariate basis). 
184   KOCAGIL, AKHAVEIN (2001, p. 5, formatting added): „The discussion about the definitions of default in-
cluded within the proposals appears to have centered around when a firm would be considered to have de-
faulted, and hence the impact on aggregate default rate numbers and PDs. There has been less discussion on 
how different default definitions might impact the variables used within internal rating tools. Our under-
standing is that this is because, as our own experience shows, the factors that can predict default are gener-
ally the same, whether the definition of default is 90 days past due or bankruptcy (in fact many of the defini-
tions contained within BIS II are steps on the road to bankruptcy/insolvency).“ 
185  In an empirical examination GUPTON, STEIN (2005, p. 22) find, that in case of bank loans, 20% to 50% of all 
“delay-of-payment-defaults” do not cause any economic damages to the concerned banks, without the banks 
having to utilize collateral or to restructure loans. For that reason, many banks do not consider and record 
such events as defaults. However, such nonuniform data recording behavior inevitably results in mismatches 
in measured default rates- and in conceptual incompatibilities of other Basel II risk parameters, such as LGD 
(loss given default). See on this also BASEL COMMITTEE (2005, p. 63) and NORDEN, WEBER (2005, p. 48f.). 
186   see on this also KOCAGIL, AKHAVEIN (2001, p. 5), KOCAGIL ET AL. (2003, p. 6) 
187   see FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, KOCAGIL (2000, p. 7): “If a company has its loans restructured in such a way that 
there is an adverse effect upon the lender, such as moving payments back in time without any compensation, 
in general we do not capture this as a default. This is not our intention, as adverse restructurings are part of 
Moody's corporate definition of default. It is a limitation of the data: rarely are such restructurings properly 
recorded in internal systems.” 
188   BASEL COMMITTEE (2004, §452f, formatting added) 
189  “Many financial market participants - investors, regulators and issuers - desire stable ratings. However, 
while reflecting an aversion to volatility per se, their desire for rating stability also reflects the view that 
more stable ratings are more accurate ratings with respect to the relative fundamental credit risk of a bor-
rower”, see CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 15), “Some investors […] highly value rating stability to avoid unex-   44
ing the OTC-approach), accuracy of ratings may be considerably negatively affected.
191  
Annotation: The aspired stability of individual rating notes should not be confounded with 
the stability of the rating system. The latter quality factor measures, whether the predictive 
accuracy of the rating system diminishes throughout time (but with constant time hori-
zon), see also the remarks concerning pool- vs. cohort data.
192 
•  Refinement of rating scale: The more imprecise a rater communicates his insolvency pre-
dictions, for instance by using only few discrete rating grades instead of continuous scores 
or default probabilities, the smaller is the discriminative power of the ratings. When using 
a 7ary scale (see S&P notation AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC/C) information losses, 
measured in accuracy ratio, of a magnitude of 2% - 3% (1 – 2.5 percentage points) have to 
be expected compared to a rating model with a continuous scale. Using a 17ary instead of 
a continuous scale comes along with information losses of about 0.5% (< 0.5 percentage 
points) (see chapter 2.3.4 and Appendix IV).  
SWETS (1988, 1289ff.) states following four qualifications concerning validity and reliability 
of accuracy measures, that are violated by some of the examples stated above: 
(1) “Adequacy of truth: The tester should know with certainty for every item in the test sam-
ple whether it is positive or negative. Incorrectly classifying test items will probably de-
press measures of accuracy.” (ibid) Related problems are expected to occur with respect to 
data quality and definition of default (see above).  
(2) “Independence of truth determination and system operation: The truth about sample items 
should be determined without regard to the system’s operation”. (ibid) Otherwise the sys-
tem’s performance is likely to be overstated. Related problems have to be expected in re-
lation with subjective definitions of default.  
(3)  “Independences of test sample and truth determination. Procedures used to establish the 
truth should not affect the selection of cases. Thus the quest for adequate truth may bias 
the sample of test cases, perhaps resulting in an easier sample than is realistic.” (ibid) See 
for instances the comments on preselected portfolios, in this case however, biasing the test 
samples resulted in worse than realistic samples. 
(4)    “Representativeness of the sample: The sample should fairly reflect the population of 
cases to which the [...] system is usually applied.” (ibid) Following issues are relevant 
here: positioning of the observation data period in the default cycle and composition of 
the test sample with respect to corporations legal forms, industry classifications, sizes, and 
regional origins. 
When ever possible, comparisons of different rating models’ performances should always 
take place based on the same sample and based on the same methodological premises (like 
                                                                                                                                                          
pected portfolio revisions.”, see FONS (2002, p. 4), “Moody’s believes that our ratings system-management 
practices, as set forth above, are desired by both issuers and investors. Issuers want stability in ratings and 
the opportunity to make changes in their financial condition, if possible, to avoid changes in ratings.”, see 
ibid (p. 12). 
190   CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 1): “Moody’s corporate bond ratings are intended to be ‘accurate’ and ‘stable’ 
measures of relative credit risk, as determined by each issuer’s relative fundamental creditworthiness and 
without reference to explicit time horizons. Moody’s performance should therefore be measured by both rat-
ing accuracy (the correlation between ratings and defaults) and rating stability (the frequency and magnitude 
of ratings changes). 
191  As one positive consequence resulting from increased rating stability, a reduction in transaction cost for 
those investors can be expected, who are pursuing rating-dependent investment strategies (e.g. due to regula-
tory restrictions), see LÖFFLER (2004a). 
192   see NORDEN, WEBER (2005, p. 41)    45
definition of default, attempted stabilization, fineness of rating scale, etc.). However, for em-
pirical comparisons, these options are in many cases just not available, in particular not, when 
ratings cannot be independently reproduced by an outside researcher, for instance because de-
tails of the rating model are kept secret
193, because the ratings are influenced subjectively by 
the rater as the cases arise
194, or because the rating model utilizes data that is not publicly 
available.
195 But also in these cases it would be desirable to make portfolio- and rating model 
spanning comparison, considering all known disturbance variables in as much as possible.  
Fortunately, many studies do not only present results for one particular rating method, but 
also results for other methods as well – based on the same sample and methodological prem-
ises - so that at least here direct comparisons are possible. The rating model that was most of-
ten chosen for such reference purposes, is the so called ALTMAN’S Z-score rating model (see 
chapter 3.4). Often univariate predictive accuracies of single ratios are reported, too (see 
chapter 3.3).  
It also has to be noted, that none of the rating models that are used in reality can perfectly 
forecast future default events. At best stochastic statements can be made. Therefore empiri-
cally measured accuracy values have to be interpreted as realizations of random events, for 
which confidence intervals may be given based on formal methods and assuming certain ap-
proximations or based on numerical methods (simulation). 
The only accuracy measure that is considered subsequently for the reasons outlined in chap-
ters 2.3 and 2.4 is the accuracy ratio.  
A very conservative
196 estimation of the standard deviation (the standard deviation is subse-
quently used for inferring confidence intervals by assuming normally distributed AR-values) 
of the accuracy ratio, in the following referred to as approximation 1, with ND defaulters and 
NND non-defaulters is given as follows: 
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193  see for instance ALTMAN, HALDEMAN, NARAYANAN (1977, p. 12): “The actual coefficients […] for the 
seven variables cannot be reported due to the proprietary nature of the ZETA model […].” or ALTMAN, 
MARCO, VARETTO (1994, p. 512): “The coefficients of all the functions are protected by secrecy for the pur-
pose of safeguarding the investments […] made in research, testing and database creating.” 
194  S&P (2003b, p. 17): “There are no formulae for combining scores to arrive at a rating conclusion. Bear in mind 
that ratings represent an art as much as a science. A rating is, in the end, an opinion.” 
195  The rating model of PLATTNER (2002, p. 50f) for instance is using a dummy variable (as one of its 27 (!) ex-
plaining variables) that is set to 1, if the corporations’ house bank believes, that the respective customer is 
affected by “temporary liquidity problems” and to 0 otherwise. For researchers outside the bank, however, it 
is practically impossible to correctly specify this variable – and to make things worse, just this variable is the 
most influential of all variables contained in the model, see ibid (p.46).  
196   Conservative here means that the values thus calculated are bigger than the real standard deviation. 
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A more efficient, formally only marginally more elaborate approximation for the standard de-
viation of the Accuracy Ratio, in the following referred to as approximation 2, is given as fol-
lows:
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≤ σ    (approximation 2) 
An unbiased determination of the standard deviation of the accuracy ratio can be obtained 
with following formula, subsequently referred to as E-H-T (2003), which however is ex-
tremely cumbersomely to implement: 
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= σ  (E-H-T (2003)) 
The terms PD,D,ND and PND, ND,D and their determinants are calculated as follows: 
F 45)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , D ND 2 , D 2 , D ND 1 , D 2 , D 1 , D ND ND 2 , D 1 , D ND , D , D S S S P S S S P S , S S P S S , S P P < < − < < − < + < =  und 
F 46)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , ND D 2 , ND 2 , ND D 1 , ND 2 , ND 1 , ND D D 2 , ND 1 , ND D , ND , ND S S S P S S S P S , S S P S S , S P P < < − < < − < + < =  
where SD,1 and SD,2 / SND,1 and SND,2 are score values for two corporations randomly chosen 
from the sample of defaulters/ non-defaulters. 
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Analogously holds:  
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       (own computation) 
In a simulation experiment based on a portfolio of 10,000 corporations, a given distribution 
a1..ag of corporations over g rating classes 1..g and 15 different PD-vectors
200 PD1..PDg, stan-
dard deviations for the accuracy ratio were obtained resting upon 200 simulation runs per set-
ting (i.e. per PD-vector). The values thus obtained are compared with approximations 1 and 2 
and the exact (unbiased) method E-H-T (2003) (see Figure 12):  
Standard deviations obtained with approximation 1 are oversized by factor 2.3 to 1.8, standard 
deviations obtained with approximation 2 by factor 2.3 to 1.4. As was to be expected, there 
were no statistically significant differences between standard deviations obtained by simula-
tion and by formula E-H-T (2003). 
Note: As can be seen from the respective formulas, the only input needed by both approxima-
tion methods are the expected accuracy of the rating model (stated in AUCROC or AR) and the 
number of defaulters and non-defaulters, while the exact (unbiased) E-H-T(2003) estimator 
requires rating class specific data concerning default rates and frequencies as well. These data, 
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Figure 12:  standard deviations of accuracy ratios of a portfolio of 10,000 corporations, obtained 
by simulation, two approximations, and one exact method; 15 different forecast peri-
ods; 200 simulation runs per setting 
                                                 
200  For the simulations a 17ary rating scale was used. The distribution of companies over the various rating 
classes was chosen according to S&P (2004). Rating class specific default probabilities were chosen accord-
ing to the respective historical, cumulated 1-15-years default rates, see S&P (2004, p. 13).    48
If accuracy ratio values are (approximately) normally distributed
201, confidence intervals with 
a confidence level of α can be constructed as follows:
202  



















         with Φ
-1  … reverse function of the standard GAUSSIAN distribution 
 
Figure 13: distributions of accuracy ratios obtained by simulation (gray areas) and GAUSSIAN dis-
tributions, fitted by maximum-likelihood-estimations (lines)  
For portfolios of the size and default distributions that were used in the simulation experi-
ment, the distribution of accuracy ratios can appropriately be modeled by GAUSSIAN distribu-
tions (see Figure 13)
203, so that reliable confidence intervals can also be obtained by the for-
mulas given in F 44 to F 53. For smaller portfolios or portfolios with unusually small prob-
abilities of default, however, the GAUSSIAN distribution (or the distribution of POISSON
204) 
                                                 
201  For theoretical reasons, it is impossible that the accuracy ratio of a given portfolio is exactly normally dis-
tributed. First, in a portfolio with a finite number of corporations only a finite number of different accuracy 
ratio values are attainable – while the GAUSSIAN distribution is a continuous function, which therefore can 
adopt indefinitely many different possible values. Second, by definition accuracy ratio values are limited to 
values between -1 and +1 while there are no limits for the GAUSSIAN distribution. 
202   see for instance ENGELMANN, HAYDEN, TASCHE (2003, p. 10) 
203  The four graphs in Figure 13 show empirical distributions of the accuracy ratio values that were obtained for 
the first 4 of the 15 PD-vectors which represent rating class specific probabilities of default for forecast hori-
zons of 1 to 4 years. Also displayed in the respective graphs are measures that show the quality of the maxi-
mum likelihood fittings according to three test methods, χ
2-, KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV- and ANDERSON-
DARLING-test. According to the χ
2-test all fittings with p-values bigger than 0.5 are considered to be good, 
according to the KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV-test p-values smaller than 0.03 and according to the ANDERSON-
DARLING-test p-values smaller than 1.5 (see DECISIONEERING (2000, p. 141)). According to the χ
2-test and 
ANDERSON-DARLING-test all of the four fittings that are displayed in Figure 13 are evaluated as good, while 
according to the KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV-test all fittings marginally miss a good evaluation.  
204  Utilizing the POISSONIAN limit theorem, it follows that the distribution of POISSON can be used for modeling 
rare events. In case of portfolios with small rating class specific probabilities of default and “sufficiently 
large” (HARTUNG (1991, p. 122), translation) rating classes, rating class specific defaults can be modeled 
with the distribution of POISSON with parameters λi=ni·PDi, although the binomial distribution with parame-
ters ni and PDi would be the most direct choice for modeling rating class specific defaults. However, on the 
contrary to binomial distributions with different PD-parameters, the sum of random variables that follow the 
distribution of POISSON also follows the distribution of POISSON with λΣ =Σλ. For λ≥9 the distribution of 
POISSON can be approximated by a GAUSSIAN distribution, see HARTUNG (1991, p. 213).    49
might not be appropriate,
205 so that confidence intervals can only be determined numerically 
(i.e. per simulation). 
When comparing accuracy results that were empirically achieved by different rating systems, 
the uncertainty of measured accuracy values that result by random realizations of individual 
defaults has to be considered. In the example chosen, even with a sample size of 10,000 cor-
porations, there is a 5% chance that a random realization of the measured accuracy ratio is dif-
fering by more than 3 percentage points from the expected value (which however is only 
known in simulation studies - but not in real life applications).
206 
In a portfolio of 5,000 companies, which about equals the current number of S&P or 
MOODY’S rated issuers
207, confidence interval breadths would rise by factor  2  (to ±4,2 per-
centage points for α=95%); and in a portfolio of “only” 1,600 corporations, which is roughly 
equal to the number of S&P and MOODY’S rated corporations in the beginning of the 1980ies 
even by factor 2,5 (to ±7,4% percentage points for α=95%).  
In the following chapters the results of various studies are presented and compared. Insofar 
these data were available, the specific parameter values of the above mentioned influencing 
factors (size of database, temporal and industry origin, sizes of enterprises, usage of bank 
portfolio data yes/no) were given – but they were not used for “correcting” the measured ac-
curacy ratio values, as no accepted correcting mechanisms is known. 
The performance of the various rating models shall not only by compared in relation to each 
other (see chapter 3.5), but also in relation to three benchmark rating models, that can be im-
plemented with minimal means and whose performance has been extensively studied. 
•  In chapter 3.2 it is examined (for the German basic population of corporations), how accu-
rate insolvency predictions are, whose only inputs are the legal forms and industry classi-
fications of firms. 
•  Chapter 3.3 summarizes the results of empirical studies that examined the insolvency pre-
dictive value of single ratios derived from firms’ financial statements.  
•  In chapter 3.4 the performance of a multivariate insolvency prediction model is examined, 
that served as benchmark model in many insolvency prediction studies. 
The performance of these three benchmark models is meant to form more meaningful lower 
thresholds of the minimal acceptable predictive quality of rating models than naïve predic-
tions with expected accuracies of 0% do. 
                                                 
205  If a portfolio consisted of n corporations with identical probabilities of default PD, the number of defaults, 
which actually follows a binomial distribution, could – according to the theorem of DE MOIVRE/ LAPLACE – 
well be approximated by a GAUSSIAN distribution with  PD n⋅ = µ  and  () PD 1 PD n − ⋅ ⋅ = σ , if 
() 9 PD 1 PD n ≥ − ⋅ ⋅ , see HARTUNG (1991, p. 201). 





= σ  
   For small values for PD, i.e.  ≈ ⋅ = µ PD n   ( ) PD 1 PD n − ⋅ ⋅ , a good approximation by the GAUSSIAN distribu-
tion is possible, if the expected value of defaults is at least 9. For PD=1%, for instance, the minimal portfolio 
size would be  900
% 1
9




 corporations (with identical probabilities of default). 
206  With a confidence level α=95%,  ( ) ( ) 96 . 1 % 5 . 97 % 5 . 2
1 1 ≈ Φ = Φ −
− − , σAR = 1.5%, and µAR=82.9% a confi-
dence interval with  [] [ ] % 8 . 85 %; 0 . 80 % 9 . 2 % 9 . 82 CI % 95 = ± =  results. 
207  On 01/01/1985 (01/01/2004) 1,620 (4,810) corporations were rated by MOODY’S and 1,650 (5,189) by S&P, 
see MOODY’S (2005, p.35) and S&P (2005, p. 26).    50
3.2  Benchmark I: Attainable accuracy by taking into account legal 
status and industry classification of corporations 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the attainable prediction accuracy of rating model 
that is only based on publicly available insolvency statistics.  
In the insolvency statistics issued by the STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, the German Federal 
Statistical Office, univariate break-downs of insolvency frequencies partitioned by industry 
classification, legal status, federal states, age, and size of enterprises (numbers of employees) 
are published. Additionally, insolvency rates are published by corporations partitioned by in-
dustry classification, legal status and federal states.
208 If insolvency frequencies and rates are 
known, it is possible to derive the total number and relative frequencies of corporations (in-
cluding non-defaulted corporations) of the respective groups.
209 Thus, if the various groups 
are sorted according to realized insolvency rates, the univariate ex-post-prediction accuracy, 
measured for instance in accuracy ratios, of the criteria mentioned above can be obtained.  
However, if the intention is to derive insolvency predictions, a method to infer an ordinal re-
lationship based on information, which is available at the beginning of the period for which 
insolvencies shall be predicted must be found. For this purpose, in the following realized in-
solvency rates of the preceding year will be used. Although, more sophisticated methods are 
conceivable, it can be shown empirically that the quality of ordinal insolvency predictions 
could only marginally be improved, as historical orderings of groups are excellent estimators 
for future years’ orderings (see Figure 18 in anticipation of this chapter’s results).  
For being able to obtain discriminative insolvency predictions based on industry classifica-
tion, legal status, or home federal state of corporations, two preconditions must be fulfilled:    
(I) there must be “notable” differences in realized insolvency rates of the groups that are de-
fined by applying the above mentioned criteria and (II) these difference must be relatively 
stable (or more general. these differences must be predictable) year-on-year. 
These aspects are investigated in the following. In Figure 14 time series of insolvency rates 
partitioned for 14 industry sector are given for 1994-2003, in Figure 15 time series for corpo-
rations of different legal status for 1980-2003, and in Figure 16 for different federal states for 
1980-2003 are given.
210 Altogether up to 3.3 m corporations per year (in 2003) are covered by 
these statistics.
211  
                                                 
208   See for instance STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004a, 2004c). Additionally here can be found partitionings of 
insolvencies according to applicants for insolvency (creditors vs. obligors) or for causes of insolvency (over-
indebtness, illiquidity, …)  
209   Number of corporations i = insolvencies i / insolvency rate i, if insolvency rate i > 0%. 
210  Data source for univariate analyses: 1980-1998 GÜNTERBERG, WOLTER (2003) and for 1999-2003 STA-
TISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004b).  
211  With to exceptions, on of it of major importance (see below), the total number of corporations covered is es-
sentially equal to the turnover tax statistics that covers all corporations liable for turnover taxes with reve-
nues of more than 16,617 EUR per year.  
   Additionally 350,000 GmbH (ltd) and 7,000 AG [plc] were considered, in particular holding companies, 
who are not liable for turnover taxes and thus are not covered by turnover tax statistics, see STATISTISCHES 
BUNDESAMT (2004a, p. 20f). Official insolvency statistics, however, are inconsistent in this respect: when 
calculating legal status dependent insolvency rates, these non-turnover-tax-liable corporations were included 
(see ibid.), but they were excluded when calculating industry specific or all-corporations default rates (while 
the total number of insolvencies remained constant), which can be shown by reverse projections based on in-
solvency frequencies and rates (S. 19, 20, 41) and which was confirmed via telephone inquiry by the STA-
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Figure 14: insolvency rates by industry classification, Germany, 1994-2003
212 
acc. ratio  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  mv 
ex-ante    25.5%  26.7%  25.8% 25.4% 25.4% 24.7% 25.0% 20.9%  19.8%  24.3%
ex-post  23.3%  25.6%  26.7%  25.9% 25.6% 25.4% 25.1% 26.0% 21.9%  19.8%  24.5%
Table B:  univariate predictive accuracy (AR) of insolvency predictions based on industry classifications, by 
ex-post-sorting (realized default rates of respective years) and ex-ante-sorting (realized default rates of 
preceding years), mv ... mean value 
Pronounced differences between insolvency rates of various industries
213 are to be noticed 
(see Figure 14). The ordinal relationship between the various industries’ default rates is rela-
tively stable, even for very long periods of time: from the five industries with the highest in-
solvency rates in 1994, four are still among the “worst five” industries in 2003. From the five 
                                                                                                                                                          
official statistics by about 12% and was in 2003 not 1.35% (ibid., p. 20) or 1.34% (STATISTISCHES BUNDE-
SAMT (2004c), but 1,19% (own calculations). 
   For correcting these inconsistencies there were used factors for projecting from the number of revenue-tax-
liable GmbH and AG to the entirety of all GmbH and AG. It was assumed that these factors (GmbH: 1.83, 
AG: 2.07), which were determined based on 2003 data, were the same throughout time and for all industries. 
  Larger deviations compared to the (definitely overstated) official industry specific insolvency rates of the 
STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT will therefore in particular appear in industries with above average shares of 
GmbH (or AG) in all companies: mining and quarrying: 1.07% (STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004c)) vs. 
0.75% (own calculations) and manufacturing: 1.60% (STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004c)) vs. 1.30% (own 
calculations). Smaller deviations will appear in industries with below average shares of GmbH (and AG): 
hotels and restaurants 1.25% vs. 1.20% or health and social work: 1.43% vs. 1.35%. 
212  source: own calculations based on GÜNTERBERG, WOLTER (2003, p. 142f) 1994-1998 data (small trades de-
ducted) and STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004b) 1999-2003 data (industry specific corrections of under 
recordation of GmbH and AG). 
213   Following sectors were covered (official denominations and, where required, own abbreviations): A: agricul-
ture, hunting and forestry (agriculture), B: fishing, C: mining and quarrying (mining), D: manufacturing, E: 
electricity, gas and water supply (supplier), F: construction, G: wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods (trade), H: hotels and restaurants (hotels), I: trans-
port, storage and communication (transport), J: financial intermediation (finance), K: real estate, renting and 
business activities, etc. (renting), M: education, N: health and social work (health), O: other community, so-
cial and personal service activities (other services).    52
“best” industries (industries with the lowest insolvency rates) in 1994, three are still among 
the five best industries in 2003
214 
Permanent and materially above-average default rates are only occurring in construction. 
Only in 2003 one other, relatively minor industrial sector (at least in terms of numbers of cor-
porations)
215 was characterized by even higher default rates (financial intermediation
216). 
Permanent below-average default rates were characteristic for electricity, gas and water sup-
ply; education; and other community, social and personal service activities. 
In Table B attainable accuracy-ratios for one-year insolvency predictions are given whose 
only explanatory variable is the firms’ industry classification.
217 Presented are both ex-post 
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Figure 15: insolvency rates by legal forms, Germany, 1980-2003
218 
AR  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  … 
ex-post    41.4%  40.6%  37.9%  37.9% 38.3% 38.4% 38.0% 38.4% 38.9%  38.6%  38.6% … 
ex-ante  39.8%  41.4%  40.6%  37.9%  37.9% 38.3% 38.4% 38.0% 38.4% 38.9%  38.6%  38.6% … 
 
                                                 
214  Because only insolvency predictions with forecast horizons of one year shall be examined, the year-on-year 
stability of default rates is more important than multi-year examinations: average changes in ranks were 0.94 
ranks per sector and year. In 45% of all cases ranks remained the same, in 32% ranks changed by one posi-
tion, in 15% by two positions and in only 7% of all cases by more than two positions. By randomly assign-
ing ranks, average change in ranks would be 4.64 ranks per sector and year and in 67% of all cases ranks 
changed by more than two positions. 
215   Only 0.5% of the 3.3 m corporations belong to the group of financial intermediation. The other negative out-
lier group, construction, accounts for remarkable 11.4% of all corporations and thus has a much bigger im-
pact on the predictive value of industry classifications. 
216  Included are for instance commercial banks (WZ2003-industry classification code 65.12), investment com-
panies (WZ 65.23.1), insurance industry (WZ 66) or insurance salesmen (WZ 67.20.1).  
217  For calculating accuracy ratios are needed: industry specific realized default rates, see Figure 14, shares of 
the various industries in all corporations and an asserted ordering of industries with respect to expected de-
fault rates.  
218  Source: own calculations based on GÜNTERBERG, WOLTER (2003, p. 144f) for 1994-1998 data (small trade 
deducted) and STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004b) for 1999-2003 data.    53
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  mv 
40.0%  38.8%  39.1%  39.3%  37.9% 37.5% 36.1% 35.2% 41.5% 42.2%  30.6%  28.1% 38.0%
40.0%  38.8%  39.1%  39.3%  38.4% 37.5% 36.1% 39.4% 41.5% 42.5%  30.6%  28.1% 38.3%
Table C:   univariate predictive accuracy (accuracy ratio) of insolvency predictions based on legal status, by ex-
post-sorting and ex-ante-sorting, mv..mean value  
In Figure 15, see above, time series of insolvency rates for five different legal forms (ltd - 
limited liability companies), plc - public limited companies and partnerships partly limited by 
shares (KGaA), part - partnerships (OHG-unlimited company), KG - limited partnership), 
sole - sole proprietorships and other - other legal forms)
219 are displayed for the 1980-2003 
period.  
Remarkable are the permanently above average default rates for limited liability companies. 
Although their share in all companies was only 25% in 2003, they accounted for 51% of all 
insolvencies in 2003. Thus, their insolvency rate is about twice as high as the average default 
rate of all companies and about three times as high as the insolvency rate of all other compa-
nies (in some of the years it is actually up to 5.5 times as high). Even higher insolvency rates 
do only occur among public limited companies as of 2001, whose share in all corporations is 
comparatively minor (0.4%). 
The final variable that was considered for univariate explanations of corporate insolvencies 
was federal state affiliation, see Figure 16. Starting with the German reunification in 1990, 
there is a striking divergence in insolvency events between old and new federal states (former 
West-Germany vs. former East-Germany), in particular from 1990-1997. The rank order of 
insolvency rates within new and old federal states is relatively stable. Within the new federal 
states Thüringen and Brandenburg achieve comparatively low and Sachsen-Anhalt and Ber-
lin-East comparatively high insolvency rates. Within the old federal states noteworthy differ-
ences between Northern and Southern states become apparent. While the Southern states Ba-
den-Württemberg, Bayern, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz - and as of 1999 also Saarland - score 
well, Northern states (and the special case Berlin-West) Nordrhein-Westfalen, Schleswig-
Holstein, Bremen, Niedersachsen - and as of 2001 also Hamburg - come off badly. 
                                                 
219  Hereunto belong for instance Vereine (associations) or Genossenschaften (co-operations). Only 1.6% of all 
corporations are organized in such legal forms.    54









































































































Baden-Württemberg Bayern Berlin-West Berlin-Ost
Brandenburg Bremen Hamburg Hessen
Meckl.-Vorpommern Niedersachsen Nordrhein-Westfalen Rheinland-Pfalz

















insolvency rates by federal states, Germany, 1980-2003
 
Figure 16: insolvency rates by federal states, Germany, 1980-2003
220 
AR  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  … 
ex-post    11.7%  12.0%  8.7%  12.3% 10.6% 12.0% 11.1% 10.8% 12.7%  12.7%  19.1% … 
ex-ante  13.2%  11.8%  12.1%  8.7%  12.8% 11.7% 12.6% 11.7% 11.4% 13.0%  12.9%  19.8% … 
 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  mv 
13.1%  9.7%  11.5%  16.8%  20.4% 21.2% 22.0% 24.4% 23.8% 21.5%  18.2%  18.5% 15.4%
14.0%  12.0%  14.4%  17.8%  20.5% 21.6% 22.4% 25.0% 24.5% 21.6%  19.9%  19.4% 16.0%
Table D:   univariate predictive accuracy (accuracy ratio) of insolvency predictions based on federal state affilia-
tion, by ex-post-sorting and ex-ante-sorting, mv ... mean value 
Besides univariate predictive accuracy, multivariate predictive accuracy is a matter of par-
ticular interest. For its calculation absolute numbers and insolvency frequencies for groups of 
corporations that are identical with respect to their parameter values concerning industry clas-
sification and legal status and federal states (or alternatively individual datasets of corpora-
tions that contain these three criteria) were needed. Though, such data is not centrally pro-
vided for Germany by the STATISTISCHES  BUNDESAMT. The STATISTISCHES  BUNDESAMT, 
however, does provide cross-classified tables with industry classification and legal status in-
solvency data for the 1999-2003 period. 
221 
                                                 
220  source: own calculations based on GÜNTERBERG, WOLTER (2003, p. 151ff) for 1994-2001 data (small trade 
deducted) and STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004b) 2001-2003 data; extrapolation: split-up of insolvencies 
Berlin, total into Berlin-West and Berlin-Ost (East) as of 2001; extrapolation of total number of companies 
domiciled in Berlin-West with West-German growth rate of total number of corporations as of 1991. 
221   STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004b)    55
The further advancements are largely analogous to the univariate analyses. The only differ-
ence is, that this time not only 14 groups (industry sectors) or 6 groups (legal status)
222 are 
formed, but 84 (=14*6) groups that each represent unique combinations of industry classifica-
tions and legal forms. Given about 3.3 m corporations and 40,000 insolvencies a year (2003) 
on average 39,000 corporations and 470 insolvencies remain per group. For preventing outlier 
values and division by zero, all groups that contained less than 1,000 corporations in 1999 
were merged within their respective legal forms (as legal form was a more predictive univari-
ate indicator of insolvencies than industry classification)
223, so that the number of distinctive 
groups was reduced to 61.
224 With 517.130 corporations (15.6%) the group most frequently 
represented was sole proprietorships- trade, the smallest group with only 479 corporations 
(0.015%) was the “remnant group” other legal forms – other industries.  
Subsequently Figure 17 depicts insolvency rates for all corporations classified by legal forms 
and industries for 1999-2003: 
225  
                                                 
222  As opposed to the data sets that were utilized for univariate analyses (1980-2003), the data set that was used 
for multivariate analyses allowed a separate treatment of GmbH&Co KG which form a subgroup of partner-
ship companies with unusually high insolvency rates (cf. Figure 17). 
223  Merged were e.g. the groups sole proprietorships –fishery (716 corporations) and sole proprietorships –
mining (591 corporations) forming the group sole proprietorships – other industries. 
224  Only 0.3% of all corporations were affected by merging groups. Most of the mergers referred to the gener-
ally weakly occupied industries fishery and mining and to the weakly occupied legal forms GmbH&CoKG 
and AG/KGaA (plc). 
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Figure 17: insolvency rates by legal forms and industries, Germany, 1999-2003  
The graph shows, that: 
•  material differences occur in default rates of corporations of different industries within 
the same legal forms (see the steep slopes of the legal form specific graphs for all legal 
forms except AG/KGaA (plc)
226), 
•  material differences occur in default rates of corporations within the same industries 
but different legal forms (see also the scale differences in Y-axes of the six legal form 
specific diagrams), 
•  relative industry specific default rates within legal forms are very stable throughout 
time (see the largely  non-intersecting year-graphs within the six legal form specific 
diagrams) and 
                                                 
226  In case of public limited companies just those industries were weakly represented, that were often related 
with far above average default rates (construction, hotels, finance) or with far below average default rates 
(supplier, other services).     57
•  at least for limited liability companies, partnerships and other legal forms also abso-
lute default rates are relatively stable, whereas there seems to be a structural break for 
sole proprietorships between 2001 and 2002, which might be caused by changes of in-
solvency law in 1999
227,228, that leads to materially and proportionally increased insol-
vency rates for all industries. In cases of GmbH&Co.KG and AG/ KGaA insolvency 
rates are not stationary either, but they seem to rise rather steadily and proportionally 
throughout time.  
Despite a few outliers, the 1999-2003 rank orders of the 61 industry-legal status groups are 
very stable. Rank correlation coefficients for adjacent years vary between 0.924 and 0.975, 
which is not only highly statistically significant,
229 but already close to perfect stability. 
From the numerically more important groups (share in all companies > 1%) permanently bad 
scores are obtained by ltd  –  construction (rank mv  1999-2003=58.0 of 61 [mv…mean value], 
PDmv 1999-2003=3.6%, share in all corporations=3.9%), ltd – renting [and services]
230 
(rank=51.4; PD=2.2%, share=6.6%) and ltd – transport (rank=49.8; PD=2.1%, share=1.1%). 
Permanently good scores were achieved from partner – renting [and services] (rank = 6.8; 
PD=0.15%, share=3.9%), sole – renting [and services] (rank=8.4; PD=0.21%, share=15.5%) 
and sole – other services (rank=14.6; PD=0.23%, share =6.5%). 
The accuracy ratio values of ordinal insolvency predictions that are attainable by taking into 
account firms’ industry classifications and legal forms are displayed in Table E. Presented are 
both, AR-values for ex-post [classifications] and ex-ante predictions.  
AR  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  mv 
ex-post    53.8%  54.7%  44.5%  44.5%  49.4% 
ex-ante  53.0%  54.1%  55.1%  45.2%  45.2%  50.5% 
Table E:  multivariate predictive accuracy (accuracy ratio) of industry classification 
and legal status, by ex-post- and ex-ante-sortings, mv ... mean value 
Graphical representations of the accuracy ratio time series for the various univariate progno-
ses and the multivariate industry-legal status-rating are given in Figure 18, while in Figure 19 
(ex-post) CAP-curves
231 for the industry-legal status-rating are given.  
                                                 
227   see for instance STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004, p.5ff) 
228  see also PLATTNER (2002, p. 37, translation): “The interpretation of the development since the implementa-
tion of the reformed insolvency law is obscured, as a part of the newly introduced consumer insolvencies is 
caused by entrepreneurial activity. In an economical sense, consumer insolvencies may be corporate insol-
vencies. (With the reformation of the reformation, which came into force as from 1
st of December 2001, 
consumer insolvencies will be more narrowly restricted to private individuals.) Further, more insolvencies 
are being captured. Henceforth, also GbR [civil law associations] are subject to insolvency laws.” 
229  Based on 100,000 simulation runs the 99%-quantil of rank correlations at random placing is 29.8%. The 
95%-quantile is 21.3%. 
230  To the industry group “renting [and services]” belong following sectors: real estate activities (WZ 70), rent-
ing of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods (WZ 71), computer 
and related activities (WZ 72), research and development (WZ 73), other business activities (WZ 74). 
231   The CAP curves are based on “ex-post-predictions”, as there are only minor differences in quality (measured 
in accuracy ratios) between ex-post- and ex-ante-predictions, while for 1999 only ex-post-predictions could 








































































































legal forms[t-1] legal forms[t] industries[t-1]
industries[t] federal states[t-1] federal states[t]
industries & legal forms[t-1] industries & legal forms[t]
accuracy ratios Germany by industries, legal forms, and federal states
benchmark rating 
(industries & legal forms), 
AR: 45%-55%
thin line: accuracy ratio based on ex-post 
sorted realized insolvency rates
(ex-post sorting)
bold line: accuracy ratio based on 
insolvency rates in t-1 
(ex-ante sorting)
 
Figure 18: time series of predictive accuracy (measured in accuracy ratio) of ordinal insolvency predic-
tions based on industry classifications, legal forms and federal state affiliations (univariate) and 
combination of industry classification and legal status, by ex-ante- and ex-post-sortings (t-1 vs. t) 
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1999 2000 2001 2002
2003 Diag. perf. Prog.
AR: 45%  AR: 45% - - 55% 55%
skill Brier: 0.9%  skill Brier: 0.9% - - 2.2% 2.2%
skill entropy (CIER): 5.7%  skill entropy (CIER): 5.7% - - 9.8% 9.8%
AR PD akt AR Vorjahr AR 1999
1999 53,0% #NV 53,0%
2000 54,1% 53,8% 53,8%
2001 55,1% 54,7% 54,4%
2002 45,2% 44,5% 44,3%
2003 45,2% 44,5% 44,3%
with benchmark rating
attainable accuracy ratio
(based on industry classification 
and legal status)
diagonal
CAP-curves, industry classification & legal status, Germany, 1999-2003
AR[t] AR[t-1] AR[1999]
perfect prediction  
Figure 19: one-year-forecast CAP-curves (ex-post), 1999-2003 and accuracy-ratio-values 
(ex-post and ex-ante) for the industry – legal status benchmark rating 
Altogether, it was shown that by considering only industry classifications and legal forms of 
corporations, accuracy ratios for insolvency predictions of 45%-55% (mean value 1999-2003: 
50%) can be achieved. For rating models that are based on the same sample (representative 
sample of German corporations of all industries and legal forms), in particular for bureau or 
business scores like the CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex (see chapter 3.5) – this is a more rea-   59
sonable minimum level of just acceptable forecast accuracy than a fictive “naïve rating” with 
an expected accuracy ratio of only 0%.  
Annotation: The predictive accuracy of the industry-legal-status-rating could possibly be im-
proved by implementing more detailed industry classifications. Most important leverages for 
this are likely to be found by subdividing the currently biggest industry aggregates – which 
might be heterogeneous concerning default rates of their various subgroups
232. The currently 
biggest industry aggregates are manufacturing (10.6% of all corporations), construction 
(11.4%), trade (24.3%), renting and services (27.0%) and other services (9.1%). It is also fea-
sible, that the information content of the ratings could be improved by including domiciles 
(federal states) of corporations.
233 
Considering even further variables that were listed in the beginning of the chapter - like size 
of enterprises (see Figure 20
234,235) or age of enterprises - probably would not be recommend-
able within the same statistical framework, as group sizes would become too small.
236  
Either some of the groups would have to be pooled
237, or additional criteria would have to be 
integrated via other statistical methods, such as linear or logit regression
238 (with considerably 
fewer interaction terms, if any). 
                                                 
232  If they were not heterogeneous at all, nothing would be lost by subdividing these aggregates. Only the num-
ber of industry – legal status groups would rise.  
233  So for instance, insolvency rates of Saxonian corporations of given industry sectors and legal forms consis-
tently differ from the respective German rates (they are higher), source: own calculations based on data from 
STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT DES FREISTAATES SACHSEN (2004). That is, differences in federal state specific 
default rates cannot be (completely) explained by differences in the distribution of certain industries or legal 
forms, which means, that adding federal state as explanatory variable should increase the predictive accu-
racy of the industry-legal-status-rating. 
234  The graphs were created utilizing data given in BLOCHWITZ, LIEBIG, NYBERG (2000, p. 12 and Appendix 2, 
p.3). The above mentioned authors’ study is based on 140,000 financial statements of German corporations, 
whose financial statements were consigned to the DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK between 1994 and 1999. 
   Although insolvency rates for the six separate groups differ by a factor of about 10, the predictive value of 
enterprise size is relatively low [measured on a an issuer weighted basis] (AR = 15,2%) and roughly con-
forms with the informational value of federal state domiciliation (cf. Table D).  
  One reason for the low informational value, despite the huge inter-group differences of insolvency rate, of 
enterprise size is, that most firms of the sample are characterized either by slightly above average (groups A 
and B) or slightly below average (group C) insolvency rates. The three remaining groups that are character-
ized by more extreme insolvency rates are relatively sparsely represented. As can be seen in Figure 20, right 
hand side, over 80% of all corporations are either in group A, B, or C. 
  Presumably, information value of enterprise size is much higher on a dollar-volume-weighted basis instead 
of an issuer-weighted basis. 
235  Comparable values for the univariate discriminatory power of enterprise size were found in HAYDEN (2003) 
for a sample of 35,000 Austrian corporations with revenues between 0.4 m to 75 m EUR (see ibid., variable 
61 (net sales/CPI), AR = 11% (average by applying three different definitions of default)). 
236  When using 14 different industry sectors, 6 different legal forms, 16 federal states, (e.g.) 5 enterprise size 
classes and (e.g.) 3 age classes, 20,000 groups resulted. Given 3.3 m corporations and 40,000 defaults, on 
average only 165 corporations and 2.0 insolvencies per year remained.  
237  Owing to comparable industry specific insolvency rates (see Figure 17) legal form groups GmbH&Co.KG 
and ltd could be pooled without much loss in predictive accuracy. Dividing Federal states into only 3 instead 
of 16 groups might turn out to be sufficient (former East-German states vs. former West-German states 
(North) vs. former West-German states (South)). It also might be sufficient to consider only 2 distinctive age 
and size groups.  
238  In particular in cases of the cardinally scaled variables enterprise size and age, using regression equations 
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Figure 20:   insolvency rates by size of enterprise (turnover in million EUR) in an empirical study (left hand 
size); CAP-curve and univariate discriminative power of enterprise size (CAP-Kurve) (right hand side), 
source: own calculations    61
3.3  Benchmark II: univariate discriminative power of financial ratios 
Besides case-by-case decisions by loan and credit officers that are more or less guided by 
bank-internal rating-rules and fully formalized evaluations of “soft factors” such as manage-
ment quality or market position
239, bank rating systems typically substantially rest upon for-
malized systems for evaluating “hard facts”, in particular on statistical analyses of ratios that 
are derived from firms’ financial statements and profits and losses accounts.
240,241  
Commercial rating models which aim at providing cheap, automated ratings for small and 
medium sized companies
242 and most statistical insolvency prediction models that are pre-
sented in scientific journals, are exclusively based on financial ratios. Additionally, in some of 
the models also variables, which were presented in the last chapter, such as size of enterprise, 
industry classification, legal status, or regional provenance are incorporated.  
Even though rating agencies officially don’t concede, that the ratings they render are essen-
tially based on formal ratio analyses, too,
243 it was shown,  
(I) that ratings (or changes in ratings) of the major rating agencies can at least be fairly well 
reproduced
244 or forecasted by simple statistical ratio-based models and  
(II) that simple ratio models do achieve predictive accuracies that are comparable or superior 
to the accuracy that agencies’ ratings are achieving on the same samples.
245,246  
                                                 
239  see for instance GRUNERT, NORDEN, WEBER (2005) 
240  see for instance BASEL COMMITTEE (2000b, p. 17ff.)  
241  ROMEIKE, WEHRSPOHN (2004b, p. 9, own translation): “In general, the bigger the bank’s financial volume is, 
the more influential ‘soft factors’ are in determining the ratings. But also for multi-million dollar loans, soft 
factors keep their role as modifying variables. The basis is still established by (mathematical) methodical 
analyses of quantitative data, in particular firms’ financial data.” 
242  see ESCOTT, GLORMANN, KOCAGIL (2001b, p. 20)  
243  S&P (2003, p. 53). “The ratio medians are purely statistical, and are not intended as a guide to achieving a 
given rating level. [..] Ratios are helpful in broadly defining a company’s position relative to rating catego-
ries. They are not intended to be hurdles or prerequisites that should be achieved to attain a specific debt rat-
ing. Caution should be exercised when using the ratio medians for comparisons with specific company or in-
dustry data because of major differences in method of ratio computation, importance of industry or business 
risk, and impact of mergers and acquisitions.“ etc. or S&P (2003, p. 17) “There are no formulae for combin-
ing scores to arrive at a rating conclusion. Bear in mind that ratings represent an art as much as a science.”  
244  Although, the method used by AMATO, FURFINE (2004, p. 2666, see panel A) seems to be poorly calibrated 
(there are to few ‘extreme’ prognoses like AAA, AA or B and CCC/C) it achieves, by utilizing seven ratios, 
a reasonably precise reproduction of STANDARD AND POOR’S 7ary ratings (n=10,002): in 53% of all cases, 
the S&P rating is specified correctly, in 43.5% of all cases it is missed by exactly one grade, in 3.3% by two 
and in only 0.1% of all cases by more than two grades. 
  For comparison: on a 7ary scale the ratings of S&P and Moody’s exactly match in 71% of all cases, in 28% 
they differ by one grade, in 1.1% by two and in 0.1% by more than two grades (own calculations based on 
GÜTTLER (2004, Appendix B)). 
Based on seven ratios (plus dummy variables for legal years) BLUME, LIM, MACKINLAY (1998, p. 1404, n = 
7,324) create ratings that in 57.2% - 40.2% - 2.3% - 0.3% of all cases deviate by 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 grades from 
S&P ratings.  
The respective congruence values for S&P’s and MOODYS’S ratings on a 4ary scale (as only investment 
grade classes AAA, AA, A, and BBB were considered) are 78.9% - 20.5% - 0.5% - 0.0% (own calculations 
based on GÜTTLER (2004, Appendix B)).  
245  see CAREY, HRYCAY (2001), ALTMAN, RIJKEN (2004), FONS, VISWANATHAN (2004) 
246  It’s a moot point whether rating agencies really utilize non-public information, which is a frequently ex-
pressed presumption (see for instance WHITE (2001, p. 13ff.) or FONS (2002, p. 5)), and thus are in principle    62
As second benchmark – next to the industry-legal-status-rating that was presented in the last 
chapter, therefore the discriminatory power of ratios will be examined, that turned out to be 
especially discriminative in empirical studies. 
With exception of the study by BEAVER (1966), who is regarded as founder of (univariate) ra-
tio based insolvency prediction
247, in order to facilitate a statistically meaningful comparison, 
in the following only such studies were considered that based on an evaluation of several 
thousand corporations (see the remarks concerning width of confidence intervals of accuracy 
ratios in chapter 3.1). 
Following details can be found in the respective columns of Table F: 
•  Study: author(s) and year of release of the study,  
•  Number of corporations: The number of corporations that were included in the 
studies is given separately for defaulted and non-defaulted companies. Sample 
sizes of validation samples
248, if available, are also given separately for default and 
non-default observations, as confidence intervals of the precision measures under 
consideration, accuracy ratios, do dependent thereof (and not just on the total 
number of corporations). 
•  Database: Data sources that were used by the studies are mentioned (bank portfo-
lio, external databases, publications by rating agencies, etc.) as well as geographic 
origin, industry classification and legal status of the included companies.  
•  Other: Amongst others, in this column the applied definitions of default are given.  
•  Prognosis accuracy: In this column accuracy ratios of the ratios and rating models 
that were analyzed in the studies are given. If there were no accuracy ratio meas-
ures published in the respective studies, they were estimated, usually based on the 
ARα&β-estimator (see chapter 2.3.3 and Appendix I). Estimated AR-values were 
                                                                                                                                                          
able to make more accurate insolvency predictions than external analysts. See on this MOODY’s (2000, p. 9): 
“A common misconception is that rating agencies, through privileged access to senior management of an is-
suer, always gain insights that are not available through any other means. While Moody’s meets with man-
agement of most issuers of securities it rates, it does not view this practice as indispensable to the formation 
of an accurate rating opinion. Moody’s finds that meetings with senior management tend to accelerate the 
analytic process, because much of the information needed can be gathered quickly from one source and the 
answers to certain questions easily obtained, but not to change the substance of such process. If such a meet-
ing is not available, the analyst usually has access to public filings, industry publications, and information 
from the issuer’s competitors, suppliers, and customers through its normal course of business.” 
   See on this also MAHONEY (2002b, p. 4): “Rating agencies routinely request nonpublic data in the course of 
their surveillance activities. However, unlike accounting firms, rating agencies have no authority to demand 
such data, and indeed many firms do not provide requested data. […] They can only work with the informa-
tion which has been disclosed or which management has elected to provide.” 
247  RÖSLER (1988, p. 102), FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2001, p. 9), BALCAEN, OOGHE (2004, p. 8) 
248  Validation of rating models is typically carried out based on data, which was not already used for parameter-
izing (also learning, training, or developing) the rating model that shall be evaluated. Strictly speaking, a 
validation that is based on such data does not test the predictive power of a model, but test its ability to re-
produce the input data. Depending on the flexibility of the model’s structure (which depends on the number 
of included variables and parameters or additional restrictions (for instance concerning the algebraic signs 
certain parameters may or may not adopt)) improvements in reproduction of learning samples may be ac-
companied by decreased “out-of-sample” performance. (“over-fitting”), see e.g. STEIN (2002, p. 14f.), OENB 
(2004a, p. 48), DWYER, KOCAGIL, STEIN (2004, p. 26).    63
indicated by asterisks. Also given are 95%-confidence-intervals based on ap-
proximation 2 (see chapter 3.1).
249  
 
                                                 
249  Approximation 2 was used, because the data at hand did not permit the implementation of the exact formula 
E-H-T-(2003) that was given in chapter 3.1. Based on the examinations that were presented in the same 
chapter, values obtained by Approximation 2 are divided by 1.6 for yielding more realistic values. Empiri-
cally measured (or calculated) accuracy ratios were implemented in formula F 42 but were truncated at 80%, 
which limits the impact of positively biased accuracy ratios on the size of the confidence interval.    64
 
Table F: studies that examined univariate insolvency predictive power of financial ratios; to be continued on the following pages 
study  number of corporations  database  other  prognosis accuracy 
BEAVER 
(1966) 
79 defaulters, 79 non-
defaulters (paired sample 
by industry sector, and 
size), 
706 observations [financial 
statements], no separate 
validation sample
250 
defaulters: “MOODY’S Industrial 
Manual”: usually big stock com-
panies,  
non-defaulters: sampled from 
“12,000 Leading U.S. corpora-
tions” 1954-1964, USA, industrial 
firms 
error statistics for 30 financial ratios, 
7 groups of financial ratios, (p. 106), 
forecast: 1..5 years, def. of default: 
insolvency (59/79), bond default 
(3/79), bank account overdraft 
(1/79), non-payment of dividends for 
preferred stocks (16/79) (!) 
cash flow / total debt: eI: 21.5%, eII: 5.1% 
(1 year), Æ AR: 73.4%-95.6%, ARα&β=89%,  
    ARactually = 93.1% (*) 
251, 
net income / total assets: eI: 16.5%; eII: 11.4% 
(1 year) Æ AR: 72.1%-92.5%, ARα&β=86% (*) 
current ratio:  eI: 30.4%, eII: 8.9% (1 year) 
Æ AR: 60.7%-89.2%, ARα&β=80% (*) 











1989-1999, big companies 
(“MOODY’S proprietary data-
bases”) 
AR data for one financial ratio and 
three/ five rating models, 
forecast: 1 year 
def. of default? 
AR distance to default  
       (“Merton model variant”): 67% 
AR return on assets: 53% 





2,300 defaulters, at least 
30,000 non-defaulters, 
139,685 observations 
training sample: data 
1994-1996, no separate 
validation sample (?) 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK financial 
statements database, “representa-
tive for German middle market 
borrowing” (p.12), revenue at least 
5 m EUR, 1993 – 1999; industri-
als: 44%, trade: 42.6%, construc-
tion: 5.5%, farming: 0.5%, other: 
7.3%, several legal forms 
6 ratios, industrial sector specific 
analysis (p.28-30),  
3 rating models, 
forecast: 1 year 
def. of default: initiation of insol-
vency proceedings 
AR capital recovery ratio: 53.7% (manufactur-
ing), 44.0% (other enterprises), 47.9% (trade), 
AR equity ratio: 44.8% (other, trade),  
AR return on equity: 40.4% (manuf.), 37.5% 
(trade), 24.9% (other) 
AR ROCE: 45.2% (manuf.) 
AR net interest rate: 44.4% (manuf.) 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.5 PP (*) 
                                                 
250  Note: In case of univariate analyses, the absence of a validation sample does not cause severe issues of “over-fitting”, because no model parameters are actually “fitted” to the 
empirical data of the learning sample as in the case of multivariate analyses. The only bias that might occur is, that – the more variables are tested - the more likely it is, that 
the best performing variable performs best on the given portfolio just by chance, and therefore is likely to perform worse on a holdout portfolio. 
251  See chapter 2.3.3 and Appendix I for determining upper and lower limits for the accuracy ratio values and ARα&β. Only for one financial ratio, cash flow to total debt, an addi-
tional bar chart with 22 intervals for solvent and insolvent corporations was given, see BEAVER (1966, p. 92ff.), from which an accuracy ratio value of 93.1% could be ob-
tained. 
252  “Walk-forward-testing” is a data parsimonious validation method, which abolishes the conventional strict separation of rating data sets into training and validation samples. 
Initially, a rating model is parameterized based on historical data by a specific date t0 and is validated on the default information for t1. Subsequently the model is re-estimated 
– by including t1-data – and validated on t2 data and so forth, see SOBEHART, KEENAN, STEIN (2000, p. 2f.) and STEIN (2002, p. 15f.). Therefore, what is actually being tested 
by this approach is not the predictive power of a concrete, fully parameterized rating model, but the predictive power of a rating methodology (like linear discriminant analy-
sis, logit analysis, etc.) in the given environment.     65





public firms (big plc): 
15,805 corporations, 1,529 
defaults, 130,019 observa-
tions [fin. statements],  
private firms (SMB): 
24,718 corporations, 1,621 
defaulters, 115,351 obser-
vations; training sample: 
up to and including 1995 
data, includes ca. 25% of 
the default and 50% of the 
non-default data (p. 23) 
public firms: MOODY’S default da-
tabase: US, Canada, Compustat, 
1980-1999; (CRD) private com-
pany data: “predominantly private, 
middle market corporations pro-
vided by financial institutions” 
(p.22), USA, Canada (?), industry 
sectors: industry 22%, services 
27%, trade 31%, construction 6%, 
other 14% 
AR data for 2 financial ratios,  
PD-profiles for 10 financial ratios,  
ca. 10 different rating models/ model 
variations 
forecast: 1 and 5 years, 
def. of default: 90 days past due, 
credit written down, classified as 
non-accrual, insolvency 
AR liabilities / assets: 61.9% (public firms) 
AR liabilities / assets: 44.8% (private firms) 
AR net income / assets: 61.5% (public firms) 
AR net income / assets: 39.9% (private firms) 
CI95%,AR = ± 2 PP (*) [both public and private 





1,406 defaulters,  
14,447 corporations 
“walk-forward-testing” 
MOODY’S proprietary default da-
tabase, MOODY’S proprietary rat-
ings database, COMPUSTAT, 
IDC, 
non-financial US firms [detailed 
into 30 sectors], (big) plc, 1980-
1999 
default rates for certain quantiles for 
9 different variables (p.11), 
AR data for one financial ratio and 5 
rating models, forecast: 1 year;  
def. of default: “bankruptcy, chapter 
11, distressed exchange, indenture 
modified, dividend omission, missed 
principal and/or interest payments” 
AR distance to default  
       (“Merton model variant”): 67% 
AR return on assets: 53% 





development sample: 485 
defaulters, 4,866 corpora-
tions 11,427 observations, 
(1987-1992) “exceptionally 
good data quality” (p.5, 
translation); validation 
sample: “representative 
and realistic” (p.5, transla-




bank portfolio data [development 
+ validation] (p. 4) 
non stock exchange listed corpora-
tions of various industry sectors 
(no financials), Germany; no af-
filiated groups, no state ownership, 
no holdings or property develop-
ers; industrials: 52%, trade: 27%, 
services: 13%, construction: 5%, 
other 2% [validation sample];  
graphical representations of shares of 
defaulters/ non-defaulters for 8 
groups; for 9 ratios (p.11-15) 
forecast: 1 year, 5 years 
def. of default: insolvency, distressed 
exchange, moratorium, note protest 
AR debt coverage: 56% (*), 
AR net indebtness: 54% (*), 
AR trade creditors ratio: 53% (*), 
AR EBITD: 48% (*), 
AR liabilities structure: 44% (*) 
AR profit on sales: 43% (*) 
AR equity ratio: 39% (*) 
AR personnel expenses on sales: 3% (*) 
AR sales growth: 1% (*)
253 
(based on development sample), 
CI95%,AR = ± 3.5 PP (*)  
                                                 
253  Insolvent corporations are overrepresented among corporations with sizably above average as well as below average sales growth rates. Therefore the discriminative power of 
the variable sales growth could be substantially improved by applying appropriate transformations (like squaring down or using absolute values of growth rates).    66
study  number of corporations  database  other  prognosis accuracy 
SHUMWAY 
(2001) 
300 defaulters,  
3,182 corporations, 39,745 
observations 
(training sample: 1962-
1983: 1,822 corporations, 
118 defaulters) 
intersection of Compustat Indus-
trial File and CRSP Daily Stock 
Return File for NYSE and AMEX 
stocks,  
defaulters: Wall Street Journal In-
dex, Capital Changes Reporter, 
Compustat Research File, Direc-
tory of Obsolete Securities, Nexis, 
1962 -1992,  
no financials; 
deciles data for hit rates, 
1 financial ratio, 
9 rating models 
(p. 118, 120, 122) 
forecast: 1 year 
def. of default: initiation of insol-
vency proceedings  
AR net income / total assets: 66.4% (*) 
CI95%,AR = ± 5.5 PP (*) 





2,156 defaulters, 19,524 
corporations, 83,613 ob-
servations, partition in es-
timation and validation 
sample?  
pooled data sets of the two biggest 
Austrian banks, predominantly 
small private firms (0.5-1m EUR: 
29%, 1-5m EUR: 41%, 5-25m 
EUR: 20%, …), same exclusions 
as in ESCOTT, GLORMANN, KO-
CAGIL (2001a,b),  
industrials: 27%, trade: 33%, ser-
vices: 17%, construction: 12%, 
other 11%; 
graphical representations of shares of 
defaulters/ non-defaulters for 8 
groups; for 8 ratios (p.13-17) 
forecast: 1 year, 5 years 
def. of default:  inexplicit (see p.6ff): 
delay-in-payment [90 days], insol-
vency, loan loss provision ?   
AR equity-liabilities ratio 43% (*) 
AR liabilities structure 25% (*) 
AR sales revenue 37% (*) 
AR debt service 33% (*) 
AR cashflow/ liabilities 39% (*) 
AR liabilities/revenue ratio 37% (*) 
AR revenue growth 3% (*) [non-transformed] 
AR current assets structure 22% (*) 
(based on development sample ?)
254, 




3,000 defaulters, 300,000 
observations 
validation sample: 825 de-
faulters, 200,000 observa-
tions 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK financial 
statements database (see above), 
Germany, 1994-1999 
 
AUC-data for 3 financial ratios  
(p. 15, 16) and 3 rating models, con-
fidence intervals for AUC 
forecast: 1 year 
def. of default: insolvency 
AR ordinary business income /  
       total assets:  57.7% (*) 
AR change in (net sales / total assets): 
       22.5% (*) 
AR current assets/ total assets: 7.1% 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.5 PP (*) [basis: complete sample?] 
                                                 
254  It is assumed, that 1/3 of the default data is used for the development and 2/3 for the validation sample - as in ESCOTT, GLORMANN, KOCAGIL (2001a,b).    67
study  number of corporations  database  other  prognosis accuracy 
HAYDEN 
(2003) 
defaulters – observations 




  (393 – 27,388) 
restructuring sample: 
1,459 – 48,115 
  (528 – 15,683) 
delay in payment sample: 
1,604 – 16,797 
  (433 –   4,649)  
3 Austrian banks, ÖNB, SMB re-
search Austria;  
exclusion of various inconsistent 
or incomplete datasets,   
no big corporations, minimum 
sales: 0.36 m EUR, 1987-1999, 
81% limited liability companies, 
14% limited partnerships, 4% sin-
gle-ownership-companies, 1% 
general partnerships; 
29% industrials, 25% services, 
33% trade, 12% construction, 
1% farming 
AR data for 65 ratios [sorted by 10 
ratio groups] and 3 default defini-
tions (!) 
forecast: 1 year 
def. of default: (1) insolvency vs.  
(2) restructuring vs. (3) delay-in-
payment [90 days] 
AR equity / assets: 44.1% (*), 
AR ordinary business income /  
      assets: 41.1% (*) 
AR ordinary business income /  
      operating income: 40.3% (*) 
AR cash flow /  
      (liabilities-advances): 39.4% (*) 
AR retained earnings/assets: 39.0% (*) 
[displayed are the averages of the AR-values for 
the three different default definitions] 
CI95%,AR = ± 2.5 PP, ± 2 PP, ± 2 PP (insolvency, 
restructuring, delay-in-payment) (*) [basis: com-
plete sample?] 
(*) source of accuracy ratio data: own calculations, usually based on data concerning error rates of types I and II    68
Disregarding BEAVER’s (1966) study, which was based on a rather small sample and an un-
usual definition of default, following statements concerning insolvency predictive power of 
single financial ratios can be made: 
•  The most discriminative financial ratios for small and medium-sized businesses, which 
predominantly emanate from ratio groups capital structure,  profitability,  and  debt 
coverage, achieve accuracy ratios of at least 45%, partially up to 55%.  
•  Univariate insolvency predictions based on financial ratios are yielding for large stock 
companies accuracy values that exceed the respective values for SMB by about 10 
percentage points. The highest discriminative power was achieved by a financial ratio 
(“distance-to-default”
255) which was based on market data (and not on financial state-
ments data) and which was the only ratio, that incorporated some measure of risk 
(here: volatility of market value).  
Comparison with the results of the industry-legal-status-rating: 
It is interesting to note, that the forecast accuracy of the industry-legal-status-rating roughly 
equals the univariate predictive forecast value of the most discriminative financial ratios– at 
least in cases of small and medium-sized businesses (but not for large stock companies).  
If, however, the industry-legal-status-rating would be applied to the same samples, which 
where used for determining predictive values of the single financial ratios, its forecast quality 
would be worse than the performance it achieved on the basic population of all German cor-
porations (cf. chapter 3.2), because the samples that were used were usually more homogene-
ously, in many cases even perfectly homogeneously (stock companies samples), with respect 
to legal status, which was the most important explaining variable of the industry-legal-status-
rating. In particular, sole proprietorships and partnerships were usually heavily underrepre-
sented compared to the basic population of all German companies. 
Also for as far as industry classification is concerned, a further decrease in power of the in-
dustry-legal-status-rating is to be expected. Only one of the nine studies cited above was ex-
clusively based on one single sector (“industrials”), while all other studies contained corpora-
tions of practically all other sectors – only financial corporations were explicitly excluded in 
most cases. However, in most of the studies, industrial sectors with “extreme” default rates – 
both high (construction) and low (services) – were underrepresented, while sectors with aver-
age default rates, in particular industrials, were notedly overrepresented.
256 
Altogether, it may be concluded that financial ratios are more precise insolvency predictors 
than industry classification and legal status. However, for establishing those ratios, financial 
statements of the corporations have to be available– which might form a much harder restric-
tion in some fields of application than the knowledge of a corporate’s industry sector and le-
gal status, which are often already evident from the company’s name. 
                                                 
255  see SOBEHART ET AL (2000, p. 9): distance to default = (MVA – DP) / VolMV, with MVA ... market valued 
assets, DP ... default point, VolMV ... volatility of market value with DP = short-term debt + 0.5 * long-term 
debt. 
256  According to the data given in chapter 3.2, only about 11% of all 3.3 million German corporations are indus-
trials, another 11% are building companies, 24% are trading companies and 46% of all corporations are op-
erating in some of the service sectors (industry sectors H, K-O) and 7% in other sectors.    69
3.4  Benchmark III: ALTMAN’S Z-score 
After BEAVERs (1966) pathbreaking univariate insolvency prognosis study (see chapter 3.3) 
was published, a further development of financial ratio based insolvency prediction methods 
towards multivariate statistical models was merely a matter of time.
257 Already shortly after, 
this development was carried out by ALTMAN (1968)
 258, who devised the first multivariate 
insolvency prediction model for corporations
259, the so-called Z-score model.  
Contrary to univariate models, multivariate models are not limited by the predictive power of 
single ratios. They can take advantage of the combined predictive power of ratio combina-
tions – possibly also by implementing ratios, which have only low or no predictive value at all 
on a univariate basis.
 260 And, though they are not based on an explicit and complete theory, 
they at least provide standardized methods for selecting and aggregating ratios that shall be 
included in a forecast model. 
261  
As ALTMAN’s Z-score model still enjoys great popularity in finance literature
262 and is still 
implemented in some of today’s commercial rating models
263, and because its capacity was 
tested in so many empirical studies, its applicability as third benchmark for evaluating the 
predictive quality of rating models shall be evaluated subsequently. In fact, the Z-score model 
is rather about a family of models, as already three different versions of it exist (see below).  
ALTMAN’s Z-score model is based on a multivariate linear discriminant analysis, a categorial 
statistical procedure,
264 which segregates corporations into two groups (“presumably solvent” 
vs. “presumably insolvent”).
265  
                                                 
257  Already BEAVER (1966) recognized this avenue, but could not find satisfactory solutions himself: “Sugges-
tions for future research: The analysis conducted here has been a univariate analysis – that is, it has exam-
ined the predictive ability of ratios, one at a time. It is possible, that a multiratio analysis, using several dif-
ferent ratios […] would predict even better than the single ratios. Some preliminary efforts have undertaken 
to develop multiratio models, but the results have not been very encouraging in the sense, that the best single 
ratio appears to predict about as well as the multiratio models.” (ibid, p. 100)  
258  See for instance SOBEHART ET AL (2000, p.6), FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p.9), FRERICH, 
WAHRENBURG (2003, p.4), BALCAEN, OOGHE (2004, p.11).  
259  However, at that time, multivariate analyses were already used for consumer credit evaluations, see ALTMAN 
(1968, p. 591). 
260  See for instance ALTMAN (1968, p. 594): “The variable finally established did not contain the most signifi-
cant variables, amongst the twenty-two original ones, measured independently.” and ibid (p. 595f.) concern-
ing variable X5 – which, however, was no longer considered in later model revisions: “This final ratio is 
quite important because […] it is the least significant ratio on a univariate basis. In fact, based on the statisti-
cal significance measure, it would not have appeared at all. However, because of its unique relationship to 
other variables in the model, the Sales/ Total assets ratio ranks second in its contribution to the overall dis-
criminatory ability of the model.” 
261  cf. ALTMAN (2002, p.8) 
262  FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p. 74): “The most well-known quantitative model for private 
firms in the U.S. is Altman's Z-score. Virtually every accounting or financial analysis book uses Z-score to 
demonstrate how financial statement data can be translated into an equation that helps predict default. […]” 
263  The Z-score method is being used by the rather miniscule German rating agencies CONFIRM GmbH and IKU, 
who offer their services for 1,200,- EUR resp. 312,- EUR per rating, see ROMEIKE, WEHRSPOHN (2004, p. 
18, 27, 29).  
264  See for instance KÜTING, WEBER (2004/1993, p. 363), DIMITRAS, ZANAKIS, ZOPOUNIDIS (1996), DEUTSCHE 
BUNDESBANK (1999, p. 58), OENB(2004, p. 41f.). 
265  ALTMAN (1968), however, derives a trisection from the model output. He assumes the existence of a middle 
interval that he depicts as “grey zone” (or “zone of ignorance” or “gray area”, see ibid, p. 606). In the dis-
criminant analysis system of the DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1999, p.55) this interval is referred to as “B-area” 
or “indifference area”.    70
The predictive power of the model, however, is not evaluated on this 0/1 classification, but on 
the underlying discriminant score, the “Z-score” itself, see also chapter 2.3.
266  
Based on a very small sample of 33 insolvent and 33 solvent corporations (for more details 
see Table G) ALTMAN’s (1968) original model correctly classified 31 of the insolvent and 32 
of the non-insolvent corporations (with a forecast horizon of one year). Following discrimi-
nant function was estimated: 
F 54: Z-score = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 +1.0X5   
267 with  
X1 … working capital/total assets,  
X2 … retained earnings/total assets,  
X3 … earnings before interest and taxes/total assets,  
X4 … market value equity/book value of total liabilities,  
X5 … sales/total assets.
268 
Corporations with Z-score values of less than 1.81 are classified as highly vulnerable to de-
faults, while corporations with Z-score values greater than 2.67 resp. 2.675 
269 are rather in-
vulnerable, at least for a period of one year.  
In order to extend the applicability of the Z-score model to non-listed companies, in a subse-
quent model revision, called Z’-score, variable X4 was replaced by book value of equity/ book 
value of total liabilities. Following, all coefficients were reestimated: 
F 55: Z’-score = 0.717X1 + 0.847X2 + 3.107X3 + 0.420X’4 + 0.998X5   
270 with  
X1 … X3 and X5 … see above, 
X’4 … book value equity/book value of total liabilities 
Because variable X5 was considered as too “industry specific”, it was abandoned in a later 
model revision that aimed at extending the applicability of the model to non-industrial firms. 
All remaining coefficients were reestimated again: 
F 56: Z“-score = 6.56X1+ 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X’4  
271  with 
X1 .. X4 … see Z’-score. 
According to this score, all corporations with a Z“-score value below 1.10 are classified as 
vulnerable.
272 In the following, Table G gives a review of empirical studies that measured the 
predictive capability of the Z-score model in one of its three versions. Where available, uni-
variate predictive power of the respectively best ratios and rating models are given, too, in or-
der to control for sample specific opaqueness. 
                                                 
266  See ALTMAN, SAUNDERS (1998, p.1737) for a procedure for mapping Z-scores to S&P-grades based on 750 
rated US-corporations. 
267  In ALTMAN (1968, p. 594) following formula is given: Z-score = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 
+0.999X5. In this formula, however, variables X1 to X4 are interpreted as absolute percentage values (a value 
of 33%, for instance, has to be entered as 33 instead of 0.33), see on this and on formula F 54 ALTMAN 
(2000/1968, p. 12f). 
268  Variables X2, X3, and X4 can be interpreted as proxies „for historic, current, and future profitability“, see 
Altman, Rijken (2004, p. 2686) 
269  cf. Altman (1968, p. 602) vs. Altman (2002, p.18) 
270  ALTMAN (2000/1968, p.25) 
271  ALTMAN, SAUNDERS (1998, p. 1737f.): “The Z”-score model is a four variable version of the Z-score ap-
proach. It was designed to reduce distortions in credit scores for firms from different industries.” 
272  see ALTMAN (2002, p. 22).     71
Table G: survey of studies that examined predictive power of the various Z-score versions,    to be continued on next page 
study  number  




33 defaulters, 33 
non-defaulters  
(paired sample by 





USA, 1946-1965, total as-
sets: 0.7 m - 25 m US$ 
(on average 6.4 m US$), 
public limited companies 












eI.: 6.1%, eII. 3.0%, Æ AR Z-score: 90.9% -99.3%, ARα&β=97%, 
ARactually =98.7% (*) 
eI.: 9.1% eII.: 3.0%,  
Æ AR Z’-score: 87.9% - 98.9%, ARα&β=96% (*), 
AR Z“-score: 70% - 80% (?) 
274 











AR Z’-score: 43% 
AR Z“-score: 53% 
AR best single financial ratio: 53% (return on assets [=NI/assets]) 
AR best model: 73% (“nonlinear model”, “MOODY’S model“)  









(p. 14)  
AR Z-score (?): 56% 
AR Z“-score (?): 53% 
AR best single financial ratio: 53% (return on assets) 
AR best model: 73% (MOODY’S Public Firm) 
CI95%,AR = ± 2 PP (*) 
                                                 
273  The given accuracy measures refer to the training sample and are therefore positively biased, in particular because of the small sample size in relation to the large number 
(22) of variables that were examined (ibid., p. 594). Though ALTMAN (1968, p. 601f.) was considering two validation samples, he did not simultaneously examine them re-
garding to classification errors of types I and II. The validation sample for examining errors of type II was clearly not representative (non-insolvent corporations with tempo-
rary profitability problems). 
274  In ALTMAN (2002, p. 18) three further own studies on the Z-score’s performance were cited that found, for different samples of insolvent corporations, following errors of 
type I when applying cut-off scores of 2.675/ 1.81: 1969-1975: 86 corporations, error type I: 18%/ 25%; 1976-1995: 110 corporations, error type I: 15%/ 22%; 1997-1999: 
120 corporations, error type I: 6%/ 16%. No information was given concerning data sources for defaulted companies, their legal forms, industry sectors and sizes of enter-
prises. Also missing was data concerning non-insolvent corporations - probably no non-insolvent corporations were included in the studies at all. It was mentioned, however, 
that “In 1999, the proportion of U.S. industrial firms that had Z-scores below 1.81 was over 20%.“ (ibid, p.18). Assuming, that also in the other evaluation periods only 20% 
of the solvent manufacturing U.S. corporations had Z-scores below 1.81 and assuming that the defaulted companies that were examined were representative for the basic 
population of all defaulted manufacturing companies following accuracy ratios result for the three studies: 55%-80% (ARα&β=71%), 58%-82% (ARα&β=74%) and 64%-87% 
(ARα&β=79,5%) [own calculations based on error rates of type I and II].    72
study  number  









public firms, 1 year (p.86f.): 
AR Z’-score: 51.3%  
AR best single financial ratio: 61.5% (net income / assets) 
AR Z”-score: 62.5%  
AR best model: 78.5% “percentiles and their squares” 
private firms, 1 year (p.86f.): 
AR Z’-score: 33.1%  
AR best single financial ratio: 44.8% (net income / assets) 
AR Z”-score: 45.5%  
AR best model: 54.1% (“RiskCalc”) 






US private: 1,393/ 
33,964/ 139,060; 
Australian private: 
1,447 / 27,712 / 
79,877; Canada 
private: 271 / 4,472 
/ 18,538;  
resampling
275 
SMB, industrials: 25%, 
trade: 35%, services: 
17%, other: 11%;  
many corporations with 
missing industry classifi-
cation, 1989-1999 
def. of default:  
90 days past due, 
bankruptcy, place-





AR Z“-score: 42.0% (US, 1-2 years) 
AR best model: 53.7% (“RiskCalc US”) (US, 1-2 years) 
AR Z“-score: 27.7% (Australia, 1-2 years) 
AR best model: 39.7% (“RiskCalc Australia”) (Australia, 1-2 y.) 
AR Z“-score: 49.7% (Canada, 1-2 years) 
AR best model: 58.3% (“RiskCalc Canada”) (Canada, 1-2 y.) 










Japanese private firms, 
exclusion of listed com-
panies, financials, real es-
tate, public sector, 
1994-2000 
def. of default:  






AR Z’-Score: 41.8% 
AR Z”-Score: 30.9% 
AR best model: 69.4% (RiskCalc Japan) 
CI95%,AR = ± 2 PP / ± 2 PP  
                                                 
275  “Resampling”, here referred to as “cross-validation”, is another data parsimonious model development and validation method that does not strictly separate between training 
and validation samples. By randomly choosing from the original dataset, two subsets are created: one development sample (here: 80%) and one validation sample (her 20%). 
By repeatedly creating new development and validation samples, confidence intervals for the variables under consideration, in particular for the accuracy ratio, can be de-
rived. Resampling does also enable to examine the overall stability of the rating methodology (which financial ratios were chosen in each simulation run, which coefficients 
were estimated): “It is not a test of [the model] directly, but instead the general methodology, and gives a good indication of its robustness.”, see ibid, p. 20. 
   On resampling/ bootstrapping see also STEIN (2002, p. 17ff.) 
276  FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, KOCAGIL (2000, p. 18) state following values as “standard errors” for the accuracy ratio (but possibly refer to the standard deviation of the AUC, see  
formula on page 26 (ibid.)): 1.8 PP, 1.5 PP, and 3.6 PP [US, Australia, Canada].    73
study  number  
of corporations  database other  Z/Z’/Z“  prognosis  accuracy 
SHUMWAY 
(2001) 




AR Z-score: 52.4% (*) 
AR best single financial ratio: 66.4% (*) (net income / total assets) 
AR best DA-model with ALTMAN variables: 70.4% (*) 
AR best model with ALTMAN  variables: 76.6% (*)  
AR best model: 83.7% (*) (“Accounting and Market”) 









up to and including 




MOODY’S KMV’s CRD 
(source: 20 banks from 
USA (76%) and Canada 
(24%)), SMB,  
sales 0.5 m – 8.8 m - 
287,5 m in US$  
(5%-50%-95% quantile), 
1986-2001, sectors: in-
dustrials 26%, trade: 34%, 
services: 15%, construc-
tion: 9%, farming: 6% 
def. of default: de-
lay in payment 
>90d, non-accrual 
status, special loss 
provisioning/ res-
ervation, charge-
off, troubled debt 
restructuring, or in-
ternal designation 





AR Z“-score: 39% (*) (from graph. representation, p.12) 
AR best model: 52.5% (*) (RiskCalc US/Canada) 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.5 PP (*) 
p. 8: “Note that there are actually two Z-score models, a four vari-
able model and a five variable model. In general, we have found the 
four variable model to outperform the five variable model and thus 





see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  Z” (?)  AR Z“-score (?): 34.5% 
AR best single financial ratio: 43% (*) (equity-liabilities-ratio) 










MOODY’S KMV’S CRD 
(see above), 1989-2002, 
no financials, insurances, 
real estates, non-profit or 
state-run corporations 
def. of default: 
probably same as 
above 
Z“(?)  AR Z“-score (?): 42.3%, 
AR best model: 57.0% (EDF RiskCalc V3.1) 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.25 PP (*) 
(*) source of accuracy ratio data: own calculations, usually based on data concerning error rates of types I and II    74
With exception of ALTMAN’s (1986) original study and later studies, cited in ALTMAN 
(2002), that were carried out by himself, empirical results consistently show very poor re-
sults for the Z-score model(s)– not only compared to other rating models, but also com-
pared with simple financial ratios.  
Even though, ALTMAN’S Z-score model originally was calibrated on U.S. stock companies 
data with financial statements that date back 40 to 60 years (as seen from today), univari-
ate predictive power of the variables that were included in the model, with exception of 
variable X5, which was abandoned in a later model revision, is by no means bad, when for 
instance applied to financial statements of present international
277 and German/Austrian 
small and medium-sized businesses of various legal forms.
 278,279  Bad, however, is the 
calibration of the model’s coefficients.
280 It is actually so bad, that this multivariate model 
does not add any predictive value to the univariate predictive value of simple financial ra-
tios, such as net income / total assets.  
All in all, the Z-score model is no suitable benchmark for evaluating the performance of 
insolvency prediction models. Therefore, it won’t be used as reference method in the fol-
lowing tables in chapter 3.5. 
More reasonable benchmarks are formed by univariate predictive performance of sample 
specific most discriminative ratios or by the performance of ratios that have empirically 
turned out to be very discriminative (see chapter 3.3). In order to assess sample specific 
opaqueness, it would be desirable, if model developers also stated the predictive accuracy 
that can be achieved by simple, uncalibrated multivariate models.
281 Another useful 
benchmark would be a comparison with the performance of the rating models that are 
given in the next chapter. From the 24 studies that are presented there, 8 studies include 
complete documentations of the rating models that were used.
282 Six models thereof are 
neither exclusively based on variables that require (bank specific) insider information nor 
are too region-specific. These six models can be easily reverse engineered and applied to 
any validation dataset.  
It might well be, that a part of the continuing popularity of ALTMAN’s model among rating 
model developers, who still use it as a benchmark rating model, stems from the fact that 
ALTMAN model is so easy to beat. 
                                                 
277  See also DIMITRAS, ZANAKIS, ZOPOUNIDIS (1996, p. 496ff.) for a survey of the 35 most often used financial 
ratios based on a review of 59 rating models from 47 studies. Four of the five ALTMAN-ratios are among the 
top 10 ranks (!), with X1: #1, X2: #9, X3: #4, X4: #24, X5: #10.  
278  Based on data from HAYDEN (2003, p. 14 and 18) following rank order of univariate predictive power of 65 
ratios was determined on a dataset of Austrian SMB (mean value of accuracy ratios for three different de-
fault definitions): X1 (HAYDEN no. 15): rank 22/65, X2 (HAYDEN no. 58) rank 11/65, X3 (HAYDEN no. 45) 
rank 18/65, X4 (HAYDEN no. 2) rank 1/65 (!) (As ALTMAN’S ratio “equity/ liabilities” was not included in 
HAYDEN’s list, the ratio “equities/assets” (HAYDEN no. 2) was used instead. This ratio should be ordinally 
equivalent to “equity/ liabilities” and therefore should have the same predictive accuracy), X5 (HAYDEN no. 
42) rank 38/65. The ALTMAN’s variables’ relative performance is worse, when measurements are based on a 
sample of German SMB, see HAYDEN (2002, p. 73f.). ALTMAN’S variables X1..5 there only achieve ranks 31, 
63 (probably due to data errors), 11, 16, and 25 (of 65), source: own examinations. 
279  Conversely, FRERICHS, WAHRENBURG (2003, p. 3, 10) find that “none of the financial ratios used for the 
Altman Z”-score is chosen in a stepwise selection procedure based on the Deutsche Bundesbank database”. 
They, however, don’t give a survey of the univariate predictive accuracy of the 49 examined ratios. 
280  see in particular the results of SHUMWAY’s (2001) study. 
281  An exemplary study in this respect is given in FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000).  
282  Some of the studies actually incorporate more than just one completely documented model. In the above 
context, only one model per study is counted.    75
3.5  Accuracy of real insolvency prediction models 
In the following tables, surveys of the performance of several insolvency prediction models are given. For improving the comparability of the re-
sults, the studies were separated into three blocks: in Table H only such studies are listed, that examined large stock companies, Table I reproduces 
studies at international small and medium sized businesses, while in Table J studies on German/ Austrian SMB are presented. Additionally to the in-
formation that was already given in the tables of the previous chapters, it is also specified, whether the underlying rating models were completely 
documented in the respective studies, so that a recreation of the rating models – and thus a direct application to other samples is possible.  
With exception of the studies from BEAVER (1967) and ALTMAN (1968), which are solely interesting for historical reasons, only such studies were 
listed that based on samples of at least 1,000 corporations.  
 
Table H: survey of insolvency prediction studies for large stock companies; to be continued on the following pages 
study  number of corpora-
tions  database other  prognosis  accuracy 
BEAVER (1966)  see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR cash flow / total debt: 93.1% (*) 
CI95%,AR = ± 7 PP (*) 
Æ only the univariate predictive power of financial ratios is be-
ing examined (no rating model),  
ALTMAN (1968, 
2000/1968) 
see chapter 3.4  see chapter 3.4  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.4 
for AR Z-, Z’- and Z“-score and CI95%,AR see chapter 3.4;  
3 discriminant analysis models with 5, 5, 4 variables 
Æ all three models are completely documented,  
model 1 requires capital market data  
OHLSON (1980) 105  defaulters,   
2,058 non-defaulters 
no separate validation 
sample 
1970-1976, listed stock companies, 
industrials, USA, non-defaulters: 
COMPUSTAT; defaulters: Wall Street 
Journal Index 
17 error-I-II-combi-
nations per model  
(p. 130), 
def. of default:  
insolvency 
2 logit models, 9 variables 
AR model 1: 81.6% (*)   
AR model 2: 86.7%  (*) 
CI95%,AR = ± 5.5 PP (*) 









1972-1978, all American or NY 
Stock Exchange listed corporations 
with industry sector SIC-code < 6,000 
[i.e. without transportation, finance, 
real estates, services],  
default information: Capital Changes 
Reporter, Wall Street Journal Index, 
COMPUSTAT Research File 
def. of default:  
initiation of insol-
vency proceedings 
probit model, 3 variables 
panel A: mv eI: 17.1%, mv eII: 2.2% (p.71) 
AR unweighted probit model: 81%-98,5%, 
ARα&β= 94%  (*) 
CI95%,AR = ± 9 PP (*) 
Æ   the models presented (“model families”) are completely 
documented    76
study  number of corpora-
tions  database other  prognosis  accuracy 
KEENAN, SOBE-
HART (1999) 
see chapter 3.3,  
analog: SOBEHART, 
KEENAN, STEIN (2000), 
SOBEHART, STEIN, MI-
KITYANSKA, LI (2000) 
see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR return on assets: 53% 
AR distance to default: (“Merton model variant”) 67% 
AR MOODY’S Public Firm (“nonlinear model”, “MOODY’S 
model”): 73%,    CI95%,AR = ± 3 PP (*) 
Æ   the 8+1 variables used are given in SOBEHART ET AL 
(2000, p. 10), capital market data is required, details for 





see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR liabilities / assets: 61.9% (public fi.) 
AR RiskCalc [Can/US]: 76.5% (public fi.)  
CI95%,AR = ± 2 PP [public firm] (*) 
Æ  the 10 variables used are given, details for aggregation are 
missing [non-parametrical transformation+probit] 
SHUMWAY 
(2001) 
see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  discriminant analysis and logit model, 3 – 6 variables 
AR net income / total assets: 66.4% (*) 
AR model with ALTMAN-variables: 76.6% (*) 
AR ZMIJEWSKI: 68.9% (*) 
AR “Accounting and Market”: 83.7% (*)  
CI95%,AR = ± 4,5 PP (*) 
Æ  all 12 models are completely documented, some models 
require market data (amongst others, also the one model 





1970-1987: 69 – 7,641 
1988-1993: 82 – 3,348 
1994-1998: 63 – 3,253 
training sample:  
 1970-1987 
defaulters: 01/1999 release of MOO-
DY’S Corporate Bond Default 
Database; non-defaulters: corpora-
tions rated by MOODY’S, 06/1999 re-
lease of Compustat (Data von 1970-
1998), US-corporations, non-
financials 
rating class specific 
defaults (absolute and 
relative),  
def. of default:  
see MOODY’s  
logit model, 4 variables 
AR (*)   
283                1970-87    1988-93    1994-98    1970-98 
MOODY’S ratings:       80.0%       67.4%      70.7%       75.4% 
logit model:                 86.4%       78.4%      75.0%       82.8%  
CI95%,AR   (*)                ±  7 PP    ± 6,5 PP     ± 8 PP     ± 4 PP  
Æ the logit-model is completely documented 
                                                 
283  Accuracy ratio values for Moody’s ratings were determined based on a 7ary scale (see ibid, p. 244, 267), accuracy ratio values for the logit model of CAREY, HRYCAY (2001) 
were determined based on a 10ary scale (see ibid, p. 220, 266).     77
study  number of corpora-
tions  database other  prognosis  accuracy 
KEALHOFER 
(2003) 
(I): “all identified de-
faults of non-financial 
companies with public 
debt ratings from 1979 
to 1990” (p.34); 657 
corporations p.a., 1,066 
corporations in total
284 
(II): 121 defaults; on 
average 1,347 different 
corporations p.a., 1,579 
different corporations 
in total  
out-of-sample-Test (?) 
(I): all non-financial corporations 
with public S&P ratings, 1979-1990 
(II): all non-financial corporations 
with public S&P and/or (?) MOODY’s 
rating, 1990-1999 
(I): 10 combinations 
of hit rates and corpo-
rations excluded, per 
model (graphs)  
(II): continuous CAP-
curves for all methods 
(graphs),  
def. of default: delay 
in payment, restruc-
turing (similar to S&P 
definition) 
(I)  AR S&P’s ratings: 60% (*)  
AR KMV EDF: 68% (*) 
       CI95%,AR = ± 6,5 PP (*) 
(II) AR S&P’s ratings (implied): 68%  (*) 
AR MOODY’S ratings (implied): 68%  (*),  
AR KMV EDF: 85% (*) 
       CI95%,AR = ± 5.5 PP (*) 
 
Æ  incomplete naming of included variables,  









1,378 corporations, 60 
defaults (2001) 
1,167 corp. p.a. (me-
dian) 
US non-financials with MOODY’S-
rating (large listed companies), 1989-
2002, accounting data: COMPUSTAT 
PD-profiles for all 
used six ratios 
def. of default:  
„missed interest pay-
ment, filing for bank-
ruptcy or completing 
a distressed exchange 
…“  
 
AR interest coverage 68% 
285 
AR 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003    total 
Bond implied ratings 80% 74% 86%  89% 91%    83.3% 
MDP implied ratings  74%  65%  80%  77%  83%  76.0% 
MOODY'S ratings   72%  59%  76%  81%  88%  74.3% 
       CI95%,AR = ± 7.5 PP (*) [only 2001 data],  
       CI95%,AR = ± 3.5 PP (*) [1989-2001 data], 
all six used variables are given;  
MDP: aggregation analog to FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY 
(2003/2000) [non-linear transformation + probit] 
                                                 
284  Based on MOODY’S (2005, p. 12f.) data, the average issuer weighted default rate in 1979-1990 was 1.48% p.a. There are no S&P statistic prior to 1981 available, but accord-
ing to S&P (2004, p.7), for 1981-1990 an average default rate of 1.31% can be determined. If one assumes a default rate of 1.4% p.a. for the KEALHOFER (2003) sample with 
657 corporations per year, for 1979-1990 about 12*1.4%*657=110 defaults in 12*657=7,884 observations have to be expected. 
285  Calculated according to ibid (p. 11): „Indeed, our testing found that a model containing only interest coverage is nearly 90% as accurate as the complete model. A model con-
taining interest coverage and leverage together displays more than 95% of the accuracy of the complete model.“.    78
study  number of corpora-
tions 




66,500 observations,  
thereof 1,170 defaults 
out-of-time test
286 
1981-2003, geographic origin (2000): 
287 USA 74%, Europe, Middle East, 
Africa 19%, Asia 3%, Latin Am. 4% 
industry sectors (2000): 
banks 12%, insurance 42% [sic!, see 
footnote above], industrials 46% 
def. of default: 
see S&P (2004, 
p.7f.)): payment de-
faults on financial li-
abilities, distressed 
exchanges  
AR S&P’s ratings: 83%  
288 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.5 PP (*) 
by regions:  
AR USA: 82%,  
AR European Union: 94% 





63,500 observations,  
thereof 1,150 defaults 
out-of-time test 
1983-2003;  
geographic origin (2000): 
290 
USA 67%, Europe, Middle East, 
Africa 19%, Asia 10%, Latin Ame-
rica 5%, 
industry sectors (2000):  
banks 29%, insurances 11%, in-
dustrials 60% 
size of enterprises (sales, median (! ) 
>> 1 billion US$ 
291 
def. of default: 
see MOODY’S (2004, 
p.3)): payment de-
faults on financial li-
abilities, insolvencies, 
distressed exchanges  
AR MOODY’s ratings: 85.0% (*) 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.5 PP (*) 
by regions:  
AR North America: 81.0%,  
AR Europe: 95.3%,  
AR Asia/ Pacific: 84.7% 
by (asset) size:  
AR “large” corporations: 84.4%,  
AR “small” corporations: 74.0% 
by industry sectors:  
AR financial corporations: 92.3%,  
AR non-financial corporations: 80.5%   
for information: AR sovereigns: 87.0%   
292 
Æ details for aggregation are missing 
                                                 
286  At each particular date S&P had to make a default forecast (assign a rating), only those defaults were known (and could be part of S&P’s development samples), that had oc-
curred before that particular date. In case S&P is regularly revising its rating methodology, this approach corresponds to the “walk-forward-method” (see above). For a de-
scription of out-of-time testing and other testing methods see SOBEHART, KEENAN, STEIN (2000, p. 1ff.). 
287  Data is based on BASEL COMMITTEE (2000c, p.33f). Concerning rating composition by industry sectors differing information for 1980-2001 can be found at S&P (2002, 
p.14): financial institutions 19.5%, consumer/service sector 13.5%, aerospace/automotive/capital goods/metal 11%, insurance/real estate 10%, utilities 9%, leisure time/media 
8%, health care/chemicals 6%, energy/natural resources 5.5%, telecommunications 4.5%, transportation 4.5%, high tech/computers/office equipment 4%, forest/building 
products/home builders 4%. 
288  for the AR data see S&P (2004b, p. 11) 
289  “There are no formulae for combining scores to arrive at a rating conclusion. Bear in mind that ratings represent an art as much as a science. A rating is, in the end, an opin-
ion.”, S&P (2003b, p. 17) 
290  The data is based on BASEL COMMITTEE (2000c, p.33f). Concerning rating composition by regions there are slightly differing data given in MOODY’S (2004c) for 2004: 
North America 63%, Europe 24%, Asia/ Pacific 12%. 
291   see CANTOR (2004, p.9) for median-enterprise sizes by regions and rating classes.    79
Table I: survey of insolvency prediction studies for international SMB; to be continued on the following page 
study  number of corpora-
tions  database other  prognosis  accuracy 
VARETTO 
(1998) 
training sample: á 1,920 
“sound” and “unsound” 
corporations 
validation sample: á  
449 “sound” and “un-
sound” corporations  
Italian industrial corporations, source: 
Italian Central Bank and 50 commercial 
banks, 1982-1995 
def. of default:  
inconsistent use and in-
complete explanation of 
the term “unsound” 
error I =4.7%, error II =6.5%  
AR genetic algorithm: 88.9% - 98.8%  
       ARα&β = 96% (*)  
       CI95%,AR = ± 2.5 PP (*) 





see chapter 3.4  see chapter 3.4  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.4 
AR RiskCalc US: 53.7% (US-corporations) 
AR RiskCalc US: 57.7% (Canadian corporations) 
AR RiskCalc US: 36.8% (Australian corporations) 
AR RiskCalc Australia: 39.7% (Australian corporations) 
AR RiskCalc Canada: 58.3% (Canadian corporations) 
CI95%,AR = ± 2 PP / ± 2 PP / ± 4.5 PP [US, Austr., Can.] (*) 






see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR liabilities / assets: 44.8% (private firms) 
RiskCalc [Can/US]: 54.1% (private firms) 
Æ 8 variables, see above 





(1996 cohort), 2,000 
defaults (1998!)
293, 
thereof each 50% for 
development and vali-
dation sample 
complete count of all Norwegian limited 
companies, 1995-1999 (ca. 100,000 cor-
porations p.a.), minimum total assets: 
12,500 EUR, Dun & Bradstreet register 
of bankruptcies, Norsk Lysningsblad, di-
verse data clearings, 
def. of default:  
insolvency 
error I =5%, error II < 50% 
294 
AR logit model: at least 45.0%- 90.0%,   
       ARα&β>74% (*) 
       CI95%,AR = ± 2 PP (*),  
Æ the model is completely documented and contains 10 
variables; some of the variables are Norway specific      
(regional origin) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
292  Region, size class, and industry sector specific accuracy ratio values were quoted from MOODY’S (2004c, p.2). Owing to MOODY’s idiosyncratic accuracy ratio definition, 
conventional accuracy-ratio-values are somewhat bigger than stated in the table above (see chapter 2.3.2). 
293  Being in possession of such an embracing data set (see above), restraining analysis to just one cohort is hardy comprehensible. The given explanation suggests, that validation 
results may be severely positively biased: “In the empirical analysis the 1996 accounting data and the 1998 bankruptcy data are used. Several combinations have been tried, 
but using the 1996-1998 data set appeared to give the best results.”, see ibid, p. 344    80
study  number of corpora-




see chapter 3.4  see chapter 3.4  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.4 
AR RiskCalc Japan: 69.4%  
CI95%,AR = ± 2 PP / ± 2 PP 






see chapter 3.4  see chapter 3.4  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.4 
AR KMV Private Firm Model (PFM): 45% (*) 
AR RiskCalc US/Canada: 52.5% (*)  
CI95%,AR = ± 1.5 PP (*) 




see chapter 3.4  see chapter 3.4  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.4 
AR EDF RiskCalc V3.1:  57.0%  
AR RiskCalc [V1.0]:  49.5% 
AR PFM: 46.1% 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.25 PP (*) 
Æ the 9-11 variables used are named, details for aggrega-
tion are missing 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
294  In the original text (ibid, p. 347) only very few quantile values concerning estimated default rates for defaulters and non-defaulters were given. These data imply that 95% of 
the defaulters had an (estimated) PD of > 0.6%, while 50% of the non-defaulters had an estimated PD of < 0.48%. Unfortunately, it was not given how many non-defaulters 
had an estimated PD of < 0.6%.    81
Table J: survey of insolvency prediction studies German/ Austrian SMB, to be continued on the following pages  
study  number of corpora-




2,580 “good accounts”, 
1,019 “bad accounts”, 
monthly account data 
thereof 75% training 
sample (2,699 corpora-
tions), 25% validation 
sample (900 corpora-
tions) 
corporate current account data of Deut-
sche Bank AG (?) costumers with annual 
turnover of between 2.5 and 25 m EUR, 
diverse data clearings,  
def. of default:  
first time losses on loans  
AR linear discriminant analysis #2: 62% (*) 
AR k-nearest neighbors:  60% (*) 
AR genetic algorithm:  62% (*) 
AR neural network #2: 61.5% (*)  
AR decision tree: 54.5% (*) 
CI95%,AR = ± 4.5 PP (*) 
Æ the 11-12 variables that were used in the models were 
partially named; variables are based on monthly values 
concerning account-keeping (utilization of credit line, over-




see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR capital recovery ratio: 53.7% (manufacturing), 
44,0% (other enterprises), 47.9% (trade), 
AR  BUNDESBANK discriminant analysis: 57.4%  
AR  KMV Private Firm Model: 59.7% 
AR  BUNDESBANK discriminant analysis  
+ expert system: 68.0%    
295 
CI95%,AR = ± 1.5 PP (*) 
Æ   the 4-6 variables are named (discriminant analysis), 





see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR debt coverage: 56% (*) [development sample]  
RiskCalc Germany: 59.7% [validation sample]  
CI95%,AR = ± 2.5 PP (*) 
Æ the 9 used variables are named, details for aggregation 
are missing 
                                                 
295  In another study, see DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1999, p. 60f), which was not included in the survey because of missing details concerning sample size, the DEUTSCHE 
BUNDESBANK discriminant analysis model achieved a considerably better classification result than in BLOCHWITZ, LIEBIG, NYBERG (2000): error I: 10.4% + 15.8%/2 = 
18.3%; error II: 12.8%+ 19.2%/2 = 22.4% Æ AR: 59%-84%, ARα&β =75%. However, in that case the downstream expert system could improve the ratings’ accuracy only 
marginally by three percentage points: error I: 16.5%+6.7%/2 = 19.9%, error II: 15.0% + 5.0%/2 = 17.5% Æ AR: 63%- 86%, ARα&β =78%.    82
study  number of corpora-




1999 cohort (?) (p.437),  
thereof ca. 200 de-
faulters (1.88%), 
out-of-time-Test 
sample: “representative for Austrian 
SMB” (p.434, translation), sales between 
1 m and 50 m EUR, “representative” cov-
erage of industry sectors (p.440)  
default rates and distribu-
tion of corporations 
among 12 rating classes  




AR   Bonitätsindex CREDITREFORM Österreich  
(partial sample): 67.4% (*) 
CI95%,AR = ± 5 PP (*) 
Æ   the 15 used variables are given, some variables can not 
be derived from financial statements (“credit assess-
ment” [sic!], “payment behavior of the company's cus-









“practically the basic population [of 
German corporations]” (p.6, translation), 
1998-2000 
default rates for cohorts 
and pool 1998-2000, dis-
tribution of corporations 
among 12 rating classes 
as of 01/01/2001, 
def. of default: see above 
AR   Bonitätsindex CREDITREFORM Deutschland 
(basic population): 50.1% (ibid, p. 27), 51.8% (*)  
(own calculation) 
297 
CI95%,AR = ± 0.35 PP (*) [p.a.] 




3,162 observations of a 
stratified sample (p.42); 
thereof 165 defaulters 
(?)
298, training sample = 
validation sample  
portfolio of 30,000 KfW-debtors, differ-
ent industry sectors and legal forms, 
1994-1998 
def. of default:  
insolvency 
logit model (27 variables): eI: 27.0% eII 5.5%  
AR: 67.5% -94%, ARα&β=86% 
CI95%,AR = ± 4.5 PP (?)(*) 
Æ the model is completely documented, but comprises the 






see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR cashflow/ liabilities 39% (*) 
AR equity-liabilities-ratio 43% (*)  
AR RiskCalc Austria: 54.7% () 
CI95%,AR = ± 3 PP (estimation sample) /  
                 ± 2 PP (validation sample) (*) 
Æ the used 8 variables are given, details for aggregation are 
missing (logit model, based on transformed data) 
                                                 
296  A CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex of 500-600 points implies the existence of “massive delays in payment” up to “hard negative characteristics”, see SCHWAIGER (2002, p.438).  
297  If one assumes that all three cohorts, for which only rating class specific default rates were given, were characterized by the same distribution of corporations among the 12 
rating classes as that from 01/01/2001, following cohort accuracy ratio values resulted: AR1998 = 52.9%, AR1999=50.3%, AR2000=51.9%. 
298  This value was estimated resting upon a later, unpublished study by PLATTNER.    83
study  number of corpora-




400 defaulters, 19,600 
non-defaulters,  
resampling, test sample: 
19,000 non-defaulters, 
67 defaulters  
German SMB of a German commercial 
bank, different industry sectors, “about 
two thirds of the companies reported an-
nual turnovers up to 5 million EUR.” 
(S.7) 
def. of default: first-time 
loan loss provision 
AR financial ratios rating (I): 43.6% (*) 
AR checking account (II): 54.2%  
AR analyst (soft factor) rating (III): 43.8% 
AR combination of (I) and (II): 58.4% 
AR combination of (I), (II) and (III): 62.4% 
Æ models are not documented 






see chapter 3.3  see chapter 3.3  def. of default:  
see chapter 3.3 
AR ordinary business income / total assets: 57.7% (*) 
AR best logit model: 62.4% 
300 
CI95%,AR = ± 2.5 (*) 
301 




see chapter 3.3   see chapter 3.3  def. of default: see chap-
ter 3.3 
AR equity / assets: 44.1% (*), 
AR best logit model: 58.9% 
CI95%,AR = ± 3.5 PP, ± 3 PP, ± 3.5 PP (insolvency, restruc-
turing, delay in payment) (*) 
302 
Æ all three logit models (with 6-9 variables) are completely 
documented 
         
 
                                                 
299  Based on a resampling study, LEHMANN (2003, p. 22) determines a standard deviation of the ROCAUC of 2.11 PP. Assuming Gaussian distributed Accuracy Ratios, this corre-
sponds with a 95%-confidence interval for the accuracy ratio of ± 2.11 PP * 2 * 1.96 = ± 8.3 PP. 
300  Based on the same dataset, HAYDEN (2002, p. 75ff.) achieves an AR-value of 70% with a logit model with 12 variables. 
301   Based on a resampling (or bootstrapping) analysis, ENGELMANN, HAYDEN, TASCHE (2003, p. 18) determine an AR-confidence interval of ±2,49 PP for model 1. 
302   Based on data given by HAYDEN (2003, p. 33), following 95%-confidence intervals result: CI95%,AR = ± 2.4 PP, ± 4.0 PP, ± 4.9 PP (insolvency, restructuring, delay in pay-
ment). [The confidence interval for the insolvency samples probably was determined based on the complete sample, not just on the validation sample.]    84
Annotation to Table H, insolvency prediction studies on large stock companies 
It is interesting to note, that the enormous effort commercial rating agencies are putting into 
their rating processes 
303 – and the enormous fees they charge in return
304,305 – are not ade-
quately reflected by the accuracy of their prognoses.
306 On principle, the one-year-accuracy 
ratios of about 85% they achieve are quite good or even above-average. But the cited studies 
exclusively base on U.S. non-financial corporations – and just here, i.e. on a comparable ba-
sis, rating agencies come off particularly bad.
307  
Annotation to Table J, insolvency prediction studies on German/ Austrian SMB 
Similar unfavorable findings with respect to the relative accuracy of their insolvency predic-
tions have to be noted for commercial rating models for (German and Austrian) SMB. 
In a current market study
308, 3 out of 15 rating models for German SMB were evaluated as be-
ing “very good”: CREDITREFORM-Bilanzrating, CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex and MOODY’S 
RiskCalc Germany. However, the predictive accuracy of the CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex 
[Germany] is even worse than the predictive accuracy of the simple industry-legal status rat-
ing (!), that was presented in chapter 3.2 – and which is based on the same sample of corpora-
tions.
309,310 With an accuracy ratio of 60%, the multivariate, financial ratio based model 
MOODY’S RiskCalc Germany –achieves a somewhat better predictive quality - based on a dif-
ferent sample, though. But the model’s predictive accuracy is only marginally higher than the 
predictive accuracy of the best single financial ratio, that was used within the model, and it is 
not higher than the predictive accuracy of some of the competing rating models that are avail-
able for free, and which were based on comparable samples in terms of origin of data and 
sample size (see Table J).
311 Likewise, the rating model CREDITREFORM-Bilanzrating
312 
achieves only an accuracy ratio of 60% as well.
313 
                                                 
303  See for instance S&P (2003b) who describe elements of their rating processes on more than 100 pages, while 
describing simple statistical models, such as discriminant or logit analysis requires just a few lines. 
304  WHITE (2001, p. 14): “Both Moody's and S&P have the following ‘list prices’ for the requested ratings: 3.25 
basis points on [bond] issues up to $500 million, with a minimum fee of $25,000 and a maximum of 
$125,000 (S&P) or $130,000 (Moody's); both charge an additional 2 basis points on amounts above $500 
million (S&P caps the amount at $200,000; it also has a one-time fee of $25,000 for first-time issuers). Both 
offer negotiated rates for frequent issuers and offer quarterly charges on amounts outstanding for issuers of 
commercial paper.” 
305  TREACY,  CAREY (2000/1998, p. 911): “S&P’s fee for rating a public corporate debt issue ranges from 
$25,000 to more than $125,000, with the usual fee being 0.0325 percent of the face amount of the issue. Fees 
are a reflection of the substantial resources the agencies typically devote to producing each rating, especially 
the initial rating.”, see also CANTOR, PACKER (1994, p. 4) 
306  Representatives of rating agencies would try to qualify the relevance of these findings by pointing out to the 
better relative performance of agency ratings for longer forecast horizons, to the greater stability of agency 
ratings when compared to other forecasts (market or accounting based rating models) or would demand to 
include additional features of the agencies’ rating systems into the accuracy analysis, such as outlook or 
watchlist status of their ratings, see CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 25,27), FONS, VISWANATHAN (2004, p. 10), 
and HAMILTON (2004, p. 11) 
307  See on this in particular the studies of CAREY, HRYCAY (2001) and KEALHOFER (2003). 
308  see ROMEIKE, WEHRSPOHN (2004a and 2004b) 
309  In 1998-2000 the CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex achieved AR-values of 51%, see Table J, while the indus-
try-legal status rating achieved AR-values of 53%-55% in 1998-2001, see Table E in chapter 3.2. Only in 
2002 and 2003 its predictive accuracy decreases to values of around only 45%. 
310  costs: yearly membership fee: 400 – 500 EUR plus 16 – 20 EUR per rating, see ROMEIKE, WEHRSPOHN 
(2004b, p.23) 
311  costs: ‘individual price system’ with a basic charge of 20,000US$, see ROMEIKE, WEHRSPOHN (2004b, p.24) 
312  Contrary to the CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex the CREDITREFORM-Bilanzrating model requires the existence 
of financial statements.  
313  costs: 549,- EUR per rating see ibid. (p.22), source of accuracy-ratio-value: own calculations based on the 
graphical representation of the CAP-curve given in ibid (p. 20).    85
4 Conclusion 
It has been the purpose of this discussion paper to contribute in improving the comparability 
of forecast quality measures of insolvency prediction studies. For being able to learn from 
good, i.e. highly predictive, insolvency prediction models, it is first of all necessary, to cor-
rectly identify them. Owing to the great number of empirically used measures for gauging 
predictive quality, this is by no way a trivial task. In the discussion paper at hand, it was 
shown that ordinal predictive quality measures, in particular the accuracy ratio, are suited 
best for sample spanning comparisons. Also several methods for extending the range of appli-
cation of these measures were presented. 
A sample spanning comparison of accuracy measures is substantially aggravated by the im-
pact of both systematic and unsystematic “disturbance factors”. Of outstanding importance in 
this respect is the influence of enterprise size, respectively of those variables that are closely 
associated with it in empirical data samples, as data quality and possible preselection biases. 
Not at least owing to disclosure requirements for large and listed companies, high-quality fi-
nancial statement and default databases are available for developing and validating insolvency 
prediction models for this group. Additionally, for listed companies capital market data is 
available - like actual stock and volatility of market value of equity or bond prices – which 
can serve as a valuable auxiliary input to rating models. The situation in cases of small and 
medium businesses is less advantageous. Besides aspects of (formal) quality of financial 
statements, that is already worse than in case of large companies, serious deficits can result 
from the fact that most insolvency prediction models for SMB are based on bank portfolios, 
which raises serious issues of preselection, as was outlined in chapter 3 and shown in Appen-
dix V. 
With accuracy ratio values ranging from 75% to more than 90% the surveyed studies show 
that insolvencies for large corporations can be predicted fairly well with financial ratio based 
rating models alone. The precision achieved is formidable, compared with insolvency predic-
tion for SMB (50%-60%), private costumers (over 50%) 
314, a simple industry-legal status rat-
ing (50%), univariate predictive power of single ratios (55%-65% [when applied to large cor-
poration data sets]) – but also when compared with the quality of predictions of completely 
different fields of application (50%-95%).
315 
Some of the completely documented and free of charge rebuildable rating models, that were 
presented in the survey, are achieving better prediction results than prevailing commercial rat-
ing models. 
 
                                                 
314  For comparison: based on a validation sample of 410,000 data sets, the SCHUFA-Score (2001), a rating model 
for private costumers, achieves an accuracy-ratio of 53%, see FAHRMEIR, HENKING, HÜLS (2002, p. 27).  
   Contrary to FALKENSTEIN, BORAL, CARTY (2003/2000, p.9) a superiority in terms of data availability in case 
of private customers compared to corporate customers does not result in a superiority of insolvency predic-
tion models that are derived from the respective data sets. See also the comparably poor performance of the 
CREDITREFORM Bonitätsindex for which millions of solvent corporations’ datasets and ten thousands of in-
solvent corporations’ datasets are available. 
315  Rain forecasts achieve accuracy ratios of 54%-80% (median: 64%); aptitude tests, for instance for predicting 
college graduation, achieve AR-values of 60%-86%. In case of medical imagery, classical chest films 
achieve AR-values of around 96% and computed-tomography-examinations (brain) AR-values of 94%, 
while AR-values obtained by polygraph lie detectors (both in “field studies” and laboratory experiments) are 
around 73%, see SWETS (1988, p. 1288ff. and the literature there cited). Predictions of subsequent offenses 
of violent delinquents achieve AR-values of about 50% and AIDS-tests AR-values of 84% to 94%, see 
SWETS, DAWES, MONAHAN (2000, p. 10 and 16) [all values were given in AUC]. Note: some of the exam-
ples cited above do not measure the quality of predictions, but the quality of classifications.   86 
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Appendix I: Upper and lower limits of accuracy ratio values  
 
Intention: It shall be determined, what discriminative power, measured in accuracy ratio, an 
ordinal prediction method may posses at least/ at most if only one CAP-curve point (X0, Y0) is 
known or when only one combination of errors of types I and II is know. 
X0 … percentage of exluded companies,  
Y0 … hit rate (=100%-error of type I) 
Technical constraints 
In a CAP-diagram the CAP curve must proceed trough points (0%; 0%) and (100%; 100%). It 
must be continuous and weakly monotonic, i.e.  ( ) 0 ' x CAP ≥ . Further,  () PD / 1 ' x CAP ≤ , as for 
excluding 100% of all defaulters, at least PD% of all corporations have to be excluded. 
Textual constraints 
Subsequently it is assumed, that the rating model underlying a given CAP-curve fulfills a 
fundamental prerequisite of rating models, namely that better predictions are accompanied by 
lower default probabilities. Thus, only concave CAP curves are considered, i.e.  ( ) 0 ' x CAP ≥  
and  () 0 ' ' x CAP ≤ .  
In point (0%; 0%) the CAP-curve’s slope has to be 1.0 or more, otherwise, with non-


































Figure 21: surface area decomposition for determining minimal AUCCAP  97 
Determining lower limits of accuracy ratios 
The “worst possible”
 316 CAP-curve that passes through CAP-diagram point (X0, Y0) and 
which complies with all technical and textual constraints, is the linear spline (0%; %) (X0, Y0) 
– (100%; 100%), see Figure 21. 
This CAP-curve corresponds with a prediction model, that can only differentiate between but 
not among the two groups that are separated by X0, i.e. the ordinal model that creates this 
CAP-curve does not add any value to a categorial model with one only cut-off score yielding 
(X0, Y0). 
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+ =  with area under the main diagonal = ½. Thus, the area above 
the diagonal line and below the CAP-curve is 
2
X Y 0 0 − .  
The difference Y0-X0 is also referred to as “vertical distance”, because it accords to the verti-
cal distance of the point (X0; Y0) to the main diagonal. The maximal vertical distance of a 
ROC-Curve is an empirically used quality measure on its own.
317  



























  with Y0–X0 measuring the vertical distance of (X0; Y0) to the main 
diagonal (see above). 
 
                                                 
316  The worst possible CAP-curve is the CAP-curve with the smallest surface area  (AUCCAP) of all admissible 
CAP-curves. 
317  see Lee (1999, p.462). 
318  As ROC-curve and CAP-curve based accuracy ratios are identical, in the following no CAP- or ROC-indices 
are used in connection with accuracy ratios. They are used only in connection with AUC-measures.  98 
In the following, AUCCAP,min and ARmin are expressed as functions of errors of types I and II 
(instead of as functions of CAP-coordinates X0 and Y0). 
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=  and thus 
F 66)  () ( ) PD F 1 PD 1 F X 1 2 0 ⋅ − + − ⋅ =        Insertion to formula F 59 gives: 
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=    and formula F 70 the area under the ROC-curve is given by: 
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Determining upper limits of accuracy ratios 
The best possible (i.e. surface area maximizing) admissible CAP-curve that is passing through 
(X0, Y0) must fulfill following conditions: starting from (0%; 0%) it proceeds along the dotted 
straight line (PD), which means that the corporations that are excluded first have a default rate 
of 100%, afterwards it linearly proceeds through (X0; Y0) until it intersects the 100%-hit-rate-
line (see Figure 9). Subsequently the CAP-curve horizontally proceeds until it reaches (100%; 
100%), i.e. the corporations finally excluded have a probability of default of 0%. The slope 
and absolute term of the center line have to be identified by an optimization approach that is 
presented below. 
Proof: It has to be shown, that the centre piece of the surface area maximizing CAP-curve has 
to be a straight line. This will be shown, by proving that both CAP-curve sections right and 
left hand side of (X0, Y0) must be straight lines with the same slope. 












≥ ≥  - otherwise, given the technical and textual restrictions, points 
(0%; 0%) and (100%; 100%) could not be “reached” starting from (X0; Y0).  
•  Because the tangent of a (weakly) concave function is always proceeding above (or 
on) the function itself, the right hand part of the AUC (=right hand side integral of the 
CAP-curve) – is, for a given a, surface area maximizing then, when it is linear. Like-
wise it can be shown, that the left hand side gradient of the surface maximizing CAP-
curve has to be linear, too.  99 
•  Both left hand and right hand side sections of the surface area maximizing CAP-curve 
at (X0; Y0) must be characterized by the same slope: given a left hand side CAP-curve, 
the area under the CAP-curve right hand side from X0 is the greater, the steeper the 
right hand side straight line is. But as the right hand side straight line must not be 
steeper then the left hand side straight line (concavity requirement), AUC is maxi-
mized than, when the straight lines that meet in (X0; Y0) have the same slope, i.e. are 
lying on one line. 
Slope and absolute value of this straight line are determined subsequently via an optimization 
approach. For that, the area under the CAP curve is divided into four sub areas I..IV as shown 
















































Figure 22: surface area decomposition for determining maximal AUCCAP  
Xu …  x-coordinate of the point of intersection of the middle CAP-section and the PD-line, 
Yu …  y-coordinate of the point of intersection of the middle CAP-section and the PD-line, 
Xr …   x-coordinate of the point of intersection of the middle CAP-section and the 100%-
hitrate-line, 
a …   slope of the middle part of the CAP-curve  
b …   absolute value of the middle part of the CAP-curve 
By summing sub areas I...IV to AUCCAP,max it follows: 
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F 77)  PD Y X u u ⋅ =  
From the linear equation for the middle part of the CAP-curve follows that: 
F 78)  u u Y b aX = +  
F 79)  0 0 Y b aX = +  
F 80)  1 = +b aXr         Inserting formula F 77 into formula F 78 yields: 
F 81)  u u Y b PD Y a = + ⋅ ⋅  






























=            From formulas F 83 and F 86 follows:  
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   Formulas F 85 and F 86 yield:  
F 88): 




































1 1        By eliminating auxiliary variables Xr, Xu and Yu by insert-
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AUC  
F 92) AUC=  101 
Subsequently, this term is maximized by b:
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F 97) AUCCAP,max= 
 
By simplifying the above term it follows: 
F 98) 
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From formulas F 61 and F 98 it follows: 
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For information:  
F 101)   PD Y PD X Xr + ⋅ ⋅ − = 0 0 2 2  
F 102)   PD Y PD 2 X 0 u − ⋅ ⋅ =  
F 103)   1 2 0 − ⋅ = Y Yu  
                                                 
319  Derivations, nulls of derivation and simplifications of the respective terms were determined with Mathe-
matica 5. 
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If AUCCAP,min and ARmin shall be determined as functions of errors of types I and II, following  
equations result from applying formulas F 64, F 66 and F 98: 
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From formulas F 71 and F 114 follows: 
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F 116)  2 1 max , ROC F F 2 1 AUC ⋅ ⋅ − =   103 
Determining heuristic estimators for accuracy ratios 
If, given a combination of errors of types I and II, not only intervals formed by the upper and 
lower limits of possible accuracy ratios shall be stated, but also univalent estimators, the aver-








≡   
Obviously, this is only a heuristic estimator, for which, at the time being, not more and not 
less can be claimed than that it always delivers accuracy ratio values within the range of ad-
missible values (for empirical examinations see the following pages). Further heuristic meas-
ures for estimating accuracy ratios based on single combinations of errors of types I and II are 
ARα, ARβ and ARα&β (average value of ARα and ARβ), that base on on the parametrical ROC-
curve functions ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ(x)=1-(1-x)
1/β. A subsumption is given in Table K: 
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Table K:  formulas for obtaining exact upper and lower limits and heuristic estimators ARmv, ARα and ARβ for 
accuracy ratios and AUC from CAP-coordinates/ combinations of errors of type I and II  104 
The suitability of the various heuristic measures presented, is examined subsequently based 
on empirical data of all nine models that were presented in chapter 3.5 and for which the data 
required for determining ROC-curves was available
321,322, see Figure 23 to Figure 31:  
•  The left hand side graphs in the following figures display the empirical ROC-curves and 
accuracy-ratio-equivalent ROC-curves according to the ROCα- and ROCβ-methods. Thus, 
the left hand side graphs show, how well the shapes of empirical ROC-curves can be ap-
proximated either by calibrated ROCα- or ROCβ-curves.  
•  The right hand side graphs show the accuracy-ratio-values that were estimated with the 
various methods for all combinations of errors of types I and II of the empirical ROC-
curves. True accuracy ratios are displayed as well, see the bold horizontal lines. These 
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comparisons of an empirical ROC-curve and two accuracy ratio 
equivalent ROC-curves of the types ROCα=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β
error of type II
 
Figure 23: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve SHUMWAY (2001), Accounting and Market and accuracy ratio 
equivalent ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accu-
racy ratio, upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and ARβ-estimators for various error-I-II-combinations, 
average value of ARα- and ARβ-estimators (ARα&β) 
                                                 
321  Following information are alternatively needed for obtaining ROC-curves: 
• (graphical) representations of ROC- or CAP-curves, 
• rating class specific default rates and shares of corporations,  
• “ROC-coordinates” (various combinations of errors of types I and II. 
322  Although, the respective data were available, the BEAVER (1967) and ALTMAN (1968) studies were not ex-
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comparisons of an empirical ROC-curve and two accuracy ratio 
equivalent ROC-curves of the types ROCα=x
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Figure 24: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex Deutschland (based on data from 
LAWRENZ, SCHWAIGER (2002)) and accuracy ratio equivalent ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; 
right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accuracy ratio, upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and 
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comparisons of an empirical ROC-curve and two accuracy ratio 
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Figure 25: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve CREDITREFORM-Bonitätsindex Österreich (Austria) (based on 
data from SCHWAIGER (2002)) and accuracy ratio equivalent ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; 
right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accuracy ratio, upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and 
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Figure 26: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve CAREY, HRYCAY (1980), logit model 1970-1998 and accuracy 
ratio equivalent ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true 
accuracy ratio, upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and ARβ-estimators for various error-I-II-
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Figure 27: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve KEALHOFER (2003), EDF 1990-1999 and accuracy ratio equiva-
lent ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accuracy ra-
tio, upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and ARβ-estimators for various error-I-II-combinations, average 
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Figure 28: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve S&P ratings, pool 1981-2003 and accuracy ratio equivalent 
ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accuracy ratio, 
upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and ARβ-estimators for various error-I-II-combinations, average 
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Figure 29: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve MOODY’S ratings, pool 1983-2003 and accuracy ratio equivalent 
ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accuracy ratio, 
upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and ARβ-estimators for various error-I-II-combinations, average 
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Figure 30: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve LEHMANN (2003), FIN/CA/AN and accuracy ratio equivalent 
ROC-curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accuracy ratio, 
upper and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and ARβ-estimators for various error-I-II-combinations, average 
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Figure 31: left hand side: empirical ROC-curve OHLSON (1980), model 2 and accuracy ratio equivalent ROC-
curves ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β; right hand side: empirical ROC-curve and true accuracy ratio, upper 
and lower limits for AR, ARmv-, ARα- and ARβ-estimators for various error-I-II-combinations, average value of 
ARα- and ARβ-estimators (ARα&β)  109 
The examinations show that: 
•  only few empirical ROC-curves do correspond well with α-type ROC-curves, 
ROCα(x)=x
α, one striking exception is the ROC-curve of the CREDITREFORM Deutschland 
Bonitätsindex that is given in Figure 24, all other accuracy ratio equivalent ROCα-curves, 
however, are steeper than the empirical ROC-curves both for very small and very large er-
rors of type II, while they are too flat for medium errors of type II, 
•  some of the empirical ROC-curves can be described quite well by ROCβ-curves, with 
ROCβ=1-(1-x)
1/β, see Figure 26 to Figure 30 – in all these and all remaining cases, how-
ever, accuracy ratio equivalent ROCβ-curves are too flat for both small and large errors of 
type II and too steep for medium errors of type II – which is directly opposed to the devia-
tions that could be observed in case of ROCα-curves, 
•  in the remaining cases (see Figure 23, Figure 25, Figure 31) empirical ROC-curves are 
positioned in about the middle of the space that is spanned by accuracy-ratio-equivalent 
ROCα- and ROCβ-curves. 
Altogether, the examinations showed that the shapes of empirical ROC-curves are character-
ized by a considerable diversity. Some of them are matched well by α-type curves, others by 
β-type curves and still others by a mixture of both types. As α-type curves can be transformed 
to β-type curves via reflection at the secondary diagonal, there is probably no functional form 
with only one parameter that is able to include both α- and β-type curves as special cases and 
still allows a good fit to empirical ROC-curves. 
For the reasons stated above, the heuristic accuracy ratio estimators ARα and ARβ should ex-
hibit systematic biases both for very large and very small errors of type II – though, with op-
posite signs, so that the average of both measures, ARα&β, should be a more suitable estimator. 
ROCα-curves are highly discriminative for “bad” corporations, i.e. they are able to identify 
groups of corporations with considerably high default rates. In the range of “good” corpora-
tions, however, they are characterized by a rather low discriminative power (see the compara-
tively steep, nearly linear progression of the respective ROC-curves for large errors of type 
II). ROCβ-curves, on the other hand, perform relatively poor among “bad corporations” (see 
the comparatively flat, nearly linear progression of the ROC-curves for small errors of type 
II), but they are highly discriminative for good corporations, because they are able to identify 
large groups of corporations with very low default rates.  
Annotation: If more than just one error-I-II-combination were available for inferring the accu-
racy ratio of a rating model, one additional parameter (besides α or β) could be estimated, 
which stated by how much the respective ROC-curve (that has to be interpolated) corresponds 
to either one of the two extremes (α- or β-type). 
Concerning the quality of the various heuristic accuracy ratio estimators, examinations based 
on the nine empirical ROC-curves revealed the following: 
•  ARmv: The average value of the upper and lower limit for the accuracy ratio converges to 
50% both for very small and very large errors of type II (as in the respective cases ARmax 
converges to 100% and ARmin to 0%) and thus is, at least for all rating models with an ac-
curacy ratio that exceeds 50%, negatively biased. Also for error-I-II-combinations with 
identical errors of types I and II (see intersection points of secondary diagonals and ROC-
curves) ARmv tends to be too small (here: in 8 of 9 cases), but misses the true accuracy ra-
tios by only -1 to -5 percentage points, 
•  ARα: In all nine cases ARα underestimates the true accuracy ratio for small errors of type 
II and overestimates it for large errors. In the range of identical errors of types I and II, the 
true accuracy ratio is hit very precisely [only in one case the deviation exceeds +/- 3 PP],  110 
•  ARβ: Directly opposed to ARα, ARβ overestimates the true accuracy ratios for small and 
underestimates them for large errors of type II. In the range of identical errors of types I 
and II, the true accuracy ratio is hit very precisely [the deviation never exceeds +/- 3 PP], 
•  ARα&β: In accordance with ARα and ARβ, ARα&β very precisely hits true accuracy ratios in 
the range of identical errors of types I and II. But contrary to ARmv, ARα, and ARβ there is 
no identifiable, uniform bias pattern for ARα&β in respect with sizes of errors of type II. 
For small errors of type II ARα&β overestimates the true accuracy ratio in three cases and 
underestimates it in six cases. For very large errors of type II ARα&β overestimates true 
accuracy ratios in one case and underestimates it in five cases
323. The recurring estimation 
errors in case of extreme errors of type II are an order of magnitude smaller than those for 
ARα and ARβ. In general, ARα&β gives very precise accuracy ratio estimations for a wide 
range of error-I-II-combinations. 
Conclusion: For error-I-II-combinations with identical errors of types I and II, all heuristic es-
timators, ARmv, ARα, ARβ, and ARα&β, predict true accuracy ratios quite well (only ARmv is – 
marginally – negatively biased). In case of asymmetric error-I-II-combinations, however, 
ARmv, ARα, and ARβ exhibit systematic and substantial biases, whereas ARα&β still gives very 
precise estimations of true accuracy ratios. Thus, compared with all other estimators, ARα&β 
only possesses advantages and no disadvantages and therefore should be the only choice.  
In the surveys in chapters 3.3 to 3.5 ARα&β is used as the sole estimator for transforming er-
ror-I-II-combinations to accuracy ratios. 
                                                 
323  In the remaining cases no error-I-II-combinations with large errors of type II were available.  111 
Appendix II: Incentive compatibility of various measures 
 
Intention: It shall be shown that the expected values of the conditional information entropy 
(CIE, logarithmic sconce function) and the Brier score (quadratic sconce function) are mini-
mized (=exhibit their best values) then, when a rater states his true subjective probabilities as 
forecasted probabilities (incentive compatibility). For illustrative purposes, one non-incentive 
compatible example - based on a simple absolute value sconce function - is presented. 
 
Conditional information entropy (CIE) 
F 118)  () ∑
=
− θ + − =
n
1 i




Note: CIE is only not defined in those cases, where a default occurs, although it was ruled out 
with certainty (Θi=1 and PDi,fore=0) or in those cases where no default occurs, although it was 
forecasted with certainty (Θi=0 and PDi,fore=1). 
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n
1 i
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 for PDi,fore=PDi,real,  




Smaller CIE-values correspond with better predictions. The smallest – and thus best – attain-
able CIE-value is zero and is being achieved only, when all forecasted default probabilities 
are either 0% or 100% and when they are always correct. But also in case of not perfectly dis-
criminative subjective probabilities, CIE is minimized, when true subjective probabilities are 
stated. 
 
                                                 
324  The marginal solutions PDi,fore=0% and PDi,fore =100% are not examined, because E(CIE) is not defined for 
them (except for PDi,real=0 or PDi,real=1), see notes above. Unless PDi,real=1/0, if PDi,fore approaches 1/0, CIE 
approaches infinity. Thus, the local optimum at PDi,fore=PDi,real is also the global optimum.  112 
Brier score 
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 , i.e. E(BS) is minimized, if PDi,fore=PDi,real for all i 
Examination of marginal solutions (PDi,fore=0 or PDi,fore=1 in F 126) yield: 
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See comments on CIE: The Brier score is minimized, if true subjective probabilities are 
stated, i.e. it is incentive compatible, too. 
  113 
A score based on an absolute value “sconce function” as example for a non incentive 
compatible score 
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If subjective probabilities of default, PDi,real, are smaller than 50%, then the resulting expected 
score value that is based on an absolute-value-sconce-function is the better (=lower), the 
smaller the respective forecasted probability, PDi,fore, is. Therefore, this score does not reward 
unbiased probabilities but is rewarding the statement of probabilities that are small as possi-
ble, i.e. 0%.  
Stating true subjective probabilities is punished, if probabilities of default PDi,tat are very 
small, giving the unbiased prediction  real , i fore , i PD PD =  leads to expected sconce values that are 
twice as large as those when stating  % 0 PD fore , i = . 
 
Annotation: For PDi,real > 50% stating always PDi,fore=100% is being awarded.  114 
Appendix III: Dependency of various measures of 
prediction accuracy on the average default rate  
 
Intention: Based on a simple model, dependencies of the following measures for predictive 
quality from the average sample default rate shall be examined: Brier score, skill-Brier score, 
entropy, skill-entropy, accuracy ratio. 
 
It is assumed, that a simple two-class  reference rating system is - under all environmental 
conditions (i.e. sample default rates) - able to separate all corporations of a sample into two 
groups, whereby the first group shall be exclusively composed of non-defaulters and shall 
have a share in all corporations of exactly 1-a. The share of the second group shall be a (inde-
pendent from the “environment”) and thus the probability of default of these corporations will 
be PD/a (dependent from the “environment”). It is assumed, that the rating model is correctly 
calibrated. 
In the following, environmental dependence (in the above sense) is examined for the various 
predictive quality measures.
 325  
 
Brier score 
If correctly calibrated, the Brier score (see formula F 37) is given by:  
F 147)  () ∑
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Interpretation: For as long as the probability of default in the second class is smaller than 
50%, every increase in the average probability of default, PD, results in an increase 
(=deterioration) of the Brier score. The strength of this undesired dependence can be 
quantified with a subsequent analysis of elasticity.  
The elasticity of the Brier score with respect to PD states, by how many percent the Brier 
score rises, if the average default rate rises by one percent [not percentage point] and is 
defined as follows: 
                                                 
325  Environmental independence as interpreted in the sense of CANTOR, MANN (2003, p. 12) is given, when an 
accuracy measure is invariant with respect to proportional changes in rating class specific default rates, see 
on this also DVFA (2004, p. 599). See the annotations in chapter 2.3.2 for criticism on this concept. For an 
alternative definition of environmental independence see SWETS (1988, p. 1286), see also OENB (2004a, p. 
117f.). According to that definition, an accuracy measure would be considered environmentally independent, 
if it was independent from the share of defaulters in the test sample (whereby defaulters and non-defaulters 









































































PD , BS −
−
= ε  
F 156)  1
a
a
lim PD , BS 0 PD = = ε
→  
 
Interpretation: For small PD the elasticity of the Brier score with respect to PD, εBS,PD, is ap-
proximately equal to 1, i.e. for small PD the Brier score nearly linearly rises with increasing 
probabilities of default. This implies that there is a strong environmental dependence of the 
Brier score. This strong environmental dependence could also be confirmed empirically (here 
even in a literal sense, see chapter 2.4) and implicates that Brier score values of samples with 
differing default rates cannot be directly compared.  
For such purposes the usage of skill-measures was suggested in order to correct for environ-
mental dependence (see chapter 2.4), which are formed by dividing the accuracy measures 
that a certain model achieves in a given environment by the same measures that a naïve rating 
model achieves in the same environment. A naïve rating model is a model, that always states 
the same (but unbiased) probability of default PD for every corporate. 
 
Skill-Brier score 
If correctly calibrated, the Skill-Brier score (see formula F 34, F 35, and F 37) is given by: 
 
F 157)  () PD 1 PD
BS
1 SkillBS − ⋅
− =     from formula F 149 follows: 











− =    by canceling down PD and expanding the first term 











































































Interpretation: Every increase in the average probability of default, PD, results in an in-
crease (=improvement) of the skill-Brier score. This is a surprising result because an in-
crease in PD leads to a simultaneous deterioration of the underlying Brier score. This re-
sult is rather unsatisfying, because – counter to its original intention – the skill-Brier-score 
is obviously environmentally dependent, too. 
The strength of this undesired dependence will be quantified with the subsequent analysis 
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= ε  
F 166)  0
PD 1
1
PD , SkillBS >
−
= ε  
F 167)  1 lim PD , SkillBS 0 PD = ε
→  
Interpretation: The skill-Brier score is the bigger (=better), the bigger PD is. For small PD, 
the elasticity of the skill-Brier score εSkill,,PD is nearly equal to 1, i.e. for small PD the skill-
Brier score nearly linearly rises with increasing probabilities of default, which implies a 
strong environmental dependence.  117 
Conditional Information Entropie (CIE) 
If correctly calibrated, CIE (see formula F 36) is given by: 
F 168)  () () () ∑
=
− ⋅ − + ⋅ − =
g
1 i
i i i i i cal PD 1 log PD 1 PD log PD a CIE   h e r e  w i t h  g = 2 ,  P D 1=0%, 
a1=1-a, PD2=PD/a, a2=a (see assumptions at the beginning of this chapter):  
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PD <  (i.e. PD/a < 50%) the enumerator inside the logarithm function is bigger than 
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2
a
PD ≥ . 
 
Interpretation: For as long as the probability of default in the second rating class is smaller 
than 50%, every increase in PD is accompanied by an increase (i.e. deterioration) of the 
conditional information entropy, CIE. 
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Interpretation: For small PD, the elasticity of the CIE with respect to PD is nearly equal to 
1, i.e. CIE nearly linearly rises with increasing probabilities of default for small PD, which 
implies a strong environmental dependence. 
 
Skill-entropie (conditional information entropy ratio, CIER) 
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326  calculated with Mathematica 5  119 
F 187)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
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The first term within the brackets is at least as big as the absolute value of the sum of the 
(negative) terms 4 and 5: 
Proof: it has to be shown that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) a log PD log a PD 1 log PD log PD a log PD log a ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ > − ⋅ ⋅ : 
According to BERNOULLI’s inequality
327 (generalized for real exponents) follows that: 
F 188) () r x 1 x 1
r ⋅ + < +     for  1 r 0 < <  and for  1 x − >  
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    and it follows that 
F 191)  () ( ) () ( ) PD 1 log a log PD a log a − < − − ⋅   
By extending the terms with log(PD), log(PD)<0 follows: 
F 192)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) PD log PD 1 log a log PD log a PD a log PD log a ⋅ − > ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅    and thus 
F 193)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) a log PD log a PD 1 log PD log PD a log PD log a ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ > − ⋅ ⋅  q.e.d. 









F 195)  0 CIER lim
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a PD  
F 199)  0 lim PD , CIER 0 PD = ε
→  
F 200)  ∞ = ε
→ PD , CIER a PD lim  
Interpretation: Analog to the skill-Brier score does the skill-entropy measures (CIER) im-
prove with increasing average sample default rates. But for small PD, the elasticity of the 
CIER with respect to PD is nearly equal to 0, i.e. at least for small PD the skill-entropy is 
less environmental dependent than all other measures examined so far. 
                                                 
327   see for instance http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernoulli%27s_inequality (26/04/2005). Jens Eisenschmidt 
pointed out the applicability of Bernoulli’s inequality in this case. 
328  Formulas F 197 to F 200 were obtained with Mathematica 5.  120 
Accuracy Ratio 
For a two class rating system, whereby all defaulters are captured by the second class, 























































Annotation: An accuracy ratio of 100% (perfect rating) results, if every corporate of the 

















































































PD , AR −
= ε   
F 208)  0
1
0
lim PD , AR 0 PD = = ε
→   
Interpretation: Every increase in PD is accompanied by an increase (=improvement) of the 
associated accuracy ratios. Thus, the accuracy ratio is an environmental dependent meas-
ure, too - at least when environmental dependency is defined in the above sense, but not in 
a sense that was outlined in chapter 2.3.2.  
However, even though the accuracy ratios measure is not completely environmental inde-
pendent in the above sense, it is at least relatively insensitive with respect to environ-
mental influences (εAR,PD ≈0 for small PD).  
 
Annotation: For the MOODY’S-defined AR (see chapter 2.3.2) instead of formulas F 204 
and F 207 following equations would result:  
F 209)  a 1 AR s ' Moody − =  
F 210)  0 PD , s ' Moody AR = ε −   121 
In Table L and Table M formal results of this chapter are summarized. In the graphs follow-
ing thereafter, Figure 32 to Figure 36, numerical examples for the five measures considered 
are given.  
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with respect  
to PD  PD a
PD 2 a
PD , BS −
−
= ε  
PD 1
1
PD , SkillBS −
= ε  
PD 1
PD
PD , AR −
= ε  
elasticity for 
small PD 
1 PD , BS ≈ ε   1 PD , SkillBS ≈ ε   0 PD , BS ≈ ε  
Table L:   various predictive accuracy measures (table 1 of 2), first derivatives and sensitivities with respect to 
PD for a simple two-class rating system, 
  conditional information  
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small PD  εCIE,PD ≈1  εCIER,PD ≈0 
Table M:  various predictive accuracy measures (table 2 of 2), first derivatives and sensitivities with respect to 
PD for a simple two-class rating system, 
 
                                                 
329  The elasticity of CIER with respect to PD was calculated with Mathematica 5. The respective term is very 
“bulky” and complex. As this term is not needed in the further analysis, it was not reproduced in the table 
above. The boundary value of this term for lim PDÆ0 was calculated with Mathematica 5 as well and is given 
in the table above.  122 
50% 25% 10% 5% 1%
0,50% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,3%
1,00% 1,0% 1,0% 0,9% 0,8% 0,0%
1,50% 1,5% 1,4% 1,3% 1,1% ---
2,00% 1,9% 1,8% 1,6% 1,2% ---
2,50% 2,4% 2,3% 1,9% 1,3% ---
3,00% 2,8% 2,6% 2,1% 1,2% ---
3,50% 3,3% 3,0% 2,3% 1,1% ---
4,00% 3,7% 3,4% 2,4% 0,8% ---
4,50% 4,1% 3,7% 2,5% 0,5% ---
5,00% 4,5% 4,0% 2,5% 0,0% ---
10,00% 8,0% 6,0% 0,0% --- ---






























Figure 32: some numerical values for the Brier score for various a and PD 
50% 25% 10% 5% 1%
0,50% 0,5% 1,5% 4,5% 9,5% 49,7%
1,00% 1,0% 3,0% 9,1% 19,2% 100,0%
1,50% 1,5% 4,6% 13,7% 28,9% ---
2,00% 2,0% 6,1% 18,4% 38,8% ---
2,50% 2,6% 7,7% 23,1% 48,7% ---
3,00% 3,1% 9,3% 27,8% 58,8% ---
3,50% 3,6% 10,9% 32,6% 68,9% ---
4,00% 4,2% 12,5% 37,5% 79,2% ---
4,50% 4,7% 14,1% 42,4% 89,5% ---
5,00% 5,3% 15,8% 47,4% 100,0% ---
10,00% 11,1% 33,3% 100,0% --- ---






























Figure 33: some numerical values for the skill Brier score for various a and PD 
50% 25% 10% 5% 1%
0,50% 50,3% 75,4% 90,5% 95,5% 99,5%
1,00% 50,5% 75,8% 90,9% 96,0% 100,0%
1,50% 50,8% 76,1% 91,4% 96,4% ---
2,00% 51,0% 76,5% 91,8% 96,9% ---
2,50% 51,3% 76,9% 92,3% 97,4% ---
3,00% 51,5% 77,3% 92,8% 97,9% ---
3,50% 51,8% 77,7% 93,3% 98,4% ---
4,00% 52,1% 78,1% 93,8% 99,0% ---
4,50% 52,4% 78,5% 94,2% 99,5% ---
5,00% 52,6% 78,9% 94,7% 100,0% ---
10,00% 55,6% 83,3% 100,0% --- ---






























Figure 34: some numerical values for the accuracy ratio for various a and PD  123 
50% 25% 10% 5% 1%
0,50% 2,8% 2,5% 2,0% 1,6% 0,7%
1,00% 4,9% 4,2% 3,3% 2,5% 0,0%
1,50% 6,7% 5,7% 4,2% 3,1% ---
2,00% 8,4% 7,0% 5,0% 3,4% ---
2,50% 9,9% 8,1% 5,6% 3,5% ---
3,00% 11,3% 9,2% 6,1% 3,4% ---
3,50% 12,7% 10,1% 6,5% 3,1% ---
4,00% 13,9% 11,0% 6,7% 2,5% ---
4,50% 15,1% 11,8% 6,9% 1,6% ---
5,00% 16,3% 12,5% 6,9% 0,0% ---
10,00% 25,0% 16,8% 0,0% --- ---






























Figure 35: some numerical values for CIE for various a and PD
  
50% 25% 10% 5% 1%
0,50% 11,0% 22,1% 36,9% 48,4% 78,0%
1,00% 12,5% 25,0% 42,0% 55,3% 100,0%
1,50% 13,5% 27,1% 45,7% 60,8% ---
2,00% 14,3% 28,9% 49,0% 65,7% ---
2,50% 15,1% 30,5% 51,9% 70,4% ---
3,00% 15,8% 31,9% 54,7% 75,0% ---
3,50% 16,4% 33,3% 57,3% 79,9% ---
4,00% 17,0% 34,6% 59,9% 85,1% ---
4,50% 17,6% 35,8% 62,5% 91,1% ---
5,00% 18,1% 37,0% 65,1% 100,0% ---




























a [share of companies of the second rating class] skill entropy 
(CIER)
 
Figure 36: some numerical values for the skill entropy (CIER) for various a and PD 
Within the scope of the assumptions chosen, it could be shown formally, that an increase of 
the average default rate: 
•  causes strong increases, i.e. deteriorations, of the Brier score and the conditional in-
formation entropy (CIE), and strong/ moderate increases, i.e. improvements, of the 
skill-Brier score/ skill-entropy (CIER), 
•  has practically no impact on the accuracy ratio (for small PD). 
Owing to its strong environmental dependency, i.e. sensitivity with respect to the average de-
fault rate, Brier score, skill-Brier score and CIE are no suitable measures for comparing pre-
dictive quality of models, which are evaluated on the basis of samples with different default 
rates. A more suitable measure, with some reservations, is the skill-entropy (CIER), but least 
environmental dependent is the accuracy ratio.  124 
Appendix IV: Estimating information losses attributable to 
discretization of continuous rating scales 
 
Intention: Information losses shall be quantified, that result from discretizing continuous rat-
ing scores into discrete rating classes.  
 
Further proceedings: For estimating the above mentioned information losses, two different 
approaches are chosen: 
The first approach is based on individual probabilities of default that are interpolated based on 
rating class specific default rates. Afterwards, the information content, measured in accuracy 
ratio, of a portfolio with individual PD is compared to the information content of a portfolio 
with only rating class specific PD.  
The second methods is assuming certain formal, parametric functional representations of 
ROC-curves and tests for a variety of parameter values, what percentage of the area under the 
ROC-curve, AUCROC (resp. AR),  a rating system with only g discrete classes can achieve.  
It turns out, that both approaches are yielding widely identical qualitative and quantitative re-
sults. 
Procedure I: Interpolation of individual probabilities of defaults 
The further proceedings according to procedure I are as follows: 
1.  In a simulation model a portfolio of n corporations is created (here n=5,000). The corpora-
tions are assigned to g rating classes (here g=17 with AAA=1, AA+=2, …, CCC/C=17) 
according to a given frequency distribution and are sorted by ascending rating classes. 
2.  Every corporate “inherits” the rating class specific probability of default of the rating 
class it belongs to,  
3.  The (expected) accuracy ratio of the given portfolio is determined (see formula F 22). 
4.  Individual probabilities of defaults (see point 2) are smoothed for allowing intra-class 
varying default rates: the smoothing is carried out by assigning to each corporate a 
weighted average of the (unsmoothed) individual default probabilities of its b “better” and 
b “worse” neighbors. For technical reasons, b additional corporations at the upper/ lower 
boundary have to be created with probabilities of default of PD_min/ PD_max.
330  
Weighting factors wi,j do linearly decrease with increasing distance of corporate i’s neig-
bors, which corresponds with a triangle core
331 estimator with core width 2*b-1:  
                                                 
330  For reasons of plausibility, PD_min should not be bigger than the average default probability of the best rat-
ing class. In the simulation study, PD_min was set to 0%. The exact specification of PD_min is of no practi-
cal relevance for the model’s results. Measurable impacts, however, are attributable to PD_max. Within the 
scope of the sensitivity analysis of the model, various values for PD_max were tried and their implications 
for the model variables under consideration (in particular their impact on the accuracy ratio) were analyzed. 
PD_max directly affects heterogeneity of individual default rates of the corporations within the worst rating 
class. For reasons of plausibility, it should not be smaller than the average default rate of the worst rating 
class. 
331  See SCOTT (1992, p. 133): “The quality of a density estimate is now widely recognized to be primarily de-
termined by the choice of smoothing parameter, and only in a minor way by the choice of the kernel.” There-
fore, in the following only the influence of the smoothing parameter on the model’s results is tested, but not 
the choice of the kernel function. 
   Although a good kernel function should be “smooth, clearly unimodal [, and] symmetric about the origin” 
(see ibid, p. 138) –recommendations that are fulfilled in case of triangle core estimators, even large devia- 125 
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Examples: if b=1 then  i i , smoothed PD PD =   or  if  b=3  then                         















PD + + − − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =  
5.  Subsequently, rating class specific calibration factors are applied in order to make sure, 
that average smoothed rating class PD are equal to average unsmoothed rating class spe-
cific PD (see point 2): 
F 213)  () ] i [ class rating , smoothed
] i [ class rating , unsmoothed
i , smoothed i , calibrated _ smoothed PD value mean
PD
PD PD ⋅ =   
6.  The (expected) accuracy ratio of the portfolio with corporations with smoothed and cali-
brated PD is determined and compared with the respective value that was obtained in 
point 3. 
For the parameterizations that were performed in steps 1 and 2, historical default rates and 
current frequency distributions of corporations according to the 17ary rating scales of S&P 
(2004)/ MOODY’S (2004) were chosen alternatively. Thus, the model results are in the first in-
stance directly applicable only to S&P and MOODY’s ratings. With different parameteriza-
tions, however, the simulation model could cover any other rating systems as well, for in-
stance a bank rating system with a 7ary rating scale and completely different rating class spe-
cific PD and frequency distributions.  
Steps 4 to 6 are repeated for different specifications of the smoothing procedure. Thereby the 
influence of the parameters PD_max and b, which ultimately have to be chosen with some ar-
bitrariness (although they can be interpreted intuitively) within certain plausible bandwidths, 
on the results finally obtained are quantified.  
In Table N and Table O results for S&P’s and MOODY’S data are given. The respective values 
show the ratios of the accuracy-ratio-values of the 17ary scale portfolio (see step 3) and the 
accuracy ratios that were obtained by portfolios with continuous probabilities of defaults (see 
step 6). 
If b-values smaller than 100 are chosen (b=100 equals a smoothing core that for each corpo-
rate entails only +/- 2% of the neighboring corporations of the portfolio – whereby more dis-
tant corporations are receiving lower weighting factors than closer corporations), there is 
practically no smoothing of probabilities of default taking place, except at the boundaries of 
neighboring rating classes, because in most cases only corporations of the same rating class 
                                                                                                                                                          
tions of these demands cause only minor “efficiency losses”. See SCOTT (1992, p. 140) for a survey of eight 
commonly used kernel functions and their respective efficiency measures. SCOTT (1992, p. 139) concludes 
„Therefore the kernel can be chosen for other reasons (ease of computation, differentiability, …) without un-
due concern for loss of efficiency.“.  126 
are included for determining weighted averages of PD.
332 Relatively large b-values (b>300, 
which equals a smoothing core bandwidth of +/- 6% of all corporations), on the other hand, 
result in implausible leaps in individual PD of corporations at the boundaries of neighboring 
rating classes. These leaps are caused by the calibration in step 5, which follows the smooth-
ing. For lim  bÆ∞ the initial situation would reappear, i.e. there would be no PD-
differentiation within rating classes at all, and PD of corporations of neighboring rating 
classes would increase by leaps and bounds according to the rating class specific default rates.  
Owing to the subsequent calibrations, the influence of the parameter PD_max is relatively low 
for given values of b. In case of S&P data the relative precision of the 17ary scale portfolio in 
relation to the continuous scale portfolio only marginally deteriorates by 0.2 PP (percentage 
points) when PD_max dramatically changes from 30% to 100%.
333 Within more reasonable 
boundaries for PD_max, 40%-75% (as is indicated by the shaded area in Table N), its influ-
ence on the model results diminishes further to only 0.1 PP. In case of MOODY’S data the in-
fluence of PD_max is somewhat bigger with 0.6 PP (0.4 PP). The greater impact of PD_max 
in case of MOODY’S data is due to the fact, that MOODY’S “worst rating class” (Caa/C) entails 
nearly twice as many corporations than S&P’s “worst rating class” (CCC/C) so that a greater 
heterogeneity of individual probabilities of default – which is affected by PD_max - within 
this class will have a greater impact in case of a portfolio with MOODY’S rating class fre-
quency distribution.  
b (number of better and worse neighbors that have to be considered when 
smoothing probabilities of defaults (core width = 2b-1))  S&P data 
50  100  200  300  400  500 
30.0%  99.8%  99.7%  99.5%  99.4%  99.4%  99.4% 
40.0%  99.8%  99.6%  99.5%  99.4%  99.4%  99.4% 
50.0%  99.8%  99.6%  99.4%  99.4%  99.4%  99.4% 






















100.0%  99.7%  99.5%  99.3%  99.3%  99.3%  99.3% 
Table N:  precision of the 17ary scale portfolio in relation to the continuous probability distribution portfolio 
for various specifications of the smoothing algorithm (maximum attainable PD and number of better and 
worse that have to be considered for smoothing probabilities of default), S&P (2004) data (historical default 
rates and current distribution of corporations among 17 rating scales), bold value: smallest value; shaded area: 
plausible area with plausible parameters 
                                                 
332  In case of a 17ary scale, every rating class entails on average about 6% of all corporations.  
333  Depending on the chosen core width, essentially only corporations of the worst rating class (CCC/C or 
Caa/C) are affected by this parameter. Further limits to the influence of this variable are due to the calibra-
tion that follows in step 5. 
  If too low values for PD_max were chosen, with PD_max < PDCCC/C, this would result in an implausible, U-
shaped curve of probabilities of defaults within the group of the worst corporations.  127 
b (number of better and worse neighbors that have to be considered when 
smoothing probabilities of defaults (core width = 2b-1))  MOODY’S data 
50  100  200  300  400  500 
30.0%  99.8%  99.7%  99.5%  99.5%  99.5%  99.5% 
40.0%  99.8%  99.6%  99.4%  99.4%  99.4%  99.4% 
50.0%  99.7%  99.5%  99.3%  99.2%  99.3%  99.3% 






















100.0%  99.5%  99.2%  98.9%  98.9%  99.0%  99.1% 
Table O:  precision of the 17ary scale portfolio in relation to the continuous probability distribution portfolio 
for various specifications of the smoothing algorithm (maximum attainable PD and number of better and 
worse that have to be considered for smoothing probabilities of default), MOODY’S (2004) data (historical de-
fault rates and current distribution of corporations among 17 rating scales), bold value: smallest value; shaded 
area: plausible area with plausible parameters 
The following examinations are based on a “conservative” parameter combination, 
PD_max=75% and b=150, which rather overstates than understates the information losses that 
are attributable to discretizing continuous rating scales.   
The resulting distributions of the smoothed and calibrated probabilities of default according to 
the S&P- and MOODY’S data are shown in Figure 37 and Figure 38.  
The ensuing graphs show - in the right hand side parts of the respective graphs - the CAP-
curves for both the 17ary scaled ratings and the continuous probability ratings. In the left hand 
side parts of the graphs is displayed, what share of the total information losses (of the 17ary 
scale compared to the continuous scale ratings) can be attributed to each single rating class. 
Deviating from the conventional proceedings, for obtaining these values, after step 5 all PD, 
except those of the corporations of the rating class under consideration, are reset to the rating 
class specific values (see step 2). Afterwards, the accuracy ratio of this portfolio is determined 
and compared both with the accuracy ratio of the 17ary scale and the continuous probability 
scale rating. 
 
Annotation to Figure 39 and Figure 40: The marked differences in the share of information 
losses attributable to the worst rating class (CCC/C resp. Caa/C) between S&P and MOODY’S 
data can be largely referred to the heavily varying class sizes (S&P: ca. 3%, MOODY’S: ca. 6% 
of all corporations. For the respective class sizes see also Figure 37 and Figure 38). Obvi-
ously, the wider a rating class is, the bigger are the information losses that accrue, if all differ-
ences in individual probabilities of defaults are ignored by assuming rating class specific de-
fault rates.  
 
Conclusion Procedure I  
Using discrete 17ary rating scales instead of continuous rating scales causes information 
losses of about 0.3% - 0.7% (S&P) or 0.4% - 1.0% (MOODY’S) (see shaded values in Table N 
and Table O). – i.e. on average 0.6% [if a univalent result is desired]. 
The examinations show, that a meaningful reduction of the (already rather sparse) information 
losses can only be achieved by increasing the differentiation within the worst rating class 
(CCC/C, Caa/C). On the other hand, improving differentiation among investment grade cor-
porations (AAA to BBB-, resp. Aaa to Baa3) practically has got no impact at all on the meas-










































































geglättete und kalibrierte Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten






corporates ranked in ascending order of ratings vs. 
rating class specific and individual (smoothed and calibrated) 
probabilities of default, S&P data, max_PD = 75%, b=150 
rating class specific probabilities of default
individual (smoothed and calibrated) probabilities of default
 
Figure 37: corporations ranked in ascending order of ratings vs. rating class specific and individual 










































































geglättete und kalibrierte Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten







corporates ranked in ascending order of ratings vs. 
rating class specific and individual (smoothed and calibrated) 
probabilities of default, MOODY’s data, max_PD = 75%, b=150 
rating class specific probabilities of default
individual (smoothed and calibrated) probabilities of default
 
Figure 38:  corporations ranked in ascending order of rating, smoothed and calibrated vs. rating class spe-
cific probabilities of default, MOODY’S data, max_PD = 75%, b=150  129 
Beitrag zur Erhöhung der Schätzgüte 
durch PD-Glättung einzelner Ratingkategorien







































































S&P-Daten; max. PD=75%(unkalibriert); i=150 S&P-Daten; max. PD=75%(unkalibriert); i=150
CAP-Kurven, geglättete und ungeglättete 
Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten
CAP-curves based on rating class specific vs. 
smoothed and calibrated probabilities of default
information losses attributable to single rating classes 
by using rating class specific default probabilities
S&P data, max_PD=75%, b=150 S&P data, max_PD=75%, b=150
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rating class specific probabilities of default
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Figure 39: information losses attributable to single rating classes by using rating class specific (instead of 
individual) default probabilities (left hand side), CAP-curves based on rating class specific vs. 
smoothed and calibrated probabilities of default, S&P data, max_PD = 75%, b=150 (right hand side) 
Beitrag zur Erhöhung der Schätzgüte 
durch PD-Glättung einzelner Ratingkategorien
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Figure 40: information losses attributable to single rating classes by using rating class specific (instead of 
individual) default probabilities (left hand side), CAP-curves based on rating class specific vs. smoothed 
and calibrated probabilities of default, MOODY’S data, max_PD = 75%, b=150 (right hand side)  130 
Procedure II: Linear ROC-curve interpolation  
The second procedure for estimating information losses that are attributable to discretizing 
rating scales does not (explicitly) model individual probabilities of default for subsequently 
deriving CAP- or ROC-curves and obtaining measures related with them. Instead, it models 
ROC-curves directly, by assuming certain formally manageable ROC-curve functions. Subse-
quently, the second procedure does determine how many percent of the “true” (“continuous”) 
ROC-curve (AUCROC) – resp. how many percent of the true accuracy ratio – can be obtained 
with a rating system with only g rating classes. All parameter values for g ranging from 2 to 
30 are examined numerically. 
For the formal representation of ROC-curves two parametrical functions (“families of func-
tions”) are used, ROCα and ROCβ, with parameters α and β that enable the specification of a 
multitude of various ROC-curves. 
F 214)  ()
α
α = x x ROC        with ROCα(x)=1-error of type I  and  x=error of type II 
By definition ROCβ(x)-curves results from reflecting ROCα–curves at the secondary diagonal. 
Thus, if in formula F 214 ROC(x) is replaced with 1-x and x with 1-ROC(x), and α with β, it 
follows: 
F 215)  ( ) ()
β
β − = − x ROC 1 x 1  
F 216)  () ( )
β
β − − =
/ 1 x 1 1 x ROC  
Empirical ROC-curves can be described well by ROCα- or ROCβ-curves or by mixtures of 
both types (see Appendix I).  
For α=1, resp. β=1, the resulting ROC-curves follow the (primary) diagonal line in the false 
alert rate-hit rate-diagram (ROC-diagram), which correspond to the ROC-curves that “naïve 
rating models” would create. For α=0 and β=0, respective ROC-curves proceed along the ex-
terior sides of the ROC-diagram (“perfect rating model”). For values for α resp. β between 0 
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Figure 41: ROC-curves with ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ(x)=1-(1-x)
1/β for various parameter values for α and β  131 
Given an error-I-II-combination, parameters α and β can be calculated as follows (cf. formu-
las F 214 and F 216) 




F 1 log −
= α      with F1 … error (failure) type I and F2 … error (failure) type II 
F 218)   ()




= β  




F 1 log −
= β          
 
The area under the ROCα-curve, AUCROC,α, and the associated accuracy ratio are given by: 
F 220)  () ∫ ∫
α





































































= α  
F 226)  ()
() 1 2
1 2
F 1 log F log




= α  
By substituting ROC-coordinates F1 and F2 by CAP-coordinates X0 and Y0 according to for-































= α  
F 228)  () ( )
() ( ) 0 0 0
0 0 0
Y log PD 1 log PD Y X log
Y log PD 1 log PD Y X log
AR
+ − − ⋅ −
− − − ⋅ −
= α  
 
The area under the ROCβ-curve, AUCROC, β, and the associated accuracy ratio are given by: 
F 229)   () ( ) ∫ ∫
β






ROC dx x 1 1 dx x ROC AUC   132 
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AUCROC     (cf. formula F 222) 









= β      





AR     (cf. formula F 224), in combination with formula F 219 follows: 
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F log




= β      
F 238)   ()
() 2 1
2 1
F 1 log F log




= β     (cf. formula F 226) 
By substituting ROC-coordinates F1 and F2 by CAP-coordinates X0 and Y0 according to for-
mulas F 64 and F 66 follows: 























1 log Y 1 log
PD 1
PD Y X






    
F 240)   () ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) PD 1 log PD Y X PD 1 log Y 1 log




− − ⋅ + − − + −
− + ⋅ + − − − −
= β    
Parameter values for α and β, that give rise to realistic accuracy-ratio-values, are for highly 
discriminative ratings in the range of about α = β = 0.1 (AR=82%), for rather below average 
ratings about α = β = 0.3 (AR=54%) and for very inefficient ratings about α = β = 0.5 
(AR=33%) (see also chapter 3.5).  
With the formulas above, exact AUCROC and accuracy ratio measures for continuous ratings 
can be calculated – and can subsequently be compared with ratings that principally base on 
the same error-I-II-trade-off, but which are based on a discrete number of rating classes (see 
formula F 22). Mathematically speaking, the attainable relative accuracy of a rating model 
with g discrete rating classes depends on how well a continuous ROC-curve can be approxi-
mated by a linear interpolation, i.e. by a “curve” that consists of g connected, linear sections  133 
whose g-1 inner supporting points are positioned on the continuous score’s ROC-curve (see 
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Figure 42:  linear approximations of ROCα- and ROCβ-type curves according to different procedures, α= β=0.3, 
two inner supporting points 
However, one further input for the linear interpolation is needed – the localization of the ab-
scissa values [false alert rates] that are used for determining the inner supporting points. In 
Figure 42 two examples of procedures for determining abscissa values (here for a rating 
model with only three different classes and therefore two inner supporting points) are pre-
sented – that are applied both for ROCα- and for ROCβ-curves.  
The first procedure creates three rating classes, whereby each rating class is assigned the same 
share in all false-alerts (here: 33.3% per rating class). The second procedure subdivides rating 
classes such, that the share in all false-alert-rates each rating class comprises rises linearly, i.e. 
the second class comprises twice as many false alert rates as the first and the third three times 
as many as the first (in general: i-th class comprise i times as many false alerts as the first 
class), so that shares in false alerts of 16.6%, 33.3% and 50% result.  
In Figure 43 relative accuracy ratio values are shown for various α- and β-type curves and for 
0 to 30 inner supporting points (1..31 discrete rating classes). Highlighted are the respective 
values for 2, 7 and 17 rating classes (which correspond to 1, 6 and 16 inner supporting 
points). All rating classes comprise equal shares in total errors of type II. 
                                                 
334  Each such section represents one discrete rating class. Linearity of these sections implies, that within the re-
spective sections (rating classes) an identical error-I-II-trade-off has to be made, which means that corpora-
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Figure 43:  relative accuracy ratios for various parameter values for α- (left hand side) and β-type ROC-curves 
(right hand side) and for 0 to 30 inner supporting points (1..31 discrete rating classes), equal shares in total 
errors of type II per rating class  
For 17 rating classes, for instance, following relative accuracy ratio values originate: 95.5% 
(α=0.1) vs. 99.3% (β=0.1) or 98.3% (α=0.5) / 99.7% (β=0.5). Therefore, based on a 17ary rat-
ing scale, the accuracy ratio of a very bad rating model (α=β=0.5, ARα=ARβ=33%) would 
produce accuracy ratio values that are about 0.3% - 1.7% (0.1 – 0.6 percentage points) below 
the “true accuracy” ratio of the continuous score model, while the respective values for a good 
rating model (α=0.1, β=0.1, ARα=ARβ=82%) would be up to 0.7%-4.5% (0.5 – 3.5 percentage 
points) too low.  
These results, however, are rather too pessimistic estimations for the information losses that 
can be attributed to discretizing rating scales – in particular for α-type curves. 
Additional examinations revealed, that information losses in case of equally wide rating 
classes (in respect with shares in errors of type II) for α-type curves are nearly exclusively as-
cribable to information losses that accrue in the first rating class (see Figure 44 left hand side, 
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Figure 44:   share of information losses in total information losses that accrue in the first rating class, for α- (left 
hand side) and β-type curves (right hand side) and 0..30 inner supporting points (1..31 rating classes), 
equal shares in total errors of type II per rating class 
For α=0.1 and 30 rating classes, for instance 98.1% (!) of all information losses that totally re-
sult by the linearly approximation of the ROC-curve accrue in the first rating class (for β=0.1 
and 30 rating classes it still are over 25%) – while the residual 1.9% of information losses are 
shared among the 29 remaining rating classes.  
Obviously, α-type ROC-curves are highly non-linear in the range of the first rating class (see 
the pronounced concave curve progression in Figure 42, left hand side). Therefore it was to be 
expected, that not only the share of information losses of the first rating class, but also the to-
tal amount of information losses could be reduced, if the class size of the first rating class was 
scaled down in order to improve the quality of the linear interpolation. One way of achieving 
this, is to apply the above mentioned procedure of linearly increasing class widths (see Figure 
45 for the resulting relative accuracy ratios depending on the quality of the rating (α- and β 
parameter values and Figure 46 for the share of the first rating class in all information 
losses).
335,336 
                                                 
335  Whether this procedure does minimize information losses given a ROC-curve of type α (or β or both) is un-
known and irrelevant. It is irrelevant, because a rater cannot perfectly control this feature of his rating sys-
tems anyway - and he might pursue other targets than minimizing information losses, such as making sure 
sufficient class width for enabling meaningful statistical tests. Further, it is not likely that a rating class dis-
tribution that is optimal (in what ever sense) for a particular ROC-curve function, is also optimal for any 
other ROC-curve function. The above mentioned procedure was chosen, because it enables a better differen-
tiation in the relevant fore part of the ROC-curve and because it is easy to implement and to communicate.  
336  For further approaches for formally and numerically modeling rating class widths (“plausible but suboptimal 
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Figure 45:  relative accuracy ratios for various parameter values for α- (left hand side) and β-type ROC-curves 
(right hand side) and for 0 to 30 inner supporting points (1..31 discrete rating classes), linearly increasing 
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Figure 46:  share of information losses that accrue in the first rating class in total information losses, for α- (left 
hand side) and β-type curves (right hand side) and 0..30 inner supporting points (1..31 rating classes), line-
arly increasing rating class widths   137 
For the procedure with linearly increasing rating class widths and 17 rating classes, for in-
stance relative accuracy ratios of 99.5% (α=0.1) vs. 99.7% (β=0.1) or 99.6% (α=0.5) vs. 
99.3% (β=0.1) result. Therefore, based on a 17ary rating scale, the accuracy ratio of a very 
bad rating model (α=β=0.5, ARα=ARβ=33%) would produce accuracy ratio values that are 
about 0.4% - 0.7% (ca. 0.2 percentage points) below the “true accuracy” ratio of the continu-
ous score model, while the respective values for a good rating model (α=0.1,  β=0.1, 
ARα=ARβ=82%) would be 0.3%-0.5% (ca. 0.3 percentage points) too low.  
Conclusion Procedure II:  
In Table P numerical results for the relative accuracy ratios of discrete scale rating models in 
relation to continuous scale rating models are given for four different numbers of rating 
classes, two different ROC-curve functions, three different rating quality levels and two 
different methods for determining rating class distributions.  
Relative accuracy ratio values that are considered especially relevant for the respective 
numbers of rating classes have been shaded (for further explanations see below). 
equal class widths  linearly increasing  
class widths 




























quality of the  
rating model 








good (AR=82%)  0.529  0.610  0.688  0.794  0.570  0.741 
mediocre (AR=54%)  0.580  0.744  0.717  0.757  0.662  0.737  2 
bad (AR=33%)  0.621  0.750  0.732  0.667  0.686  0.699 
good (AR=82%)  0.880  0.959  0.971  0.985  0.920  0.978 
mediocre (AR=54%)  0.915  0.979  0.977  0.978  0.947  0.977  7 
bad (AR=33%)  0.938  0.980  0.978  0.964  0.959  0.971 
good (AR=82%)  0.919  0.980  0.986  0.992  0.950  0.989 
mediocre (AR=54%)  0.946  0.990  0.989  0.989  0.968  0.989  10 
bad (AR=33%)  0.963  0.990  0.990  0.982  0.977  0.986 
good (AR=82%)  0.955  0.993  0.995  0.997  0.974  0.996 
mediocre (AR=54%)  0.973  0.996  0.996  0.996  0.985  0.996  17 
bad (AR=33%)  0.983  0.997  0.996  0.993  0.990  0.995 
good (AR=82%)  0.976  0.998  0.998  0.999  0.987  0.999 
mediocre (AR=54%)  0.987  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.993  0.999  30 
bad (AR=33%)  0.993  0.999  0.999  0.998  0.996  0.998 
Table P: relative accuracy ratios for four different numbers of rating classes, two different ROC-curve 
functions, three different rating quality levels and two different methods for determining rating class 
distributions 
The examinations show, that there is no unequivocal interrelationship between the number of 
rating classes and the information losses compared with a continuous scale rating model, but 
that additional influencing variables have to be considered.  138 
Besides the functional forms of the continuous ROC-curves, which empirically may well be 
described by a mixture of ROCα- and ROCβ-curves
337, see the examinations in Appendix I, re-
sults are strongly influenced by the assumed distributions of corporations among the different 
rating classes – for which, however, practically no empirical information is available, except 
for rating systems with either 7 or 17 classes. 
In the following it is assumed, that the “worst rating classes” are notedly below average 
sized,
338 so that the results of the method with increasing class sizes should reveal more realis-
tic results than the method with equally sized rating classes (see the respective shadings in 
Table P). The results of the method with equal class sizes, though, are relevant in all those 
cases, where the quality of rating models has to be determined based on groups that are 
equally sized by definition. Often each such group embraces exactly 10% of all corporations 
(“decile”), see the respective shadings in Table P.
339  
As a matter of principle, if information losses have to be estimated for a concrete rating 
model, it is advisable to implement the distribution (of corporations among the various rating 
classes) actually observed for this rating model instead of above mentioned methods for parti-
tioning corporations among the various classes. 
As a rule of thumb, it may be stated that by using a 7ary scale information losses of about 3% 
have to be expected in comparison with a continuous rating scale and by using a 17ary scale 
rating losses of about only 0.5%.   
As was already found by procedure I (see beginning of Appendix IV), disproportionate in-
formation losses occur in particular in the worst rating class. 
                                                 
337  For that reason, in Table P mean values that were determined according to the α- and β-methods are espe-
cially shaded and highlighted. 
338  With shares of 3.1% resp. 6.2% in all corporations, rating classes CCC/C (S&P) resp. Caa/C (MOODY’S) are 
clearly underrepresented based on 7ary scales (average class coverage = 1/7 = 14%). On 17ary scales, how-
ever, their shares are roughly equivalent to the average class coverage (1/17 = 5.9%). But if it is accounted 
for, that classes CCC/C resp. Caa/C are actually aggregates of five modified-rating sub classes (CCC+, CCC, 
CCC-, CC, C resp. Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca, C), see S&P (2003b, p.8) and MOODY’S (2004b, p.6), the average 
share of these groups is only 0,6% (S&P) resp. 1,2% (MOODY’S) – which is clearly below average size, too. 
   In the major agencies’ default studies by 2004 CCC/C resp. Caa/C classes were disclosed only in aggregated 
form (see i.e. S&P (2004, p.13f), S&P (2005, p. 18, 31) or MOODY’S (2004, p. 22, 26)).  
  It may be speculated, whether an aggregated disclosure was chosen in order to conceal a rather low discrimi-
native power of the agencies’ ratings within the CCC/C resp. Caa/C group. See on this for instance HAMIL-
TON’s (2004, p. 18) data: the average 3-years-default rates for 1996-2003 [according to ibid, p. 4, alphanu-
meric modifiers for the Caa rating category were introduced in June 1997] for Caa1 (33.4%) is bigger (!) 
than for Caa2 (31.3%), which in turn is bigger (!) than the default rate for Caa3 (24.4%). 
   Only in its most recent default study, see MOODY’S (2005, p. 18), MOODY’S also revealed historical default 
rates for the Caa-subgroups (Caa1, Caa2, and Caa3) and for the aggregated group Ca/C for the 1998 (!)-2004 
period. According to the data given there, the realized default rates behaved very plausibly: PDCaa1 < PDCaa2 
< PDCaa3 < PDCa/C both for 1- and 3-years default rates. [But still questions remain why Ca and C default per-
formance were not revealed separately.] 
339  See on this e.g. MCQUOWN (1993, p. 17), KEALHOFER (2003, p. 35), SHUMWAY (2001, p. 118ff.)  139 
Appendix V: The effect of preselection of portfolios on the 
accuracy of insolvency predictions 
 
Intention: Impacts of “positive preselections” on the accuracy of rating models shall be quan-
tified, which occur when banks reject a certain share of potential customers due to their bad 
solvencies, or if they transfer low solvency (but non-defaulted) existing customers to “special 
asset groups” - but measure the performance of their rating models based on the default be-
havior of the remaining pool of accepted and non-transferred costumers. 
Respective impacts of “negative preselections” shall be determined as well.
340 
 
Further proceedings: Based on the formally analyzable, parametrical ROC-curve functions 
that were developed and empirically tested in Appendices I and IV, it is both formally and 
numerically tested, how preselection (as defined above) affects accuracy measures of rating 
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Figure 47: comparison of a total sample’s and a preselected sample’s ROC-curve, conceptual sketch 
The basic concept of the following analyses is outlined in Figure 47. The ROC-curve of a 
portfolio from which a share d of the corporations with the worst ratings was removed
341 re-
sults from scaling the respective ROC-curve-section (see the hatched area in the left hand il-
lustration) with a vertical scale factor of (1-d)-1 and a horizontal scale factor of (1-ROC(d))-1. 
See also Figure 48 for some numerically obtained examples of ROC-curves for selected 
portfolios, if the complete portfolio’s ROC-curve is modeled by a ROCα-curve with α=0.3.  
                                                 
340  See the remarks on positive and negative preselections of bank portfolios in chapter 3.1.  
341  Strictly speaking, d (see the figure above) states the share of excluded non-defaulters (in all non-defaulters) 
and not the share of excluded corporations (in all corporations). For small average default rates PD, which 
are characteristic for insolvency prediction studies - at least for one-year prediction horizons, not much pre-
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Figure 48: comparison of a total sample’s ROCα-curve (with α=0.3) and preselected samples’ 
ROC-curves for various d (percentages of excluded worst corporations) 
In general, the area under the scaled ROC-curve of a selected portfolio AUCROC,d, is given in 
dependence of the ROC-curve function of the complete portfolio, ROC(x), by: 
F 241) 
() ( ) ()
() ( ) () d ROC 1 d 1









In the following, accuracy ratios are calculated based on AUCROC,d and are accounted for in 
relation to the accuracy ratio of the complete portfolios. ROC-curves are modeled by the for-
mally analyzable ROC-curve-functions ROCα(x)=x
α and ROCβ(x)=1-(1-x)
1/β that were intro-
duced in Appendices I and IV. As was shown in Appendix I, both functions (or better: func-
tion families) represent rather extreme examples of possible ROC-curves. Empirical ROC-
curves can be well described as mixtures of ROCα- and ROCβ-curves, whereby some empiri-
cal ROC-curves are rather complying with α-type and other with β-type ROC-curves.  
While the accuracy of ROC-curves is determined by the parameter α or β (see formulas F 224 
and F 235), α-type ROC-curves are comparatively discriminative in the range of low solvency 
corporations and indiscriminative in the range of good solvency corporations (see Appendix 
I), it is just the opposite way around in case of β-type ROC-curves. 
Therefore, it may be reckoned, that the relative performance of both ROC-curve functions are 
struck unequally when low solvency corporations are sorted out. A more adverse performance 
may be expected for ROCα-curves, because just those corporations are removed from the sam-
ple, where the respective rating models have “comparative advantages” in comparison with 
rating models, whose ROC-curves are better described by β-type ROC-curves. In case of 
sorting out good solvency corporations, ROCα-curves are expected to be less negatively af-
fected than ROCβ-curves.  141 
For α-type ROC-curves following equation holds: 
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According to formula F 8, the accuracy ratio can be derived from AUC as follows: 
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The relative accuracy ratio, ARrel,α,d, which states the accuracy ratio of the preselected portfo-









d , , rel    and thus, in connection with formula F 224, it follows that  
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This term can not be substantially simplified and its derivations with respect to d and α are 
quite intricate. In the following, it is therefore examined only numerically for various combi-
nations of d and α, see Figure 49. 
Thereby it was shown, that relative accuracy ratios of preselected portfolios are the worse (i.e. 
smaller), the more corporations are excluded, which was expected. Relative losses in accuracy 
ratios are the bigger, the more discriminative the respective rating models are, i.e. the smaller 
α is. However, within an interval of realistic α-values (0.1 < α < 0.5, see on this Appendix I 
and IV) results are not differing materially. 
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Figure 49: relative accuracy ratios of preselected portfolios for α-type ROC-curves, subject to 
various parameter values for α and d (share of the excluded “worst” corporations) 
If only 10% of all corporations are excluded, the accuracy ratio of the rating model – meas-
ured on the remaining portfolio – is reduced by more than a half! If 50% of the corporations 
(with the lowest solvencies) are excluded, the measured accuracy of the preselected portfolio 
even reduces to less than the sixth part of the original value.  
In the following, an analog analysis is carried out for β-type ROC-curves. 
For β-type ROC-curves following equation holds: 
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By insertion to formula F 241 for determining AUCROC,d, β it follows that:  
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1
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AUC     for all d, cf. formula F 233 
Therefore, according to the formal analysis, β-type ROC-curves are completely unaffected by 
excluding discretionarily large shares of low solvency corporations, be it 1%, 50% or even 
99% (graphical presentations of the results are set aside for this reason)
342 – while rating mod-
els that can be described by α-type ROC-curves are incurring information losses of over 50% 
when excluding only 10% of the worst corporations. 
The analyses showed, that for preselected portfolios (whereby low solvency corporations 
were sorted out) rating model performance values may either decline materially – or may stay 
completely unaffected. The extent of information losses is mainly determined by whether the 
rating model is either relatively more discriminative in the range of low solvency corporations 
(which means, that its ROC-curve rather conforms to an α-type ROC-curve) or in the range of 
good solvency corporations (which means, that its ROC-curve rather conforms to a β-type 
ROC-curve). 
Subsequently, a crosscheck with empirical data is carried out, that tests whether real rating 
models’ selection sensitivities are actually as diverse as formal analyses imply. In the follow-
ing, three real rating models are examined, which were already used in Appendix I. 
Results are displayed for the ratings of S&P (1981-2003 pool data) and MOODY’S (1983-2003 
pool data), whose ROC-curves are a mixture of α- and β-type ROC-curves but which are 
closer to β-type ROC-curves and for the CREDITREFORM Bonitätsindex Deutschland, whose 
ROC-curve nearly perfectly matches an α-type ROC-curve (see Appendix I). 
                                                 
342  Even rating models are conceivable, whose predictive qualities are improving when lowest solvency corpo-
rations are excluded. See for instance the ROC-curve of a rating model with minimal discriminative power at 
low solvency corporations and maximal discriminative power at good solvency corporations - which implies 
a linear progression of the ROC-curve for low errors of type II until intersecting the 100%-hit-rate-line. If a 
share a, with 0<a<1, of the low solvency corporations is excluded, the remainder portfolio’s ROC-curve still 
rises linearly until it intersects the 100%-hit-rate-line – the slope of this line, however, will be steeper by fac-
tor (1-a)
-1 – and thus its AUCROC and AR will increase.  144 
In the first instance, accuracy ratios of the complete portfolios are calculated according to 
formula F 21, which requires rating class specific data concerning relative frequencies and 
historical default rates. Afterwards, the corporations of the worst (remaining) rating class are 
removed and accuracy ratio calculations for the remainder-portfolio are updated. These steps 
are repeated so long, until the remainder-portfolios are exclusively composed of (homoge-
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Figure 50: relative accuracy ratios of preselected portfolios; excluding corporations with worst 
ratings; based on empirical data of MOODY’S portfolios (1983-2003), S&P’s portfolios (1981-
2003) and CREDITREFORM Bonitätsindex Deutschland (1998-2000), source: own examinations 
As could be expected, the progression of the relative-accuracy-ratio-graph for the CREDIT-
REFORM-Bonitätsindex quite closely matches the progression of ROCα-curves (cf. Figure 49 
for α=0.3). The exclusion of only 10% of the corporations (with the lowest solvencies) re-
duces the accuracy ratio of the CREDITREFORM Bonitätsindex – which is already extremely 
low, see chapter 3.5 – for the preselected portfolio by 50%-60%! 
According to the results for the MOODY’S and S&P’s ratings, exclusions of low solvency cor-
porations of up to 50% of the original sample
343 come along with nearly proportional accu-
racy losses for the remainder portfolio (see the progressions of the relative-accuracy-ratio-
graphs along the secondary diagonal), i.e. an exclusion of 10% of the “worst” corporations in-
duces an accuracy loss of (only) about 10%, an exclusion of 20% of the corporations induces 
an accuracy loss of 20%, etc.  
The aft ranges of the curves are marked by discontinuities that may be evoked by statistical 
artifacts owing to the sparsity of defaults (within one-year prediction horizons) for investment 
grade, in particular for AA and AAA rated corporations.
344 
                                                 
343  The boundary between investment and speculative grade ratings is - based on both major agencies’ pools da-
ta - marginally above 30%. At around 50% starts the domain of A/AA/AAA (resp. A/Aa/Aaa) ratings. 
344  High accuracy ratios based on the remaining portfolios are obtained for both agencies, if all corporations of 
the rating grades BBB+ to CCC/C (resp. Baa1 to Caa/C) are separated out, because historically both for 
MOODY’S and S&P’s ratings only in rating class AA- (resp. Aa3) very few one-year defaults ever occurred,  145 
The decline of relative accuracy ratio values for increasing exclusion rates down to 0% – in 
contrast to the formally derived total selection-insensitivity of “pure” ROCα-curves – may 
also be traced back to the fact, that only rating class specific data was available, which im-
plies that at the latest when only one rating class is left, the remaining portfolio’s accuracy ra-
tio must equal zero.  
For the sake of completeness, in the following consequences on prediction accuracies (based 
on the remaining portfolios) in case of sorting out corporations with the best ratings are exam-
ined, too. These investigations are relevant for instance for investors, who intentionally spe-
cialize on low solvency corporations or for banks, if they don’t succeed in acquiring cos-
tumers with excellent solvencies. 
If u % of the “worst” corporations remain in the portfolio (in the following u is herein after 
referred to as “cut-off value”), the area under the scaled ROC-curve of the selected portfolio, 
AUCROC,u, subject to the ROC-curve of the complete portfolio is given by: 
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For α-type curves it holds that: 
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AUC u ,  for all u (cf. formula F 222)! 
The results imply, that in case of α-type ROC-curves, excluding any fraction of the best sol-
vency customers does not result in accuracy losses – irrespective of u and α (graphical presen-
tations of the results are set aside for this reason). 
For β-type curves it holds that: 
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but never (at least not in 1981-2003 resp. 1983-2003) in the other rating classes AA, AA+, and AAA (resp. 
Aa2, Aa1, and Aaa). If in the next step corporations of rating class AA- (Aa3) are removed, prognosis accu-
racy sinks to zero, because all remaining rating classes are characterized by the same realized (one-year) de-
fault rate.  146 
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The accuracy ratio is given by (cf. formula F 248): 
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Subsequently, this term is numerically determined and plotted for various u and β, see the fol-
lowing Figure 51. It appears, that relative accuracy ratios of the selected portfolios are the 
worse (lower) the more good-solvency corporations are excluded, i.e. the lower the cut-off 
value u is. Relative accuracy losses are the smaller, the more selective a rating model is, i.e. 
the smaller β is. In case of highly selective models (β ≥0.1) relative accuracy starts decreasing 
materially only for very small u-values, i.e. when very many of the best corporations are ex-
cluded. In the relevant range (for large u and small α or β) it turns out, that selection sensitiv-
ity with respect to ROC-curve shapes is considerable lower than in case of excluding corpora-
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Figure 51: relative accuracy ratios of preselected portfolios for β-type ROC-curves, subject to 
various parameter values for β and u (cut-off value) 
Again, selection sensitivity of three real rating models is determined based on empirical data, 
see Figure 52. Contrary to the proceedings described above, not the respective worst rating 
are removed step by step, but the respective best rating classes. 
The results found empirically may quite well be explicated by the theoretical analyses. In case 
of CREDITREFORM Bonitätsindex Deutschland, whose ROC-curve nearly perfectly matches an 
α-type ROC curve, the (considerably low) accuracy virtually stays constant when measured 
on the remaining portfolio – even when up to 80% of the corporations with the best solvencies 
are sorted out! Only if more than 80% are sorted out, relative accuracy decreases noticeably – 
which is also due to the fact, that the empirical analyses are employing rating class specific 
data (concerning relative frequencies and default rates) and not continuous or quasi-
continuous individual scores. If only one rating class remains, relative accuracy measured on 
the remaining portfolios must sink to zero. 
The curve progression of relative accuracy ratios for S&P’s and MOODY’S ratings, whose 
ROC-curves rather match β-type ROC-curves, can be explained quite well by a curve pro-
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Figure 52: relative accuracy ratios of preselected portfolios; excluding corporations with best rat-
ings; based on empirical data of MOODY’S portfolios (1983-2003), S&P’s portfolios (1981-2003) 
and CREDITREFORM Bonitätsindex Deutschland (1998-2000), source: own examinations  
Overall, empirically and theoretically derived results permit the conclusion, that sorting out 
corporations with good solvencies induces clearly less dramatic and under-proportional accu-
racy losses (when measuring predictive quality of rating models based on the remaining port-
folios) than in case of sorting out corporations with the worst solvencies.  
As a rough rule of thumb it may be stated, that each percent of excluded corporations with 
good solvencies comes along with accuracy losses (measured on the remaining portfolio) of 
about ¼ percent. That is, excluding 20% of the best rated corporations from a portfolio will 
reduced measured accuracy by (only) 5% and excluding 40% of all corporations will reduce 
measured accuracy by (only) 10% or less.  
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